On Point: a. Found

Martin Woolley v. Rednour, 7th Cir No. 10-3550, 12/14/12

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Review – Issue Left Unaddressed by State Court

Where, on state (Illinois) postconviction review of an IAC claim, the trial court ruled that counsel’s performance had been deficient but not prejudicial, and the state appellate court affirmed solely on the basis of prejudice without reaching deficient performance, habeas review of counsel’s performance is de novo (that is,

seventh circuit decision (html) (90-page pdf download: here), granting habeas relief in 904 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. 2009)

A significant decision in several respects – not least, attorney performance – that a summary post cannot hope to capture, save broad highlights. Executive summary: Harris was convicted of killing her 4-year-old son Jaquari, against a defense of accidental death (self-strangulation with an elastic band). The defense had potential,

seventh circuit decision

Habeas Procedure – Appellate Jurisdiction 

Where a party has filed a timely notice of appeal to a judgment, and the district court subsequently enters an amended judgment nunc pro tunc (“now for then”) conforming language in the original judgment, an amended notice of appeal isn’t necessary to confer appellate jurisdiction:

… The district court’s February 3, 2012 judgment thus had retroactive legal effect back to August 26,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, affirming habeas grant following remand in 539 F.3d 766 (further case history: here)

Habeas Review – Evidentiary Hearing 

The rule of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), that 2254(d)(1) review is limited to the state-court record, doesn’t apply where the state court didn’t address a component part of the claim (here, 

State v. Troy D. Jefferson, 2011AP1778-CR, District 1, 6/26/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Counsel was ineffective for failing to inform the sentencing court “about Jefferson’s good character and positive social history.”

 ¶17      Specifically, trial counsel’s failure to inform the trial court about Jefferson’s good character and positive social history in any meaningful way was deficient because it was not,

Michael B. v. Marcy M., 2011AP2846, District 2, 5/16/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marcy M.: Jane S. Earle; case activity

By responding (inadequately) to a TPR motion for summary judgment on grounds with a letter rather than evidence such as an affidavit, counsel provided ineffective assistance.

¶10      We disagree that counsel’s performance was “not ineffective.”  In the face of summary judgment that would deprive Marcy of a jury determination on her failure to assume parental responsibility,

State v. Ralph S. Stewart, 2011AP1424-CR, District 1, 5/15/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Stewart: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Counsel’s failure to impeach police officers, with their own reported statements, was deficient:

¶17      While matters of trial strategy are generally left to counsel’s professional judgment, counsel may be found ineffective if the strategy was objectively unreasonable.  See State v.

State v. Anthony L. Prineas, 2012 WI App 2 (recommended for publication), reissued after initial decision withdrawn; for Prineas: Robert R. Henak; case activity; prior history: State v. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, 316 Wis. 2d 414, 766 NW.2d 206

Evidence – Prior Inconsistent Statements 

Evidence of complainant KAC’s statements made during an alleged sexual assault were admissible as prior inconsistent statements,

State v. David W. Domke, 2011 WI 95, reversing unpublished decision; for Domke: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Although Domke establishes deficient performance in several different respects, he fails to satisfy his burden of showing prejudice.

• Failure to object to hearsay testimony / medical treatment and diagnosis exception inapplicable to counselors and social workers.

State v. Edward Beck, 2010AP872-CR, District 4, 10/20/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Circuit court is under no obligation to seek extension of the § 809.30(2) limitation period for its ruling on a postconviction motion.

¶6        Beck reads too much into the 2001 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(i).  The amendment simply added language to § 809.30(2)(i) specifying the entities that may request an extension,