On Point: 1. Deficient performance

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

Kenosha County DHS v. M.M.B., 2019AP1776 & 1777, 1/22/20, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. is the father of two children, each of whom has a serious genetic disorder that threatens normal brain growth and function. The disorder can’t be cured but it can be controlled by adherence to a ketogenic diet. Both children were adjudicated CHIPS due to M.M.B.’s asserted inability to provide for their special needs; he allegedly does not believe that they have the disorder and does not comprehend the recommended diet. He also, per the county, doesn’t respond to their emotional needs in appropriate ways.

State v. A.M., 2019AP475-476, District 1, 1/3/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is A.M.’s pro se appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to her two children. The briefs are confidential, and the court of appeals states that it had difficulty discerning her arguments.  She appears to have argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the circuit court erred in determining the best interests of her children.

State v. Toby J. Vandenberg, 2018AP1810-CR, District 3, 12/23/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vandenberg pled no contest to OWI 7th. The state agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at four years of confinement and four years of extended supervision. At sentencing Vandenberg’s lawyer, while saying there was “a strong argument there’s a mandatory minimum of three years’ incarceration,” nonetheless argued for probation. (¶¶6-11). Was counsel ineffective for making that argument? Nope.

State v. N.M.A.-S., 2018AP2308-09, 12/17/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR case involves a mom with a substance abuse problem and her daughter  who had ingested morphine.  At the trial on grounds, defense counsel asked the jury pool: “Is there anyone that believes that someone who is struggling with an addiction currently is not fit to parent their children?”

State v. Robert C. Washington, 2018AP1771-CR, District 1, 10/8/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Washington was convicted of first degree reckless homicide and first degree reckless injury for shooting his two sons, killing one and injuring the other. He argues his lawyer was ineffective for advising him to plead without discussing possible lesser included offense possibilities and for failing to advocate for him at sentencing. He also argues newly discovered evidence shows the shootings were accidental, not reckless.

State v. Johnalee A. Kawalec, 2017AP798, 7/24/19, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

We’ve questioned the blanket claim that a lawyer can’t be ineffective for failing to argue an unsettled proposition of law. Here we have the sort of case for which the general rule makes some sense. Kawalec was charged with theft by a bailee under Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). She was the holder of a joint bank account with the alleged victim; the victim had given her a power of attorney but the relationship fell apart and she was accused of having used some of the funds for her own benefit, rather than abiding by the prohibition on self-dealing inherent in the POA.

State v. Tyrus Lee Cooper, 2016AP375-CR, 6/20/19, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)

Cooper moved for pre-sentencing plea withdrawal and filed an OLR grievance because his lawyer failed to provide him with discovery, contact witnesses, and communicate with him. Days before trial, his unprepared lawyer misled him about the strength of the State’s case and rushed him into a plea. The circuit court denied Cooper’s motion, but OLR later concluded that the lawyer committed 19 acts of misconduct, 5 directly relating to Cooper’s plea. Consequently, SCOW suspended his license. Now, in 4-3 decision SCOW holds that the lawyer’s professional misconduct does not satisfy the requirements for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

You don’t have to say that 3 times fast . . . or slow. We all know it’s true. Here is a study that confirms the point. While the article focuses on death penalty cases, its conclusions apply broadly. Want to challenge Strickland? This article is a place to start.

State v. Robert Brian Spencer, 2017AP1722-CR, 4/16/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Spencer raised many issues on appeal: insufficient evidence to support his conviction, multiple ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and a Brady violation. This post focuses on the 2 most interesting claims: ineffective assistance for failure to move to suppress evidence obtain via a no-knock warrant and the DA’s failure to turn over evidence of an officer’s disciplinary history.