On Point: Machner Hearing

State v. David J. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, reversing unpublished decision; for Balliette: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Balliette’s pro se § 974.06 motion, asserting ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failing to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, was insufficiently pleaded to require an evidentiary hearing.

Unless you’re an appellate specialist or a masochist –

State v. Jimmie C. Grayer, 2010AP1749-CR, District 1, 6/1/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Grayer: Bridget E. Boyle; case activity

Postconviction denial of ineffective assistance of counsel challenge without Machner hearing upheld.

1. Although counsel performed deficiently by inaccurately telling the jury in his opening statement that Grayer’s in-custody had not been recorded by the police, Grayer wasn’t prejudiced by the deficiency.

State v. Sidney Clark, 2010AP790, District 1, 2/23/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Clark: John A. Pray; case activity

Clark can’t show prejudice from the deficient performance he alleges, therefore he isn’t entitled to a Machner hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶21      A postconviction hearing is necessary to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See State v.

decision below: summary order (not posted); case information here; prior appeal: 2001AP2527-CR; for Balliette: Steven D. Grunder, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue (from AG’s petition for review):

Is an evidentiary hearing into the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel required in every case where the § 974.06 motion merely makes the conclusory allegation that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising additional challenges to the effectiveness of trial counsel on direct review?

State v. Timothy Ray Anderson, 2009AP2416-CR, District 1, 8/17/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Jeremy C. Perri; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Anderson’s postconviction motion for plea withdrawal, on the ground he didn’t understand that a charge “dismissed outright” could nonetheless be considered at sentencing, was properly denied without hearing. The circuit expressly denied that the dismissed charge was factored into the sentence,