On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

State v. Carrie E. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, 2/13/20 modifying and affirming an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2017AP2265; case activity (including briefs)

This case is the companion to State v. Coffee, which, though argued on the same day, came out a few weeks earlier and failed, in particularly confusing fashion, to announce any binding rule. This case does make a rule:

We conclude that where previously unknown information is raised by the circuit court at the sentencing hearing, a defendant does not forfeit a direct challenge to the use of the information by failing to object at he sentencing hearing. Under the facts of this case, Counihan appropriately raised the alleged error in a postconviction motion.

(¶4).

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

State v. George E. Savage, 2019AP90-CR, District 1, 1/22/20 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted, 5/19/20; case activity (including briefs)

Savage pleaded guilty to violating the sex offender registry statute for not providing updated information about where he was residing. He moved to withdraw his plea, asserting his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him he had a defense to the charge under State v. Dinkins, 2012 WI 24, 339 Wis. 2d 78, 810 N.W.2d 787. The circuit court rejected the claim based on an erroneous understanding of Dinkins, so it has to reassess Savage’s claim.

Kenosha County DHS v. M.M.B., 2019AP1776 & 1777, 1/22/20, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.M.B. is the father of two children, each of whom has a serious genetic disorder that threatens normal brain growth and function. The disorder can’t be cured but it can be controlled by adherence to a ketogenic diet. Both children were adjudicated CHIPS due to M.M.B.’s asserted inability to provide for their special needs; he allegedly does not believe that they have the disorder and does not comprehend the recommended diet. He also, per the county, doesn’t respond to their emotional needs in appropriate ways.

State v. A.M., 2019AP475-476, District 1, 1/3/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This is A.M.’s pro se appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to her two children. The briefs are confidential, and the court of appeals states that it had difficulty discerning her arguments.  She appears to have argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the circuit court erred in determining the best interests of her children.

State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2017AP880-W, 2019 WI 110, affirming a court of appeals unpublished memorandum opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Two weeks ago, we posted “SCOW holds defendants abandoned by counsel to same standards as licensed lawyers,” calling State v. Pope “the most absurd decision this term (still time for worse).” Behold an even more absurd decision: even teenagers who read at 2nd grade level are held to the same standard as licensed lawyers. And, sadly, there’s still time for worse.

State v. Antonio L. Bell, 2018AP1593 & 1594, 12/27/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bell pleaded to two sexual assaults: one of his 9-year-old daughter and one of his 14-year-old stepdaughter. He maintained his innocence but insisted that he would plead to spare them from testifying. After sentencing, he filed postconviction motions alleging his counsel didn’t sufficiently investigate the possibility that the 14-year-old’s boyfriend was the actual perpetrator, and also that there was newly-discovered evidence in the form of a more detailed recantation by the 9-year-old: she now also said it was the boyfriend who’d assaulted her. The circuit court denied both without a hearing, but the court of appeals now says Bell should have a chance to prove his claims.

State v. Toby J. Vandenberg, 2018AP1810-CR, District 3, 12/23/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vandenberg pled no contest to OWI 7th. The state agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at four years of confinement and four years of extended supervision. At sentencing Vandenberg’s lawyer, while saying there was “a strong argument there’s a mandatory minimum of three years’ incarceration,” nonetheless argued for probation. (¶¶6-11). Was counsel ineffective for making that argument? Nope.

State v. N.M.A.-S., 2018AP2308-09, 12/17/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR case involves a mom with a substance abuse problem and her daughter  who had ingested morphine.  At the trial on grounds, defense counsel asked the jury pool: “Is there anyone that believes that someone who is struggling with an addiction currently is not fit to parent their children?”