On Point: 8. Counsel, 6th Am.

State v. Demetrius M. Boyd, 2011 WI App 25; for Boyd: Rebecca Robin Lawnicki; case activity; Boyd BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Request for New Counsel

An indigent defendant doesn’t have the right to counsel of choice, but does have the right to counsel with whom he or she can communicate effectively. When an indigent defendant requests change of counsel,

Harrington v. Richter, USSC No. 09-587, 1/19/11, reversing grant of habeas relief, in 578 F. 3d 944

The 9th Circuit failed to give sufficient deference to the state court’s determination that Richter received adequate representation, requiring reversal of it grant of AEDPA-2254 habeas relief. The principal thrust of the opinion relates to the standard of review, both as to AEDPA habeas generally and ineffective-assistance claims more particularly.

Premo v. Moore, USSC No. 09-659, 1/19/11, vacating grant of habeas relief, in 574 F.3d 1092

Moore, who admitted brutalizing the victim and shooting him in the temple, accepted a plea bargain on advice of counsel: he pleaded guilty to felony-murder, and received the minimum allowable sentence, thus avoiding a capital-offense charge. He raised a postconviction challenge to counsel’s failure to seek suppression of his statement to the police,

State v. Charles R. Black, 2009AP2036-CR, District 4, 1/13/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Black: Devon M. Lee, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity; Black BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Expert Opinion – “Jensen” Testimony – Failure to Object

An expert may testify that a complainant’s behavior is consistent with a sexual assault victim’s,

Thomas Vitrano v. Milwaukee Police Department, 2010AP1987, District 1, 1/11/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity; Resp. Br.

footnote 2:

We note with some frustration that neither party included a single citation to the record in their respective briefs in violation of Wis. Stat. Rule 809.19(1)(d).  Record cites are helpful to the court and are required even when the record is not voluminous. 

Docket

Decision below (311 S.W.3d 350, Mo. Ct. App)

Question Presented:

Contrary to the holding in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)–which held that a defendant must allege that, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would have gone to trial–can a defendant who validly pleads guilty successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging instead that,

Docket

Decision below (CTA6)

Questions Presented:

Anthony Cooper faced assault with intent to murder charges. His counsel advised him to reject a plea offer based on a misunderstanding of Michigan law. Cooper rejected the offer, and he was convicted as charged. Cooper does not assert that any error occurred at the trial. On habeas review, the Sixth Circuit found that because there is a reasonable probability that Cooper would have accepted the plea offer had he been adequately advised,

State v. Kenneth B. Bonner, 2010AP1414-CR, District 1, 12/28/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Bonner: Dennis P. Coffey; case activity; Bonner BiC; State Resp.

Counsel – Waiver

The trial court’s waiver colloquy omitted two required components: assurance that the defendant made a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel, and was aware of the difficulties and dangers of self-representation,

State v. Charles A. Bouc, 2010AP180, District 2, 12/22/10

court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Bouc: Adam Walsh; case activity; Bouc BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Effective Assistance – Plea Advice

Counsel did not fall short of normative performance standards, where he weighed with his client the pros and cons of admissibility of potentially crucial evidence;

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Nikola P. Kostich, 2010 WI 136

Counsel publicly reprimanded for “a clear conflict of interest,” SCR 20:1.9(a): sexual assault victim had consulted counsel about suing his assailant, and counsel later represented assailant in criminal case involving number of victims including the one who had consulted him. The matters were “the same or … substantially related”; the interests of the subsequent client was “materially adverse”