On Point: G. Sanctions

Godfrey & Kahn, S.C. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 2012 WI App 120(recommended for publication); case activity

A court doesn’t possess inherent authority to impose on counsel a sanction (here, monetary) for pre-litigation advice, that is, conduct occurring before the court’s jurisdiction was invoked:

¶3        We conclude that the record, particularly the trial court’s own words in its ruling, clearly shows that the trial court imposed the sanction for pre-litigation legal advice that the trial court believed Godfrey &

7th circuit decision, imposing discipline 

Sanctions – Abandonment of Client 

It is apparent from this final motion for additional time that Boyle-Saxton elected to put work for other clients ahead of her obligations to Rodriguez and this court. That is unprofessional; lawyers have an ethical obligation to take no more work than they can perform. …

…

She is unfit to practice law in this court.

State v. Luke T. Nirmaier, 2011AP1355-CR, District 3, 12/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nirmaier: Michael M. Rajek; case activity

The odor of alcohol on Nirmaier following a traffic accident resulting in substantial bodily injury triggered the implied consent law, notwithstanding absence of probable cause to arrest at that point:

¶9        Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3) outlines different scenarios in which an officer may invoke the implied consent law and request a chemical test of an individual’s breath,

Nielsen sanction after show cause (summary order, not citable), on remand from State v. Nielsen, 2011 WI 94

Sanction for Incomplete Brief Appendix 

The appellant’s brief argued that the circuit court failed to fulfill the mandate articulated in State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, to explain the rationale for the particular sentence imposed.

In the Matter of Sanctions in: State v. Gregory K. Nielsen, 2011 WI 94, remanding sanctions order; for State Public Defender: Joseph N. Ehmann; case activity; subsequent history: sanction re-imposed on remand

Monetary sanction summarily ordered by court of appeals against appellate counsel for allegedly violating appendix-content rule reversed, with following “suggestion” for procedure to be followed in such situations:

¶5   Considering the interests of the court of appeals,

seventh circuit court of appeals decision

Inadequate Argumentation – Sanction 

Counsel’s woefully inadequate argumentation (“a single, underdeveloped legal argument” that, “(w)orse yet … was foreclosed by” prior precedent) not only dooms his client’s effort to resist deportation, notwithstanding palpable equities on her side, but has consequences for counsel himself:

… We are disturbed, however, by Baniassadi’s perfunctory performance. People in Wroblewska’s position face life-changing consequences from their immigration proceedings.

Estate of Brianna Kriefall v. Sizzler USA Franchise, Inc., 2011 WI App 101

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity

¶24 n. 7:

On page 36 of its brief responding to Excel’s main appellate brief, E&B asserts:  “[n]ot a single non-Kriefall [Pierringer] settlement agreement” is in the Record.  That is not true, as Excel’s reply brief points out.  

State v. Marilee Devries, 2011 WI App 78 (recommended for publication); for Devries: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

OWI – Repeater – Proof, Prior “Conviction”

Certified copies of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions established adequate proof of prior OWI “connvictions,” § 343.307(1)(d).

¶9        When Wisconsin’s driving laws provide for the enhancement of penalties for a current offense based on prior offenses, the State must present “‘competent proof’” of those earlier offenses.  

State v. Allen L. Resch, 2010AP2321-CR, District 2, 4/27/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Resch: Christopher Lee Wiesmueller, Corinne N. Wiesmueller; case activity

Reasonable suspicion supported investigatory stop for possible burglary, where vehicle was parked in private business parking lot at 2:26 a.m., with engine running and lights off.

¶13      Specifically, as the trial court indicated, the time of day is an important factor in determining whether a law enforcement officer had a reasonable suspicion. 

State v. George McGee, 2010AP3040-CR, District 3, 4/26/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for McGee: Steven G. Richards; case activity

McGee’s collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction used to enhance his present sentence is necessarily limited to denial of the constitutional right to counsel, ¶5. Although McGee represented himself in the challenged prior, he failed to show that his waiver of counsel was invalid.