On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. K.K.E., 2019AP115-117; 9/24/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court terminated K.K.E.’s parental rights based on the best interests of her three daughters. On appeal, K.K.E. conceded that the trial court addressed the 6 “best interests of the child” factors required by §48.426(3). But she challenged the weight the trial court assigned to each factor. In affirming, the court of appeals explains how a trial court’s weighing of these factors is virtually unassailable on appeal.

State v. Troy K. Kettlewell, 2018AP926, 9/18/2019, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is a very fact-intensive OWI case and the court is to be commended for really critically examining what all these facts add up to: not much. As in, not much reason to think Kettlewell was in any danger, so no good reason to go into his house without a warrant.

State v. Tyler J. Yost, 2018AP2251-CR, 9/18/19, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Loose lips sink ships. They can also land you in jail for another year. That’s what happened to Yost when he and other inmates started bad mouthing their probation agent while chilling in the common area of the Waukesha County Jail. Yost allegedly called his agent a “bitch” and said that when he got out he was going to “crimp her brake lines,” and he didn’t care if her kids or family were in the car. 

State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)

Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers.  The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution  and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period  on Count 2 would be revoked.

State v. Taurus Donnell Renfro, 2019AP193, 9/17/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Renfro was a passenger in a car stopped by the police. He was riding from his old residence to his parents’ house–he was moving in with them. When asked, he told the officers that he was carrying a gun in his pocket, and that he didn’t have a concealed-carry permit. A jury convicted him of violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23.

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

State v. Eric L. Vanremortel, 2018AP417, 9/4/19, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanremortel was charged with disorderly conduct for an incident in which he followed the wife of a retired police officer in her car, then repeatedly got out of his own car and shouted at her. The state sought to admit evidence of three prior incidents involving Vanremortel following and/or shouting at police officers, including one that happened a few weeks before the charged conduct and involved the wife’s retired-officer husband. The circuit court admitted the evidence, finding it satisfied the test of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), and Vanremortel appeals.

State v. T.L.G., 5018AP1291, 9/4/19, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T.L.G., who is cognitively limited, appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son. During the proceedings below her lawyer requested a competency evaluation; eventually the court appointed T.L.G. a guardian ad litem. T.L.G. ultimately pleaded no-contest to the asserted ground of continuing CHIPS, and her rights were terminated.

Dane County v. N.W., 2019AP48, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

N.W. entered a written stipulation to extend his Chapter 51 involuntary mental commitment. On appeal he argued that due process required the circuit court to conduct a colloquy to determine whether he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily agreed to the extension before approving it. Ironically, the court of appeals held that in Chapter 51 cases–where a person’s mental capacity to make treatment decisions is directly at issue–circuit courts have no obligation to inquire whether he knows that he is voluntarily agreeing to an involuntary commitment for treatment.

State v. Richard Rusk, 2019AP135-CR, 8/29/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Rusk because he believed that tinting on the windshield of Rusk’s vehicles extended so far down as to violate Wis. Admin § Trans 305.34(6)(c)(May 2014). Rusk argued that this was a mistake of law because the rule was invalid and moved to suppress evidence of an OWI 3rd. He lost the circuit court, and loses again on appeal.