On Point blog, page 113 of 485
Judge’s comments at start of restitution hearing showed objective bias
State v. Deshawn J. Driver, 2018AP870-CR, District 1, 2/26/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At the start of Driver’s restitution hearing, before hearing testimony from any witness, the judge told defense counsel on the record that the victim’s word “is more credible than your client’s words[.]” Later in the hearing, when defense counsel told the judge that Driver and his co-defendant did not see “a lot” of the items the victim claimed were in the stolen car, the trial court said it would “take that without their testimony” and added, “That’s why I didn’t give them a chance to say it.” Does that show “objective bias”? You bet it does.
Sentencing judge could conclude defendant made choice to kill despite stipulation to adequate provocation
State v. Ashlee A. Martinson, 2017AP1889-CR, District 3, 2/20/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Martinson was charged with two counts of first-degree intentional homicide for killing her mother and stepfather. She pled to second-degree intentional homicide based on her claim of adequate provocation, which is premised on a complete lack of self-control, § 939.44(1)(a). That mitigating defense didn’t preclude the sentencing court from basing its sentence on the conclusion the defendant “had a choice” whether to kill the victims.
Defense win on soliciting reckless injury versus soliciting reckless endangerment of safety
State v. Kelly James Kloss, 2019 WI App 13, petition and cross petition for review granted, 6/11/19, petitions dismissed as improvidently granted, 3/6/20; case activity (including briefs)
Bad news first: Addressing an issue of first impression, the court of appeals held that Wisconsin now recognizes the crime of solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury. Good news: Solicitation of 1st degree recklessly endangering safety is a lesser included offense of solicitation of 1st degree reckless injury, which means that convicting a defendant of both violates multiplicity principles and Double Jeopardy. Defense wins!
Judge’s acceptance of Facebook “friend” request from litigant created appearance of bias
Timothy W. Miller v. Angela L. Carroll, 2019 WI App 10, petition for review granted, 8/14/19, affirmed, 2020 WI 56; case activity (including briefs)
After a contested hearing between Miller and Carroll about custody and physical placement of their child, and before issuing a decision, the circuit judge accepted a Facebook “friend” request from Carroll. Miller argued the circuit court demonstrated objective bias by doing so. The court of appeals agrees.
Defense win! Circuit court erroneously denied State’s motion to dismiss and then to amend charge
State v. Esmeralda Rivera-Hernandez, 2018AP311-312-CR, 2/20/19, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
DAs have almost limitless discretion in deciding whether to initiate a prosecution. But their discretion to terminate a prosecution is subject to independent review by the circuit court, which must consider the public’s interest in: (1) the proper enforcement of its laws, and (2) deferring to the prosecutor’s legitimate discretion. See State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 45, 270 N.W.2d 170 (1978). In this case, the court of appeals holds the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it considered (1) but not (2).
Defendant must testify to prove that, but for counsel’s advice to plead, he would have gone to trial
State v. Jeninga, 2019 WI App 14; case activity (including briefs)
Jeninga asserted that he would not have pled guilty to a weak child sexual assault charge if his trial counsel had filed an obvious motion to suppress child porn on his cell phone. Trial counsel, who missed the suppression issue, testified that the child porn caused to her to advise Jeninga to plead guilty, and he followed her advice. The court of appeals says trial counsel’s testimony was not enough to prove prejudice. Jeninga had to testify himself.
Partial summary judgment, best interests determination upheld
D.R. v. B.D., 2018AP1731 & 2018AP1732, District 3, 2/20/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
B.D.’s challenges to the order terminating his parental rights come up short.
Victim’s failure to wear seatbelt doesn’t diminish OWI defendant’s culpability
State v. Pierre Deshawn Johnson, 2018AP595-CR, 2/12/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Johnson pled to operating a vehicle with a suspended license and injury by operating under the influence of a controlled substance. His lead issue–whether the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was a significant intervening factor that diminished his culpability and warranted a new sentence–failed based on State v. Turk, 154 Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163.
To prove misdemeanor bail jumping, State must show defendant was arrested, not charged, with a misdemeanor
State v. Melodie Cheree Taylor, 2018AP1953-CR, 2/14/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In a misdemeanor prosecution under §946.49(1)(a) is the State required to prove that, before jumping bail, the defendant had been charged with a misdemeanor? Or may the State simply prove that the defendant had been released from custody under 969 after an arrest for a misdemeanor?
Court of appeals affirms extension of stop and OWI 4th for impairment from prescription medication
State v. James R. Mueller, 2018AP44-CR, 2/12/19, District 3 (1-judge opinion, eligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).
Mueller conceded that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him. He argued that the officer extended the stop based on a “hunch” and that his FSTs results did not provide probable cause for arrest or sufficient evidence to convict him because they test for impairment by alcohol, not prescription meds.