On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Ryan L. Schultz, 2017AP603-CR, 12/20/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).

Schultz was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content 2nd offense. He sought suppression of his blood test results on the grounds that the warrant-issuing judge lacked probable cause, or alternatively, that Officer Halfmann’s application omitted facts that would have undermined a finding of probable cause. On appeal, Schultz lost both arguments.

State v. Darrin K. Taylor, 2016AP1956 & 1957, 12/20/2017, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor was convicted at trial of seventeen charges related to sexual assault of a child, S.F. On appeal he attacks only his conviction for causing mental harm to a child and the associated bail-jumping count. He argues the evidence was insufficient to show that S.F. suffered “mental harm” as it is defined in the statute, or that his post-assault contact with her was a substantial cause of said harm.

State v. Neil R. Hebert, 2016AP2168, 12/19/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

That’s the long and short of it. The circuit court held the officer, who had pulled Hebert over for speeding,  unlawfully extended the stop to investigate an OWI, but the court of appeals reverses. 

State v. Antonio Johnson, 2018 WI App 2; case activity (including briefs)

Under § 973.155(1)(a) a convicted offender is entitled to credit for “all days spent in custody” in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence is imposed. So what’s a “day” for credit purposes? Any part of a calendar day, as Johnson claims? Or a continuous twenty-four-hour period, as the state asserts? Based on supreme court cases dealing with credit, the court of appeals agrees with Johnson that it is any part of a calendar day.

State v. Bobby Lopez, 2017AP923-CR, District 2, 2/13/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In order to be “within” the 10-year period under § 346.65(2)(am)2., the subsequent offense must occur before the tenth anniversary of the prior offense. Thus, Lopez’s July 9, 2016, OWI offense is not “within [the] 10-year period” that began on July 9, 2006, the date of his prior offense, and he can’t be charged with second-offense OWI.

State v. Travis J. Rose, 2018 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)

A police officer investigating reports of Rose’s erratic driving concluded Rose was not intoxicated by alcohol, but continued to detain him and, after securing consent, searched Rose’s car, where he found narcotics. The court of appeals holds the officer’s continued detention of Rose, and thus the consent to search the car, were lawful because the officer had reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation.

State v. S.N.N., 2016AP2102 & 2016AP2103, District 1, 12/12/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

S.N.N. admitted the continuing CHIPS ground that was alleged in the TPR petition regarding her two children. The court of appeals rejects her claim that her admission was not knowing and voluntary.

State v. Bradley E. Ammann, 2017AP866-CR, 12/7/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A state trooper stopped Ammann for speeding as he and his wife were driving home from a wedding reception. The trooper asked Amman to exit the car and then smelled intoxicants on him. This led to field sobriety tests and then a preliminary breath test showing that Ammann had an .068 alcohol concentration. He almost escaped with a mere citation for speeding except the trooper had to go and check his driving record.

State v. Lonnie S. Sorenson, 2016AP1540-CR, 12/5/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Sorenson appeals jury-trial convictions for operating with a PAC and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was also found guilty of operating with a detectable amount of THC in his blood, but this was dismissed by operation of statute. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(am). He raises ineffective assistance, pretrial discovery, and confrontation issues, but the court rejects them all.

State v. D.C., 2016AP2229-2230, District 1, 11/30/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

During the grounds phase of her TPR proceeding, D.C.’s lawyer asked the trial court to: (1) instruct the jury that she was prohibited from having visitation with her children for a period of time, and (2) give curative instructions that it was impossible for her to perform a condition for return of her kids and to assume parental responsibility due to her incarceration.  The court planned to rule on these requests just before trial, but, oops, that did not happen.