On Point blog, page 141 of 485
Extension of stop, FSTs okay, no reversal for error of law regarding probable cause for PBT
State v. Bradley E. Ammann, 2017AP866-CR, 12/7/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A state trooper stopped Ammann for speeding as he and his wife were driving home from a wedding reception. The trooper asked Amman to exit the car and then smelled intoxicants on him. This led to field sobriety tests and then a preliminary breath test showing that Ammann had an .068 alcohol concentration. He almost escaped with a mere citation for speeding except the trooper had to go and check his driving record.
Court of appeals rejects assorted challenges to drunk driving conviction
State v. Lonnie S. Sorenson, 2016AP1540-CR, 12/5/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Sorenson appeals jury-trial convictions for operating with a PAC and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was also found guilty of operating with a detectable amount of THC in his blood, but this was dismissed by operation of statute. See Wis. Stat. § 346.63(2)(am). He raises ineffective assistance, pretrial discovery, and confrontation issues, but the court rejects them all.
COA rejects ineffective of assistance of trial counsel claim due to appellate lawyer’s failure to develop argument on prejudice
State v. D.C., 2016AP2229-2230, District 1, 11/30/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
During the grounds phase of her TPR proceeding, D.C.’s lawyer asked the trial court to: (1) instruct the jury that she was prohibited from having visitation with her children for a period of time, and (2) give curative instructions that it was impossible for her to perform a condition for return of her kids and to assume parental responsibility due to her incarceration. The court planned to rule on these requests just before trial, but, oops, that did not happen.
Quasi-anonymous tip, prolonged stop at at intersection gave reasonable suspicion for stop
State v. Xavier Grullon, 2016AP2404-CR, District 3, 11/28/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A tip from a 911 caller together with an officer’s observations provided reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, holds the court of appeals.
Odor of marijuana is probable cause for search; text messages admissible as “panorama” or “other acts” evidence
State v. Willie Brownlee, Jr., 2015AP2319-CR, 11/21/17, District 1, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Two officers stopped Brownlee after he drove his rental car through a red light. One officer approached the driver’s side, the other approached the passenger side occupied by Brownlee’s friend. Both smelled the distinct odor of burnt marijuana. They ordered Brownlee and his friend out of the car and searched it. Guess what they found in the glove compartment?
Good faith exception to exclusionary rule applies to pre-Rodriquez dog sniff
State v. James R. Stib, 2017AP3-CR, District 2, 11/15/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Stib argues his traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged to conduct a dog sniff under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). Assuming Stib is correct, suppression of the evidence seized after the dog alerted is inappropriate under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule because the dog sniff was conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on then-existing precedent, namely, State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748.
Post-disposition evidence about a change in child’s placement didn’t merit new disposition hearing
State v. R.G., 2017AP1078, District 1, 11/14/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
After R.G.’s parental rights were terminated the child was removed from the care of D.L., the foster parent at the time of the TPR dispositional hearing and prospective adoptive parent, because D.L. was abusing the child. (¶¶5-6). A new disposition hearing isn’t merited because this new evidence wasn’t sufficient to “affect[] the advisability of the court’s original adjudication” under § 48.46(1) and Schroud v. Milw. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 53 Wis. 2d 650, 654, 193 N.W.2d 671 (1972). (¶¶10-15).
Defense evidence properly excluded for lack of foundation
State v. Scott F. Ufferman, 2016AP1774-CR, District 3, 11/14/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Ufferman complains the trial court’s evidentiary rulings improperly stymied his defense against the charge of operating with a detectable amount of THC. The court of appeals holds the trial court’s rulings were correct.
It’s a fact—the defendant’s hair looked “marvelous”!
State v. Keith J. Eggum, 2016AP2036-CR, District 2, 11/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
And that factual finding dooms Eggum’s claim that his “noticeably disheveled” appearance made his trial unfair. Eggum’s complaint about the presence of extra officers for courtroom security fares no better. And topping it all off, Eggum’s First Amendment defense to the disorderly conduct charge makes no headway, either.
State’s summary of expert testimony needn’t specify the subject matter of his testimony
State v. Jamie M. Srb, 2017AP307-CR, 11/9/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Srb objected to the admissibility of his BAC results at his OWI trial in part because the State submitted a summary of expert testimony that failed to indicate that its expert would testify about retrograde extrapolation. See §971.23(1)(e). The court of appeals agreed that the State’s summary contained no information regarding retrograde extrapolation, but held that this level of specificity was not required.