On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2017AP1313-FT, District 3, 11/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

There was sufficient evidence at D.J.W.’s commitment trial to establish he met the standard for dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.d.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, 11/1/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs)

“If you start off on the wrong foot, the footer you go, the wronger it gets.” So said Hank the Cowdog and so, essentially, argues the dissenting opinion in this case.  Section 973.20(1r) allows a sentencing court to order a defendant to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a “crime considered at sentencing,” which means “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.” §973.20(1g)(a). Before ordering restitution, the court must first find a “causal nexus” between the “crime considered at sentencing” and the victim’s alleged damages. Here, the court of appeals finds a “causal nexus” between the lone burglary considered at sentencing and possible losses caused by possible, uncharged prior burglaries that were never considered or read in at sentencing. It does so based upon a series of restitution decisions that have incrementally produced a result the dissent finds absurd.

State v. A.L., 2017 WI App 72, petition for review granted 6/11/18, affirmed, 2019 WI 20; case activity; review granted 6/11/18

The court of appeals holds that § 938.30(5) permits a juvenile court to order the re-evaluation of competency of a juvenile previously found not competent to proceed even though the juvenile was also found not likely to regain competence within the relevant statutory time frame (12 months, or the maximum criminal sentence for the offense, whichever is less).

State v. Micah Nathaniel Reno, 2016AP1371-CR, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Reno’s trial lawyer wanted to call A.A. as a witness at trial. But A.A. had a pending case and A.A.’s lawyer told Reno’s lawyer not to talk to her. Thinking he was barred by the ethics rules from talking to a represented person, Reno’s lawyer didn’t attempt to talk to A.A. or call her as a witness. Trial counsel was ineffective because he was not attempting to talk to A.A. about the subject matter of her case, but only about the subject matter of Reno’s case, and therefore counsel wasn’t barred under the rules of ethics from trying to talk to or call A.A. as a witness.

State v. Gary Lee Wayerski, 2015AP1083-CR, District 3, 10/31/17 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/18, and modified, and afford as modified, 2019 WI 11; case activity (including briefs)

Rejecting Wayerski’s argument to the contrary, the court of appeals holds that a police officer alleged to have sexually assaulted two teenage boys could be convicted under § 948.095(3)(a), which prohibits a person over age 21 “who engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position that requires him or her to work or interact directly with children” from having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a child “whom the person works or interacts through that occupation or volunteer position.” The court also rejects the challenges Wayerski makes to the conduct of his trial.

State v. Eric L. Moore, 2016AP1292-CR, District 1, 10/31/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Moore’s right to confrontation wasn’t violated by the admission of the recording of a 911 call about an incident in which Moore was alleged to have committed battery against A.J. Nor was Moore’s lawyer ineffective for deciding not to elicit information that A.J. later recanted that allegation of battery.

Waushara County v. B.G., 2017AP956, 10/26/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

When the circuit court entered a protective services order for B.G., it did not include any conditions or labels such as “temporary” or “conditional.” It did, however, state that B.G. “does not meet the standards for protective placement.” When B.G. tried to resist services,  the County filed a “Notice of Transfer of Protective Placement” asking the circuit court to remove him from his home and place him in a facility. The court did as asked. The court of appeals now reverses.

State v. Christopher C. Bouchette, 2017AP820-CR, 10/26/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A Wood County officer spotted Bouchette driving “at a higher rate of speed” near the county border.  He followed Bouchette for less than 5 minutes outside of his jurisdiction into Portage County and activated his siren. Bouchette did not pull over. He veered across the center line and drove into a ditch, which led to a search and a charge of driving with a PAC (2nd offense). Bouchette moved to suppress evidence that the officer obtained outside of his jurisdiction.

Dane County DHS v. S.J., 2017AP1578-1580, 10/19/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication) case activity

When an opinion starts by saying a mother answered more than 80 questions relating to her understanding of pleading “no contest” during the grounds phase of a TPR case and quotes the her lawyer as saying “she’s one of the brightest clients I’ve ever worked with,” you know her motion to withdraw her plea is doomed.

State v. James Charleston, 2016AP2116-CR, 10/18/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Charleston was in custody in Illinois and had pending Wisconsin charges. Twice he submitted to his Illinois jailers properly prepared requests for final disposition of those charges under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The first request, in 2014, somehow didn’t make it to the Wisconsin authorities; the second in 2015 did and thus commenced the 180-day clock to try him or dismiss the case with prejudice. But, he wasn’t tried within 180 days, due in part to delays Charleston caused or agreed to. So, no dismissal.