On Point blog, page 145 of 484
“Dazed and confused” and smelling of alcohol = reasonable suspicion of OWI
State v. Denton Ricardo Ewers, 2016AP1671-CR, 8/22/2017, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An employee at Family Dollar called the police to report that man who appeared “dazed and confused” and whose breath smelled of intoxicants had come into the store before leaving in a gold Ford Focus and heading west. An officer looked for the Focus but could not find it. Two hours later, the employee called back to say the same man, still “dazed and confused,” had once again been in the store, and once again had departed to the west in his gold Ford Focus. This time, the officer located the car and stopped it. The driver, Ewers, seemed intoxicated, which he eventually proved to be.
Petitioner isn’t required to present testimony of a physician or psychologist at a ch. 51 extension hearing
Dodge County v. L.A.S., 2017AP302, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under § 51.20(9)(a) the circuit court must appoint two licensed physicians or psychologists to examine and write reports on an individual subject to involuntary commitment proceedings. This requirement applies only to the initial commitment proceeding, not to the proceeding to extend a commitment.
County-imposed conditions for reinstating visits in CHIPS proceedings didn’t violate due process
Monroe County DHS v. T.M., 2017AP875 & 2017AP876, District 4, 8/17/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T.M.’s parental rights were terminated on abandonment grounds under § 48.415(1). (¶¶2-10). She argues this violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cty. DHS v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845, because the period of alleged abandonment included time during which the County suspended her visitation rights based on her failure to satisfy conditions it was impossible for her to meet. (¶14). The court of appeals disagrees.
Can Wisconsin medicate prisoners against their will without first finding them dangerous?
Winnebago County v. C.S., 2016AP1955, 8/16/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.S. argues that §51.61(1)(g) is unconstitutional because it allows the government to administer involuntary medication to a prisoner without a finding of dangerousness. The court of appeals elected not to decide the issue due to mootness, but that seems like a mistake.
When a change in expression amounts to reasonable suspicion for a frisk
State v. Kavin K. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Nesbit ran out of gas on I 94. He and his buddy were walking on the shoulder, red can in hand, to get gas when Deputy Fowles pulled up and told them he’d give them a ride to and from the gas station. But first, he asked them if they had any weapons. The friend said “no.” Nesbit who had been behaving normally “‘all of a sudden’ became ‘very deflated’ and shook his head slightly in the negative.”
Challenges to successive TPR proceeding don’t succeed
State v. K.J. & State v. A.W., 2016AP1501/1502 and 2017AP720/721, District 1, 8/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2016AP1501; 2016AP1502; 2017AP720; 2017AP721
The circuit court didn’t lose competency to terminate the parental rights of K.J. and A.W. after an initial TPR petition failed, nor did the doctrine of issue preclusion apply to the second TPR trial.
Erroneous admission of child’s videotaped statement was harmless
State v. J.L.B., 2016AP2358, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court erred in finding that a six-year-old child’s videotaped interview was admissible under § 908.08 because nothing in the interview showed the child understood the importance of telling the truth and that there are negative consequences to untruthfulness. See § 908.08(3)(c); State v.
Juvenile court’s reliance on wrong sex offender registration statute was harmless
State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).
Courts may reopen suppression hearings to give State 2nd kick at meeting burden of proof
State v. Jesse U. Felbab, 2017AP12-CR, 8/2/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s surely the State’s take away from this decision. Deputy Schoonover stopped Felbab for erratic driving and determined that field sobriety tests and a drug-detecting dog were in order, so he called for a back up. This led to the State charging Felbab with possession of THC. He moved to suppress. Before giving its decision, the court told the parties that it would be willing to grant a motion to reopen if the losing party wanted to enter more evidence into the record. Hint. Hint.
Juror agreement on one count not a “verdict,” so retrial not double jeopardy
State v. Anthony Alvarado, 2017 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
In this recommended-for-publication opinion, the court of appeals tackles an issue of first impression in Wisconsin.