On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Java I. Orr, 2016AP2009, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Orr raises and loses 3 issues relating to the sentence credit that he received in this case. He argues that (1) he should have been allowed withdraw his plea because trial counsel gave him incorrect infromation regarding the sentence credit he would receive; (2) the actual amount of sentence credit he received is a new factor warranting modification of his sentence; and (3) the trial court sentenced based on inaccurate sentence credit information.

State v. James D. Carter, 2016AP1054-CR, District 1, 7/5/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Carter was charged in a 20-count information with various crimes, most of them involving theft and forgery arising out of a scam Carter perpetrated against multiple victims using the same basic modus operandi in October and November. But he was also charged with a burglary in June, which wasn’t part of the scam and looked nothing like the acts committed during the scam. (Pages 3-5). [NB: We’re citing to pages rather than paragraphs because on pages 6-7 and 12-15 the paragraph numbering is messed up.] The court of appeals rejects his argument that the burglary charge was improperly joined to the other charges.

State v. S.D., 2016AP1701-1702, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR appeal raises a number of interesting issues ranging from a Daubert challenge to the State’s psychologist and “parenting capacity assessment” to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise an “unconstitutional as applied” challenge to the standard jury instruction on “failure to assume parental responsibility.”

State v. M.G., 2016AP1197, District 1, 7/5/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.G. moved to withdraw his no contest plea to the petition to terminate his parental rights based on CHIPS grounds. He alleged the plea colloquy was deficient regarding his waiver of the right to trial because his lawyer and the judge referred to his having a “second” trial regarding disposition, and that he was confused by these statements. (¶15). The court of appeals finds no deficiency in the plea colloquy and therefore no basis for plea withdrawal.

State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, petition for review granted 12/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 73; case activity (including briefs)

We all know that an appellate court determines the accuracy of a trial court’s jury instructions by reviewing them as a whole, not in isolation. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 637-638, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).  But surely this doesn’t mean that a “whole” that includes incomplete, inaccurate instructions for some charges is fine so long as it includes the correct instructions for other charges. Surely we don’t expect 12 people unfamiliar with the complex law of “self defense” and “accident” to determine which versions of these instructions are correct and whether the same version applies to three distinct charges. This split opinion says “sure we do.” Judge Reilly objects to the majority’s “as long as the correct words are in there somewhere” approach to instructing a jury. Hopefully, SCOW will too.

State v. Nathan J. Paape, 2015AP2462-CR, District 2, 6/28/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paape and a co-defendant, Antonio Barbeau, were convicted as adults for a first degree intentional homicide they committed when they were 13 years old. Both received the mandatory life sentence and both were granted eligibility under § 973.014(1g)(a)2. to petition for release to extended supervision under § 302.114(5), Paape after 30 years, Barbeau after about 35 years. Both argued their sentences were invalid under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The court of appeals rejected Barbeau’s arguments last year, State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, and it now rejects Paape’s arguments.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.

State v. Matthew Ray Taylor, 2016AP682-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taylor argues he should get a new trial based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals rejects his claims.

State v. Dimitri C. Boone, 2016AP918-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Boone sought a “new factor” sentence modification based on alleged inaccuracies in the report of the presentence investigation (PSI). The court of appeals holds that Boone failed to show the information in the PSI was inaccurate, failed to show new information, or failed to show any of the information was highly relevant to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.