On Point blog, page 149 of 487
When a change in expression amounts to reasonable suspicion for a frisk
State v. Kavin K. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Nesbit ran out of gas on I 94. He and his buddy were walking on the shoulder, red can in hand, to get gas when Deputy Fowles pulled up and told them he’d give them a ride to and from the gas station. But first, he asked them if they had any weapons. The friend said “no.” Nesbit who had been behaving normally “‘all of a sudden’ became ‘very deflated’ and shook his head slightly in the negative.”
Challenges to successive TPR proceeding don’t succeed
State v. K.J. & State v. A.W., 2016AP1501/1502 and 2017AP720/721, District 1, 8/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2016AP1501; 2016AP1502; 2017AP720; 2017AP721
The circuit court didn’t lose competency to terminate the parental rights of K.J. and A.W. after an initial TPR petition failed, nor did the doctrine of issue preclusion apply to the second TPR trial.
Erroneous admission of child’s videotaped statement was harmless
State v. J.L.B., 2016AP2358, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court erred in finding that a six-year-old child’s videotaped interview was admissible under § 908.08 because nothing in the interview showed the child understood the importance of telling the truth and that there are negative consequences to untruthfulness. See § 908.08(3)(c); State v.
Juvenile court’s reliance on wrong sex offender registration statute was harmless
State v. D.J.A.R., 2017AP52, District 4, 8/3/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
After D.J.A.R. was adjudicated delinquent for second degree child sexual assault under § 948.02(2), the circuit court ordered him to register as a sex offender. (¶¶4-6). It relied on § 938.34(15m)(am)1., which requires finding that the juvenile’s conduct was sexually motivated and that registration is in the interest of public protection. That was a mistake, because D.J.A.R.’s offense is governed by § 938.34(15m)(bm), which mandates registration unless the requirements of § 301.45(1m) are met. (¶¶11-14). The mistake was harmless, however. (¶15).
Courts may reopen suppression hearings to give State 2nd kick at meeting burden of proof
State v. Jesse U. Felbab, 2017AP12-CR, 8/2/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
If at first you don’t succeed, try, try, try again. That’s surely the State’s take away from this decision. Deputy Schoonover stopped Felbab for erratic driving and determined that field sobriety tests and a drug-detecting dog were in order, so he called for a back up. This led to the State charging Felbab with possession of THC. He moved to suppress. Before giving its decision, the court told the parties that it would be willing to grant a motion to reopen if the losing party wanted to enter more evidence into the record. Hint. Hint.
Juror agreement on one count not a “verdict,” so retrial not double jeopardy
State v. Anthony Alvarado, 2017 WI App 53; case activity (including briefs)
In this recommended-for-publication opinion, the court of appeals tackles an issue of first impression in Wisconsin.
Tumblr qualifies as an “identified citizen informant,” and sec. 939.617(2) is not void for vagueness
State v. Samuel Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64; case activity (including briefs)
Pursuant to a warrant, police searched Silverstein’s computer for child porn. The “informer” was Tumblr, which is required by federal law to report suspected child pornography to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Silverstein challenged the warrant as well as the mandatory minimum sentence the trial court imposed per §939.617, which he contends is unconstitutionally vague.
Note to police (again): Holding pants up by waistband is not reasonable suspicion for stop!
State v. Travail L. Lewis, 2017AP234-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
After shots were fired in a high crime area of Milwaukee, police dispatched Officer Robert Crawley (no relation to the 7th Earl of Grantham) to investigate. He and his partner saw Lewis (African American) walking down an alley holding the waistband of his pants. They told him to stop and hold up his hands. Then they drew their guns. Lewis told them that he had a gun but no permit, so they arrested him. The State charged him with misdemeanor carrying a concealed weapon. Lewis filed an unsuccessful suppression motion. On appeal, the State wisely conceded that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Lewis based on State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, 353 Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483.
Court of appeals upholds “identification search” after arrest
State v. Janaya L. Moss, 2016AP1856-CR, 7/25/17 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Moss and another woman had a fight in a bar; responding police found Moss intoxicated to the point of incoherence. They arrested the other woman and frisked her, but could not find any identification (she would give only a first name). One officer noticed a wallet on a nearby table and asked the other woman if it was hers; she did not respond. The officer opened the wallet, revealing Moss’s ID but also cocaine and marijuana.
Court of appeals upholds no contest plea to grounds for TPR despite problems with plea hearing
State v. K.H., 2016AP1180, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
During a lengthy colloquy regarding her “no contest” plea to grounds for terminating parental rights to her son, K.H. “seemed confused.” She said she hadn’t taken all of her prescribed medication. The court was concerned that she “was not able to fully understand the proceedings.” So her lawyer conducted a direct examination to determine her understanding of what she was doing. Eventually, the court was satisfied that she did and found that her plea was freely, voluntarily and intelligently given. Then it proceeded to establish a factual basis for it. On appeal, K.H. contends that (1) her plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and (2) the court erred in accepting the plea before the factual basis for it was proven as required by §48.422(7).