On Point blog, page 155 of 484
A puzzling decision on collateral attack pleading requirements
State v. Matthew A. Seward, 2016AP1248-CR, 3/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is a permissive appeal. Matthew Seward is charged with OWI-3rd; he seeks reversal of the circuit court’s denial of his collateral attack on his OWI-2nd conviction.
Trial court’s evidentiary rulings weren’t erroneous
State v. Victoria Ward, 2015AP2638-CR, 3/21/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
To no avail, Ward challenges two evidentiary rulings the circuit court made at her trial on charges of being party to the crimes of maintaining a drug house and possession of heroin with intent to deliver.
Court of appeals again blurs harmless error test
State v. Julius Alfonso Coleman, 2013AP2100-CR, 3/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Julius Coleman was set up by a confidential informant to participate in an armed robbery of a nonexistent drug dealer named “Poncho.” He challenges the admission of various statements at trial on the ground that they were taken in violation of Miranda. The court of appeals concludes that any error in their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but along the way (and not for the first time) seems to confuse the test for harmless error with that for sufficiency of the evidence.
Factual findings defeat motorist’s claim he did not consent to BAC test
State v. Joseph K. Larson, 2016AP1002-CR, 3/21/17, District III, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Joseph Larson contends on appeal that the circuit court erred when it concluded he consented to a breath alcohol test after his arrest for OWI.
No IAC for implying prior OWIs; stipulation to three priors valid; no issue preclusion on number of priors
State v. Bruce T. Henningfield, 2015AP1824-CR, 3/15/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bruce Henningfield was convicted by a jury of OWI and PAC counts, and was sentenced on the OWI as a tenth or subsequent offense. He raises three issues related to his prior convictions; the court rejects them all.
Crossing fog line and pulling into closed business at 1:30 a.m. is reasonable suspicion of OWI
County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees.
Conduct relating to dismissed charges can support restitution claim for crime involving different kind of conduct
State v. Roy A. Mitchell, Jr., 2016AP937-CR, 3/16/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Mitchell pled guilty to misdemeanor theft, resisting or obstructing an officer, and prostitution in exchange for the State’s agreement to dismiss charges for misdemeanor/battery, strangulation/suffocation, and felony theft. But when the State sought restitution for medical expenses incurred by the victim on the dismissed charges that involved physical contact, Mitchell objected because the victim’s injuries’ and expenses were not related to the crimes for which Mitchell was convicted and sentenced.
Circuit court’s “continuing CHIPS” finding affirmed
Jefferson County Human Serv. Dep’t v. V.B., 2016AP2468-2469, 3/16/17, District 4 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court found that V.B.’s children were in continuing need of protective services and thus there it had grounds to terminate her parental rights pursuant to §48.415(2). On appeal,V.B. unsuccessfully challenged the evidence supporting the 3rd and 4th elements of continuing CHIPS–namely, that the county made reasonable efforts to provide court-ordered services to V.B. and that V.B. failed to meet the conditions for return of her children.
Adult court had jurisdiction, competency to adjudicate offenses committed before defendant was age 10
State v. Shaun M. Sanders, 2017 WI App 22, petition for review granted 6/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 51; case activity (including briefs)
When Sanders was 19 years old he was charged with committing repeated sexual assaults of H.S. during a time period when he was aged 9 to 12 and H.S. was aged 7 to 9. He asserts the circuit court had neither subject matter jurisdiction nor competency to proceed on those charges because under §§ 938.02(3m), 938.12(1), and 938.183(1)(am) persons who commit criminal acts when they are under the age of 10 are not subject to the juvenile justice code or the criminal code. The court of appeals rejects the claim.
Partial TPR summary judgment upheld
Racine County HSD v. R.E., 2016AP2039, 3/15/2017, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The record supported the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment on grounds of abandonment because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether R.E. had failed to visit or communicate with her child, S.E., for a period of three or more months, § 48.415(1)(a)2.