On Point blog, page 166 of 484
Defendant didn’t invoke right to counsel, and his statement wasn’t coerced
State v. Christopher E. Masarik, 2015AP194-CR, District 1, 10/4/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Masarik didn’t unequivocally assert his right to have counsel present while he was being questioned about an arson that resulted in the death of another, and his statement wasn’t involuntary despite his mental health difficulties.
Two-day wait for TPR default not required where counsel continues
State v. J.B., 2016AP483, 484 & 485, 10/4/2016, District 1 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
2013 Wis. Act 337 created Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., which permits a TPR court in some circumstances to find that a parent who has defaulted as to grounds by failing to appear has also waived his or her right to counsel. The statute then imposes a two-day waiting period before the court proceeds to disposition. But what if the court finds a parent in default but does not find counsel waived?
Police could seize, search car parked near storage shed
State v. Kenneth M. Asboth, Jr., 2015AP2052-CR, 9/29/16, District 4 (not recommended for publication); petition for review granted 1/9/17; affirmed 2017 WI 76; case activity (including briefs)
Police suspected Kenneth Asboth in a bank robbery. They received a tip that he would be at a storage facility, and converged there, where they arrested him. They also decided to seize the car he had been driving, which was parked in the lane between storage sheds. Once the car was at the police station, officers searched it, finding evidence linking Asboth to the robbery. The trial court denied suppression, holding that the car was validly impounded, and that an inventory search was thus permitted.
Drinking at a bar with seemingly drunk person raises suspicion of OWI
State v. Courtney L. Carney, 2016AP175-CR & 176, 9/21/2016, District 2 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At 3 a.m. on a Saturday morning, police pulled a car over for a broken light. The car driving in front of the targeted vehicle also stopped; this was Carney’s. The police ended up detaining him too, leading to his eventual OWI arrest; the question here is whether they had reasonable suspicion for the initial detention.
Failure to use turn signal justified stop
Town of Grand Chute v. Shelley L. Kowalewski, 2015AP1788, District 3, 9/20/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The stop of Kowalewski’s car was supported by probable cause that she violated § 346.34(1)(b), which requires a drive to use a turn signal “[i]n the event any other traffic may be affected by the movement” of the vehicle.
Blood draw by paramedic was okay
State v. Steven W. Heath, 2014AP2466-CR, District 4, 9/15/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Heath challenges the blood draw evidence in his OWI prosecution, claiming that the paramedic who did the draw wasn’t a “person acting under the direction of a physician” as required by § 343.305(5)(b) and that the method and manner of the blood draw was not constitutionally reasonable. The court of appeals rejects his claims.
Toxicologist could give opinion about impairment
State v. Lory F. Kerk, 2015AP2608-CR, District 3, 9/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court didn’t err in allowing the state to elicit testimony from its expert toxicologist that Kerk was impaired by the amount of alcohol and prescription drugs found in her blood.
Court had jurisdiction over OWI mistakenly charged as a criminal offense
State v. Timothy A. Giese, 2015AP1838-CR, District 3, 9/13/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court’s recent decision in City of Eau Claire v. Booth Britton, 2016 WI 65, disposes of Giese’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over a mistakenly charged second-offense OWI.
No felony witness intimidation without proof of felony charges
State v. Gary Abdullah Salaam, 2014AP2666-CR & 2667-CR, 9/13/2016, District 1 (Not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Salaam raises four claims challenging his convictions, at jury trial, of recklessly endangering safety, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of witness intimidation. The court affirms as to the first two counts but finds insufficient evidence as to the witness intimidation charges.
Circuit court’s immigration warning didn’t comply with § 971.08(1)(c), and defendant has sufficiently alleged likelihood of deportation
State v. Jose Alberto Reyes Fuerte, 2016 WI App 78, petition for review granted 1/18/2017, reversed, 2017 WI 104; case activity (including briefs)
This decision is important to anyone who litigates claims for plea withdrawal under § 971.08(2) because it helps clarify the law in two ways. First, it provides two examples of a circuit court’s failure to comply with § 971.08(1)(c)’s requirement that the defendant be warned about the immigration consequences of a plea. Second, it explains what a defendant must allege to make a sufficient showing that his or her plea is likely to result in deportation.