On Point blog, page 181 of 490
“Im finna have to go on da run smh” is obviously incriminating
State v. Mario Martinez Redmond, 2015AP657-2015AP658-CR, 5/17/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Redmond was charged and convicted of battery, disorderly conduct, and multiple counts of witness intimidation. His appeal raised various ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims. But the most interesting issue concerns Redmond’s failed motion to suppress a cryptic text message sent from his phone.
Defendant not in Miranda custody during search of home
State v. Bradley L. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47; case activity (including briefs)
The execution of the search warrant at Kilgore’s home started with a heavily armed officers, including a SWAT team, entering and putting Kilgore down on the floor at gunpoint; but once the home was “cleared” and weapons were secured and the SWAT team left, Kilgore was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, the statements he made to police while they searched his home were admissible despite the lack of a Miranda warning.
Evidence sufficient to support verdict of drugged driving
Walworth County v. James E. Robinson, Jr., 2015AP2504-FT, 5/18/16, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including memo briefs)
The County needed to prove Robinson drove his motor vehicle on a highway while under the influence of a drug to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving, § 346.63(1)(a). It succeeded.
Being in alley at 3 a.m., walking into bushes suspicious
State v. Arturo Luiz-Lorenzo, 2015AP1540-CR, 5/18/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police discovered cocaine on Luiz-Lorenzo as a result of his arrest; he challenges the grounds for the initial Terry stop.
Instructing jury on wrong law requires new trial
State v. Michael W. Bryzek, 2016 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)
Bryzek had already completed most of his alleged acts when a 2010 statute broadened the definition of theft by a bailee; the court of appeals agrees with the circuit court that the jury should have been instructed on the narrower element.
Openly carrying firearms didn’t violate loitering ordinance
Village of Somerset v. Mark J. Hoffman, 2015AP140, District 3, 5/17/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Viewed through the interpretive prism mandated by § 66.0409(6), a local ordinance prohibiting “wander[ing] or stroll[ing] in an aimless manner” that is “not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons” isn’t violated by a person walking around with a loaded semi-automatic rifle slung over his shoulder and a loaded handgun in a holster on his hip.
Child welfare agency can file TPR petition on any ground
Rock County HSD v. W.J., 2015AP2469, District 4, 5/12/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The county department had authority under § 48.42(1) to file a TPR petition alleging any ground for termination.
Privilege re: desire to shoot victim waived by statement of desire to shoot self
State v. Daniel L. Schmidt, 2016 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals rejects three challenges to Schmidt’s jury-trial conviction of two homicides.
Traffic stop unreasonable; officer had no reason to conclude driver violated parking statute
State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.
Evidence supported extension of involuntary commitment
Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2016AP46-FT, 5/4/16 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 9/13/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 57; case activity
To commit a person involuntarily, the county must show that the person is mentally ill and dangerous. To extend the commitment, the county may prove “dangerousness” by showing that “there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment record, he would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.” §51.20(1)(am).