On Point blog, page 181 of 485
Accident reporting statute covers injury regardless of monetary cost
City of Rhinelander v. Thomas V. Wakely, 2015Ap302, 3/8/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
While the accident reporting requirement under § 346.70(1) requires that property damage reach a certain minimum “apparent [monetary] extent” before the accident is reportable, it does not require a minimum monetary extent for personal injuries before the accident is reportable.
Court of appeals sees no problem with initiation or duration of traffic stop
State v. John D. Arthur Griffin, 2015AP1271-CR, 3/3/16, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals finds that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop the car Griffin was driving and, even though that suspicion dissipated during the encounter, that the continued detention of Griffin was reasonable.
Record supported trial court’s rejection of NGI defense
State v. Corey R. Kucharski, 2013AP557-CR, 3/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The trial court correctly applied the elements of § 971.15, and the record supports the trial court’s finding that Kucharski failed to meet his burden of showing that he lacked mental responsibility when he killed his parents.
Surrogate medical examiner’s testimony didn’t violate Confrontation Clause
State v. Miguel Muniz-Munoz, 2014AP702-CR, 3/1/16, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
By the time Muniz-Munoz went to trial for first degree intentional homicide, the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy of the victim was dead. The trial court allowed another medical examiner who reviewed the case record to give his independent opinion about the cause of the victim’s death. This did not violate Muniz-Munoz’s right to confrontation.
TPR affirmed against welter of challenges
Pierce County v. C.S., 2015AP1463 & 2015AP1464, District 3, 2/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
C.S. challenges the orders terminating her parental rights to her sons, D. S. and K. S., based on their continuing need for protection or services. She raises multiple, fact-specific claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and circuit court error. All her claims are rejected.
Domestic abuse repeater enhancer applies only if state proves or defendant admits prior convictions
State v. Gavin S. Hill, 2016 WI App 29; case activity (including briefs)
The court of appeals holds that the standards for alleging and applying the ordinary repeater enhancer under § 939.62 also govern the domestic abuse repeater enhancer under § 939.621. Thus, the state must either prove that the defendant was convicted of the required predicate offenses or the defendant must admit that he was convicted of those offenses.
Dying declaration properly admitted
State v. Anthony R. Owens, 2016 WI App 32; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court properly admitted the victim’s statements about who shot him under the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, and the admission of the victim’s statements didn’t violate the Confrontation Clause.
Misinformation about IC max does not permit plea withdrawal
State v. Jason D. Henderson, 2015AP1740-CR, District I, 3/1/16 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Henderson pled to two misdemeanor repeaters. He now seeks to withdraw his plea on the ground that counsel was ineffective for misinforming him that the two-year maximum sentence on each count was divided into one year of initial confinement and one year of extended supervision, rather than the correct 18 month/6 month split.
Juvenile had sufficient notice at hearing to lift stay of sentence
State v. D. T., 2015AP1476, 3/1/2016, District 1 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity
D.T. asserts he was ambushed when the juvenile court took judicial notice of his file and sua sponte called a witness before lifting the stay of his five-year sentence; the court of appeals affirms after finding different grounds to lift the stay.
Multiple counts for single sexual assault were neither “inconsistent” nor multiplicitous
State v. Jama I. Jama, 2014AP2432-CR, District 4, 2/25/16 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Jama was convicted of both second degree sexual assault of a person too intoxicated to give consent, § 940.225(2)(cm), and third degree sexual assault (sexual intercourse or contact without consent), § 940.225(3), for the same act. The court of appeals rejects Jama’s claim that he can’t be convicted of both counts.