On Point blog, page 187 of 484
Court lost competency to decide constitutional challenge to statute due to failure to notify AG of challenge
S.R. v. Circuit Court for Winnebago County, 2015 WI App 98; case activity
Because S.R. and C.L.’s “petition for determination of parentage” effectively asked the circuit court for a declaratory judgment about the meaning of Wisconsin’s parentage statutes in light of the cases holding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, the petition should have been served on the Attorney General. Because that didn’t happen, the circuit court lacked the competency to decide the petition.
Child sexual assault statute survives as-applied vagueness, equal protection challenges
State v. Colton M., 2015 WI App 94; case activity
Colton challenges his delinquency adjudication for repeated acts of sexual contact with a child under the age of 16 under § 948.025(1)(e), arguing that applying the statute to him violates due process because it provides insufficient standards for distinguishing him from D., the victim, as both were 15 years old and both engaged in sexual activity. Colton also argues that prosecuting him rather than D. violates equal protection. The court concludes that, under the facts of this case, the statute is sufficiently definite to satisfy due process and there was a rational basis for prosecuting Colton instead of D.
TPR petition gave parent sufficient notice of grounds for termination
N.A.H. v. J.R.D., 2015AP1726, 2015AP1727, and 2015AP1728, District 4, 10/29/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (first case number)
The petition to terminate J.R.D.s parental rights set forth sufficient facts to support the allegation that J.R.D. had failed to assume parental responsibility.
Multiple challenges to OWI 1st rejected
State v. Joseph William Netzer, 2015AP213, District 4, 10/29/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
¶1 …. Netzer argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial, and that the results of his blood tests were impermissibly admitted into evidence. We conclude that Netzer possessed no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil proceeding,
Forfeiture of co-owner’s interest in car violated Eighth Amendment’s excessive fine prohibition
State v. One 2013 Toyota Corolla, 2015 WI App 84; case activity (including briefs)
While a co-owner’s interest in a car didn’t make her the owner for purposes of the “innocent owner” exception to property forfeiture under § 961.55(1)(d)2., forfeiture of her full financial interest violated the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against the levying of excessive fines.
When car has multiple owners, the fact that one owner has invalid license doesn’t by itself justify traffic stop
State v. Joshua Allan Vitek, 2015AP421-CR, District 3, 10/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Under State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, police may reasonably assume the driver of a car is likely to be the owner, and may stop the car if they know the owner’s operating privileges are invalid. But what if more than one person owns the car, but only one of the owners has an invalid license? The state claims that a traffic stop is still justified by the fact that one of the owners has an invalid license. The court of appeals disagrees, at least when—as in this case—the state presents no evidence as to the number of registered owners and the validity of their operating privileges.
Father’s stipulation to TPR grounds was valid despite later remarks suggesting he didn’t understand the grounds
State v. K.G., 2015AP245, District 1, 10/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
K.G.’s stipulation to the failure-to-assume-parental-responsibility ground alleged in the TPR petition was valid even though K.G.’s later statements during the disposition hearing suggest he misunderstood what the state would have to prove to establish that ground for termination.
Restitution may be ordered in JIPS cases only after a finding the juvenile committed a delinquent act
State v. B.A.H., 2015AP1256-FT, District 4, 10/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
While restitution is a possible disposition in a proceeding involving a juvenile in need of protection or services (JIPS), it can only be ordered when there has been a finding a finding the juvenile committed a delinquent act. Because there was no such finding in the JIPS case involving B.A.H., the juvenile court had no authority to order restitution.
Introduction of evidence of prior TPR, parenting of other children, didn’t entitle parent to new TPR trial
Sauk County DHS v. A.C., 2015AP898 & 2015AP899, District 4, 10/22/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.C.’s trial lawyer was not ineffective for failing to take steps to exclude evidence about the termination of A.C.’s rights to a child in a prior case and about her parenting conduct toward that child and another child.
Imposition of DNA surcharge for a single felony committed before January 1, 2014, doesn’t violate ex post facto prohibition
State v. Tabitha A. Scruggs, 2015 WI App 88, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 15; case activity (including briefs)
Addressing a question left open by State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, the court of appeals holds that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws does not bar the mandatory imposition of a DNA surcharge for a single felony conviction based on conduct that was committed before the mandatory DNA surcharge requirement took effect.