On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. James Lee Eady, Jr., 2016 WI App 12; case activity (including briefs)

Under the forgiving standard for assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the state managed to introduce enough circumstantial evidence to prove that the bank Eady robbed was “chartered” by a state of the federal government, and therefore was a “financial institution” for purposes of § 943.87.

State v. Charles Ray Stewart, 2014AP276-CR, District 1, 12/22/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The warrantless search for and seizure of evidence from Stewart’s apartment was lawful because, after Stewart allowed police to enter the apartment and was arrested, the community caretaker doctrine allowed police to remain in the apartment to assure Stewart’s dog was cared for, and the office could seize evidence discovered in plain view.

City of Stevens Point v. Todd P. Beck, 2015AP978, District 4, 12/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

State law confers automatic admissibility on the results of blood alcohol tests performed in accord with Wis. Stat. § 343.305, but does the plaintiff’s failure to show compliance with that statute render such results inadmissible?

State v. Stephen Toliver, 2014AP2939-CR, 12/15/15, District 1 (not recommended for publication);case activity

Here, in Wisconsin’s very own Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, the court of appeals upholds the denial of Toliver’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the circuit court’s refusal to vacate his felony murder plea, and the circuit court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Adams County DHHS v. D.S., 2015AP1937, District 4, 12/10/2015 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

D.S. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, raising a substantive due process challenge to the jury’s finding of unfitness and contending that the circuit court erroneously found termination to be in the child’s best interest.

State v. Larry J. Smith, 2016 WI App 8; case activity

Ordinarily, “the third time’s a charm.” But here, with its third decision rejecting a Daubert challenge to expert testimony, the court of appeals triple underscores just how flexible the test really is. The decision also addresses a vouching issue.

State v. David Aaron Piggue, Jr., 2016 WI App 13; case activity (including briefs)

Under State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶¶14-18, 25-27, 606 N.W.2d 155, a defendant is entitled to sentence credit for time in custody on charges that are dismissed and read-in for sentencing purposes. The court of appeals declines to extend Floyd to require credit for time the defendant was in custody on a charge for which he was acquitted, even though the acquitted conduct is used by a judge to fashion a sentence for a different crime.

State v. L.C., 2015AP1460, District 1, 12/4/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating L.C.’s rights to her child T.C. because, as required by § 48.426(3)(c) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, 26, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475, the court considered whether T.C. had substantial relationships with his mother and siblings and whether severing those relationships would harm T.C.

State v. Glenn T. Zamzow, 2016 WI App 7, petition for review granted, 3/7/16, affirmed, 2017 WI 29; case activity (including briefs)

Relying on precedent predating Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), two judges of the court of appeals hold that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to suppression hearings and that the circuit court could rely on hearsay evidence in denying Zamzow’s motion to suppress. The third judge on the panel dissents, arguing the majority’s conclusion “rests upon a shaky foundation” (¶20) and “continues [the] unfortunate legacy” of pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence (¶23).

State v. Thomas Treadway, 2015AP591, District 1, 12/1/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The evidence in the record is sufficient to support an order for involuntary medication under § 51.61(1)(g)4(intro.) and b.