On Point blog, page 198 of 485
Counsel wasn’t ineffective at TPR trial for failing to objecting to hearsay, “best interest of child” reference
State v. Kamille M., 2014AP2911, District 1, 6/26/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective at Kamille M.’s TPR grounds trial for failing to object to hearsay and to the state’s veiled reference to the best interests of the child during closing arguments.
Officer’s mistake of fact about car’s make and model didn’t invalidate stop
State v. Nathan Lewis Teasdale, 2015AP338-CR, District 4, 6/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer reasonably suspected that Teasdale was violating § 341.61(2), which prohibits displaying on a registration plates that are not issued for that vehicle, even though the officer was mistaken in believing that the make and model of the car was different from the make and model of the car for which the plates were issued.
Transcript of municipal court hearing doesn’t provide evidence supporting stop or refusal
Town of Bloomfield v. Petko Zvetkov Barashki, 2015AP226, District 2, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
In a case the court of appeals aptly describes as “unusual,” the court exercises its discretionary power of reversal under § 752.35 to throw out Barashki’s OWI 1st conviction and refusal finding on the grounds that the evidence doesn’t show the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Barashki.
Voluntary TPR reversed; circuit court lacked proper evidentiary foundation to support decision to terminate
Caroline P. v. Shawn H., 2014AP2004 & 2014AP2005, District 3, 6/24/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Even if the circuit court considered the statutory factors for termination of parental rights under § 48.426, the court lacked an evidentiary foundation in the record to make a determination as to whether termination was in the best interests of the child.
Evidence sufficient to support “bail jumping” verdict, no due process violation for accidental contact with victim
State v. Lavarren D. Etienne, 2014AP2881-CR, 6/18/15, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This appeal concerned the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict that Etienne intentionally violated a bond which prohibited him from having contact with “P.J.” Etienne said the contact was accidental. Due to the deference given to jury findings, Etienne’s argument failed. So did his claimed due process violation.
Traffic stop justified because officer saw driver drinking out of a brown bottle
State v. Timothy J. Relyea, 2014AP2860-CR, District 4, 6/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Put down that Sprecher® Root Beer if you’re behind the wheel! It could get you pulled over by a sharp-eyed cop who is knowledgable about the bottling practices of the beverage industry.
Police had probable cause to believe motorcyclist they located in a bar was intoxicated before he got to the bar
State v. Kirk L. Griese, 2015AP180, District 4, 6/18/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
There was probable cause to believe Griese was operating under the influence, even though the officer arrested Griese while he was having a Bacardi and Coke in the bar to which he had driven.
Court of Appeals addresses how to determine whether a conviction is a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for purposes of federal gun prohibition
Steven Michael Leonard v. State of Wisconsin, 2015 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs) NOTE: This case’s analysis of whether DC is a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is effectively overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31.
The court of appeals concludes that there’s no basis in the record for determining whether Leonard’s disorderly conduct conviction qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under the federal firearm prohibition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), and therefore he is not barred from possessing a firearm under that statute. The court also holds that Leonard’s disorderly conduct “involv[ed] the use of” one of Leonard’s guns and therefore § 968.20(1m)(b) bars the return of that gun.
Expiration of ch. 51 commitment made appeal moot, despite continuing restriction on gun possession
Dunn County v. Dennis M., 2014AP2579, District 3, 6/16/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Despite the fact Dennis M. can’t possess a firearm as a result of a prior involuntary commitment order, his appeal from that order is moot because he entered into a voluntary stipulation to recommitment that has expired and not been renewed.
It doesn’t take an expert to make a map using cell phone tower data provided by phone company
State v. Lance Donelle Butler, Jr., 2014AP1769-CR, District 1, 6/9/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Using cell phone tower data provided by Butler’s cell phone service provider to make a map of where Butler had used his cell phone on the day of the crime didn’t require “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” under § 907.02(1); thus, the police officers who created the map didn’t need to be qualified as experts under the statute and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).