On Point blog, page 199 of 485
Notice requirements were satisfied by CHIPS extension order that incorporated by reference terms of original order
State v. Amelia A., 2015AP630 & 2015AP631, District 1, 6/9/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
While the order extending the placement of Amelia’s children outside of her home did not specifically recite the conditions she needed to meet for the return of her children, the extension order specifically incorporated by reference the original CHIPS order, which did recite the conditions Amelia had to meet for return of the children and warned that failing to meet the conditions could result in termination of her parental rights. Thus, Amelia received the notice required under §§ 48.356(2) and 48.415(2)(a)1. and Waukesha County v. Steven H., 2000 WI 28, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607.
Circuit court’s power to dismiss under § 48.21(7) applies only to minors in custody
Ozaukee County DHS v. J.R. and S.R., 2804-2809, 6/3/15, District 2 (one-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for docket
Sec. 48.21(7) allows the circuit court to dismiss or informally dispose of a CHIPS petition, if doing so would be in the best interests of the child and the public. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of several CHIPS petitions in this case because the children at issue were not in custody. The statute, said the court of appeals, applies only to children who are in custody.
Revocation of driving privileges upheld despite pro se litigant’s efforts to comply with statute
Ozaukee County v. Michael T. Sheedy, 2015AP172, 6/3/15, District 3 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); click here for docket and briefs
Sheedy was arrested for OWI and refused to submit to a blood test. A few weeks later, the circuit court entered a default judgement against him. On appeal, Sheedy, pro se, argued that he in fact wrote to the circuit court and asked to reopen his case within the 10 days required by §343.305(2). His appeal failed.
Recent overt act of violence not required for extension of Ch. 51 commitment
Kenosha County v. James H., 2014AP2945, 6/3/15, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); click here for case activity
James was diagnosed with chronic paranoid schizophrenia and hospitalized many times. He appeal an order extending his involuntary commitment and argued, unsuccessfully, that the county failed to present evidence of recent acts of violence against others and insufficient evidence that he would become dangerous if treatment were withdrawn.
Credible victim supports adjudication on one count, but trial court’s mistake of law invalidates adjudication on second count
State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.
Using therapist as part of defense against TPR petition waived therapist-patient privilege
State v. Mary G., 2015AP55, 2015AP56, & 2015AP57, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
At the grounds phase of the trial on a TPR petition, the circuit court properly ordered Mary G. to provide the State with notes from her mental health treatment provider and appropriately considered evidence regarding Mary’s failure to manage her medications.
Exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry to hotel room
State v. Jeffrey F. Smart, 2014AP2604, District 2, 5/27/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The warrantless entry into Smart’s hotel room was supported by probable cause and justified by exigent circumstances because there was an objective basis to believe there was a risk to the safety of Smart’s children.
Imposition of DNA surcharge for every felony committed before January 1, 2014, violates ex post facto prohibition
State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)
A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.
Mandatory DNA surcharge for certain misdemeanors violates ex post facto prohibition
State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)
Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]
Statute authorizing hearsay at prelims doesn’t violate ex post facto prohibition
State v. David E. Hull, 2015 WI App 46; case activity (including briefs)
The recently enacted statute allowing the admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings is not an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it affects only the evidence that may be admitted at the preliminary hearing and does not alter the quantum or nature of evidence necessary to convict the defendant. In addition, the court commissioner properly refused to allow Hull to call the alleged victim to testify at the preliminary hearing because the anticipated testimony was not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.