On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Juan Francisco Rosas Vivar, 2014AP2199-CR, District 4, 5/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vivar wasn’t seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when an officer “called out” to Vivar in as he walked across a parking lot, saying “Juan, can you come talk to me?”

State v. Mastella L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 49, petition for review granted, 10/8/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 56; click here for briefs

This decision is SCOW bait. Police in Outagamie County engaged in what the court of appeals called “reprehensible” actions while interrogating the defendant. “Outraged” the circuit court suppressed the defendant’s statements to police and the physical evidence obtained during the search of her home. The court of appeals reversed the suppression of physical evidence on the theory that the untainted evidence described in the officers’ search warrant established probable cause and that the physical evidence was admissible via the inevitable discovery doctrine.

State v. Andrew L. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45; case activity (including briefs)

The standard established under State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), for determining a defendant’s competency to represent himself does not violate Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), the court of appeals holds. The court also affirms the circuit court’s conclusions that Jackson didn’t validly waive his right to counsel and wasn’t competent to represent himself.

County of Sauk v. Thomas D. McDonald, 2014AP1921, District 4, 5/7/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McDonald was arrested for OWI and taken to the county jail, where his blood was drawn by a paramedic employed by the city’s ambulance service. Contrary to McDonald’s claims, his blood draw was constitutionally reasonable and the paramedic who performed the blood draw was a “person acting under the direction of a physician,” as required by § 343.305(5)(b).

State v. Andrew J. Joda, 2014AP1949 & 2014AP1950, District 2, 5/6/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Given the trial court’s conclusion that Deputy Becker’s testimony was more credible than Joda’s testimony, the court factual findings are not clearly erroneous just because there was a discrepancy between Becker’s testimony and his written report and Becker was unable to remember exactly where he was when he saw Joda make an illegal u-turn.

Langlade County v. Casey Joseph Stegall, 2014AP2369, District 3, 5/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Reasonable suspicion does not require the presence of certain facts, or a certain number of facts; rather, “what constitutes reasonable suspicion is a common sense test: under all the facts and circumstances present, what would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience.” State v. Young, 212 Wis. 2d 417, 424, 569 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1997). That “common sense test” was met here.

State v. Eric L. Nigl, 2014AP1876-CR, District 4, 4/30/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Nigl challenged his conviction for a sex offender registry violation by attacking the validity of the juvenile delinquency disposition that required him to register. The court of appeals holds Nigl forfeited his challenge because he could have sought a waiver or stay of the registration requirement at the time of the delinquency adjudication.

State v. Richard S. Foley, 2014AP2601-CR, District 4, 4/30/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Detaining Foley in a squad car during a traffic stop was reasonable under the circumstances and didn’t transform the stop into an arrest.

Dane County v. Thomas F.W., 2014AP2469, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

To extend a ch. 51 commitment, the County must prove the subject individual is a proper subject for treatment, which means showing he or she is “capable of rehabilitation,” §§ 51.01(17) and 51.20(1)(a)1. The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s argument that the evidence in this case shows treatment will only blunt the symptoms of his mental illness, not rehabilitate him.

State v. Zach Geyer, 2014AP2625-CR, District 4, 4/23/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Under the totality of the circumstances, police had probable cause to arrest Geyer for OWI.