On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Melisa Valadez, 2014AP678, 2014AP679, 2014AP680; District 2, 1/21/15, certification granted 3/16/15; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; case activity

Issue presented (from certification):

How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy?  If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?

County of Calumet v. Lisa L. Dolajeck, 2014AP2100, District 2, 1/21/15 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals here affirms a decision denying a motion to dismiss OWI charges and a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. It holds that the sheriff in this case had reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and nothing requires law enforcement officers to record a stop even if they have  video cameras in their squad cars.

St. Croix County DHHS v. Michael D. & Juanita A., 2014AP2431, District 3, 1/16/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 4/16/15, reversed, 2016 WI 35; case activity

The court of appeals holds that the notice requirements of §§ 48.415(2)(a)1. and 48.356(2) were not satisfied because the last order concerning out-of-home placement of Juanita’s child did not include the written notice of the applicable grounds for termination or the conditions for Matthew’s return. The County therefore failed to meet its burden of proof on the continuing CHIPS ground under § 48.415(2)(a)1. and the termination order is vacated and the TPR petition dismissed.

State v. Mariah E., 2014AP1788, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The decision to waive a juvenile into adult court is reviewed for erroneous exercise of discretion, State v. Tyler T., 2012 WI 52, ¶24, 341 Wis. 2d 1, 814 N.W.2d 192, and in this case the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving sixteen-year-old Mariah to adult court on charges of battery of a police officer, battery to an emergency worker, and resisting and obstructing.

Fond du Lac County v. Robyn M. Pollack, 2014AP1936, District 2, 1/14/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Pollack’s license was properly revoked after refusing a chemical test because the police officer had probable cause to arrest her for OWI under the totality of the circumstances.

Milwaukee County v. Andy S., 2014AP1885, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The evidence was sufficient to prove dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., as it showed Andy “[e]vidence[d] a substantial probability of physical harm to himself … as manifested by evidence of recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.”

State v. Kiwana L., 2014AP2306, District 1, 1/13/15 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Kiwana L.’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the conditions set by the circuit court for return of her daughter Jasmine because those conditions were narrowly tailored to address her mental health issues; thus, the termination of her parental rights based on continuing CHIPS grounds under § 48.415(2) was proper.

State v. Jonathan Thomas, 2014AP543-CR, District 1, 1/5/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity

At his trial on a charge of second degree reckless homicide for causing the death of Michael Brown, Thomas claimed Brown accidentally shot himself while handling a gun. The jury found Thomas guilty of the lesser included offense of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, § 940.08(1). The court of appeals rejects Thomas’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for that verdict.

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Terrance L. Ware, 2014AP378-CR, District 1, 12/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative stop of Ware’s car gave the police reasonable suspicion that Ware or his passenger was dangerous and might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, justifying a protective search of the car for weapons. In addition, a police officer wasn’t vouching for another state’s witness by saying the witness “told the truth” after additional questioning.