On Point blog, page 212 of 484
Counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving prelim and not moving to suppress statement
State v. Isaiah N. Triggs, 2014AP204-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for waiving a preliminary hearing in Triggs’s homicide prosecution or for failing to move to suppress Triggs’s confession. Further, the circuit court’s plea colloquy with Triggs was not defective and the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
History of domestic violence supported increase of probationary period under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b.
State v. Millard Reno Bandy, Sr., 2014AP1055-CR & 2014AP1056-CR, District 1, 10/28/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP1055-CR; 2014AP1056-CR
A defendant’s history of domestic violence against a victim provided a basis for trial court to increase the period of probation under § 973.09(2)(a)1.b. even though the offenses for which the defendant was placed on probation didn’t involve physical harm or a direct threat to the victim.
Defendant wasn’t in custody when he was questioned while sitting in DNR warden’s truck
State v. David A. Myhre, 2014AP376-CR, District 4, 10/23/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Myhre was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he answered questions posed by a DNR warden while sitting in the warden’s truck. Thus, the warden was not required to advise Myhre of his Miranda rights.
Other acts evidence was harmless and PTAC amendment during trial was not prejudicial
State v. Sean T. Pugh, 2013AP1522-CR, District 3, 10/21/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
If the trial court erred in admitting evidence that Pugh had a prior conviction for an offense similar to the ones he was on trial for, the error was harmless, given the overwhelming evidence against him. In addition, the trial court properly allowed the state to amend the information to add party-to-a-crime modifiers because Pugh wasn’t prejudiced by the amendment.
Initial “stay” of juvenile sex offender reporting requirement wasn’t a permanent stay under § 938.34(16)
State v. Jermaine C., 2014AP467, District 1, 10/21/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s decision at Jermaine’s disposition hearing to stay the sex offender registration requirement wasn’t a permanent stay of the requirement under § 938.34(16) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1, because the record shows the circuit court was only deferring a final decision on a permanent stay pending reviews of Jermaine’s progress.
Suicide threat justifies “community caretaker” stop of vehicle
Dane County v. Joshua H. Quisling, 2013AP2743, 10/16/14, District 4, (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying the “community caretaker” doctrine, the court of appeals held that a police officer was justified in stopping Quisling’s car based upon an informant’s tip that he was suicidal. Evidence obtained after the stop need not be suppressed, and Quisling’s OWI conviction stands.
Trial counsel’s failure to object to jury instruction deprives appellant of right to challenge sufficiency of evidence
State v. Addison F. Steiner, 2013AP2629-CR, district 4, 10/16/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This case raises an issue that even the court of appeals deemed to be of first impression. Does §948.20, which criminalizes abandonment of a child, require an intent to abandon a child permanently, or is leaving a child alone for 1 or 2 hours enough? If the latter, then how is “child abandonment” different from “child neglect” under §948.21? The court of appeals refused to address the issue for reasons that should trouble anyone challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict.
Evidence supported probable cause for OWI and PBT
State v. Jessica Ann Stofflet, 2014AP823-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals held that the officer who stopped Stofflet’s vehicle and conducted a preliminary breath test had probable cause to believe she was committing OWI.
The officer observed that she had deviated within her lane, swerved over the fog line, varied her speed, swerved into the left lane,
Violation of statute governing turn of vehicles provides probable cause for stop
State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, 10/16/14, District 4 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of Salzwedel’s motion to suppress and her conviction for OWI (3rd offense). Apparently, a deputy was driving right behind Salzwedel when she made a quick left turn in front of him without using her turn signal. The court of appeals held that the deputy had probable cause to stop her vehicle for a violation of §346.34(1)b,
Threats to harm others, when made to third parties, show dangerousness under Sec. 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
Kenosha County v. Steven H., 2014AP1435-FT, District 2, 10/15/14 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals here affirmed an order finding Steven H. “dangerous” under §51.20(1)(a)2.b, which requires, among other things, evidence that people were placed in reasonable fear of Steven’s violent behavior. Under this standard, a court may consider threats voiced to third parties rather than to the potential victims. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521-22, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).