On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Bobbie Tanta Bowen, 2015 WI App 12; case activity

Bowen was found guilty of bail jumping for violating the provision of his bail that he have no contact with F.B., the victim of an earlier battery charge, or F.B.’s residence. The court of appeals holds that the trial evidence—which showed Bowen went into F.B.’s residence but had no direct contact with F.B. while he was inside—was sufficient to support the verdict because the bond condition “that [Bowen] not have contact with F.B.” did not require proof that Bowen directly communicated with F.B.

State v. Terrance L. Ware, 2014AP378-CR, District 1, 12/30/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances surrounding the investigative stop of Ware’s car gave the police reasonable suspicion that Ware or his passenger was dangerous and might have access to a weapon hidden in the car, justifying a protective search of the car for weapons. In addition, a police officer wasn’t vouching for another state’s witness by saying the witness “told the truth” after additional questioning.

State v. Charles A. McIntyre, 2014AP800-CR, District 3, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

When pronouncing sentence in McIntyre’s case the circuit court repeatedly interchanged “consecutive” and “concurrent” when referring to Count One (of five). (¶¶2-5). Thus, despite the court’s several attempts at clarification during the sentencing hearing, the sentence imposed on that count was ambiguous because it was “undeniably confusing and capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two different ways.” (¶11). Nonetheless, the court’s intent was clear, so it properly amended the judgment post-sentencing to clarify that Count One was consecutive.

County of Fond du Lac v. Jeffrey K. Krueger, 2014AP1494, District 2, 12/30/14 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Krueger was stopped by an officer who said Krueger drove his car over the center line. Krueger disputed that and moved to suppress. At the suppression hearing the officer testified and the video from his squad car camera was played. The trial court found the video to be inconclusive and the officer’s testimony to be credible.

State v. Lance F., 2014AP1881-FT, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court lacks authority to order a juvenile (who had been found delinquent for battery, disorderly conduct and physical abuse of a child) to make restitution of the victim’s missing property, where he was never charged with theft of the property, he never admitted to stealing the property, and the state did not read in charges relating to theft of the property. The court explained:

Winnebago County DHS v. Ashley A.O., 2014AP2404, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A circuit court may not enter a summary judgment finding a parent unfit during the grounds phases of a TPR proceeding when that finding is based on an order denying the parent physical placement due to his (or her) incarceration.

State v. Charles V. Matalonis, 2014AP108-CR, District 2/4, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 4/17/15; case activity

The warrantless search of Matalonis’s home, which led to the discovery of marijuana, was not justified under the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement because there was no reasonable basis to believe there was an injured person in the home.

State v. Brett W. Dumstrey, 2015 WI App 5, petition for review granted 3/16/15, affirmed, 2016 WI 3; case activity

The court of appeals holds that the warrantless, nonconsensual entry by police into Dumstrey’s apartment complex parking garage was not unreasonable because the area was not part of the curtilage of Dumstrey’s home. The court also holds that any trespass by the police didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment because the garage wasn’t a constitutionally protected area. But a dissenting judge concludes prior Wisconsin case law establishes the garage was part of the curtilage and that the police conduct was unreasonable.

Racine County HSD v . Latasia D.M., 2014AP1672/1673, 12/23/14, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The stand out in this multi-issue TPR case is whether the circuit court erred in denying Latasia’s permission to withdraw her jury demand. The court of appeals answered “no” because even though § 48.31(2) and §48.422(4) set forth the procedures for demanding a jury in a TPR case, the general civil procedure statute, § 805.01(3), governs the withdrawal of a jury demand. The latter statute requires the consent of all the parties, which Latasia did not have.

State v. Timothy D. Russell, 2014AP451-CR, District 1, 12/23/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity

When sentencing Russell for a series of thefts committed while he was deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive, the circuit court referred to the charge to which Russell pled as “misconduct in public office, … not a theft as I think has been reported.” (¶8). The court of appeals holds that the sentencing transcript, when read as a whole, makes it clear that the circuit court did not erroneously believe it was sentencing Russell for the offense of misconduct in public office, but merely intended to note that Russell committed the offense of theft by virtue of his public position as deputy chief of staff to the Milwaukee County Executive.