On Point blog, page 218 of 485
Officer reasonably assumed that the car’s owner was driving
State v. Travis Daniel Thom, 2014AP613-CR, District 3, 9/9/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A police officer reasonably assumed a car was being driven by the owner where there was no additional information suggesting someone else was driving.
Police had probable cause to arrest for operating with a detectable amount of a controlled substance
State v. Alpesh D. Shah, 13AP2755, District 1, 9/9/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police officers’ observations of Shah and his driving supplied probable cause to arrest Shah for operating with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.
Extended statute of limitation for theft runs from actual discovery, not from when theft should have been discovered
State v. Kim B. Simmelink, 2014 WI App 102; case activity
The court of appeals holds that § 939.74(2)(b)’s extended statute of limitation for certain theft charges runs from actual discovery of the theft, and not from when the theft should have been discovered with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Tip from one student provided reasonable grounds for search of another student
State v. Chase A.T., 2014AP260, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A student’s tip to an assistant principal that a bathroom “smelled like marijuana smoke” and that a student named Chase walked out of the bathroom immediately before the tipster smelled the smoke provided reasonable grounds for the assistant principal to search Chase. In addition, the search of Chase was not excessive in scope. Thus, his motion to suppress was properly denied.
Police had reasonable basis to stop car for failing to signal
State v. Deborah K. Salzwedel, 2014AP301-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court’s finding that Salzwedel’s act of turning without signaling affected the movement of other traffic was not clearly erroneous, and therefore the officer had a reasonable basis to stop Salzwedel for violating § 346.34(1)(b).
Pro se defendant’s appellate arguments too undeveloped to address
State v. James E. Grant, 2013AP1829-CR & 2013AP1830-CR, District 4, 9/4/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1829-CR; 2013AP1830-CR
Two of the three arguments made in Grant’s appellate brief were sufficiently stated to survive the state’s motion to strike, but they are ultimately too undeveloped to address under State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, Grant failed to arrange for the production of the transcript of the circuit court’s oral ruling on his postconviction motion, meaning the transcript is assumed to support the circuit court’s decision, State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774.
Trial counsel’s failure to file timely alibi notice doesn’t get defendant new trial
State v. Deshun Latrell Bannister, 2013AP2679-CR, District 1, 9/3/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
A claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely alibi notice founders on the lack of prejudice, as there’s nothing in the record showing what the alibi witness would have said had she been allowed to testify.
Any error in admitting expert testimony in CHIPS case was harmless
State v. Eugene P., 2014AP361, 2014AP362 & 2014AP363, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP361; 2014AP362; 2014AP363
Allowing a doctor to testify at a CHIPS trial that the children’s injuries were the result of abuse was harmless because there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
Ch. 51 appeal is moot
Milwaukee County v. Rebecca G., 2014AP359, District 1, 9/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rebecca’s appeal of her ch. 51 commitment is dismissed as moot because the six-month commitment order expired while the appeal was pending and the County didn’t seek an extension.
A “motor bicycle” is a “motor vehicle” for purposes of § 346.63(1)
State v. Thomas W. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94; case activity
A “motor bicycle” is a bicycle with a motor added, and can be either pedaled or self-propelled using the motor, § 340.01(30). Whether a person can be charged under the OWI/PAC statute based on his operation of a motor bicycle depends on whether a motor bicycle is a “motor vehicle” under § 340.01(35). The court of appeals concludes that a plain-language reading of the relevant statutes shows a motor bicycle is a motor vehicle, “at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled.” (¶1).