On Point blog, page 223 of 485
Reading Miranda warnings before the “Informing the Accused” caution didn’t mislead defendant about implied consent law
Eau Claire County v. Michael A. Grogan, 2014AP172, District 3, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A reasonable person would have understood that he was given Miranda warnings because of his obstructionist behavior, so those warnings didn’t mislead Grogan into believing that the warnings applied in the implied consent context.
Failure to preserve evidence rule from Youngblood applies even though defendant wasn’t notified of right to test evidence before it was destoyed
State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity
Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.
County presented sufficient evidence to support involuntary medication order; recommitment deadline explained
Portage County v. Jeffrey J.T., 2013AP2481, District 4, 6/26/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The report of the examining physician was sufficient to show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication were explained to Jeffrey, the subject of a ch. 51 recommitment proceeding, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
County failed to prove lack of competence to refuse medication or treatment
Waukesha County v. Kathleen H., 2014AP90, District 2, 6/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The County did not show that Kathleen, the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is incompetent to refuse medication or treatment because it did not show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to her medication were explained to her, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
Failure to present evidence of alternative sources for child’s sexual knowledge wasn’t ineffective
State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
City failed to prove gun was used in commission of a crime, so it must be returned to owner
Aaron v. Ols v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP1882, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ols is entitled to the return of his firearm under § 968.20 because there is insufficient evidence that Ols used the firearm in the commission of a crime.
Bifurcated sentences for enhanced misdemeanors reversed because they violate the 75% rule
State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR
Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to comment on defendant’s silence or for telling jury defendant would testify
State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity
In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI despite lapse between time of driving and time of police contact
State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.
Theft-by-fraud conviction upheld based on indirect “communication” from defendant to victim
State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole. This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim. It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.