On Point blog, page 223 of 485
Comments posted on police department’s Facebook page weren’t “fighting words”
State v. Thomas G. Smith, 2013AP2516-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The profane comments Smith posted on a police department’s Facebook page are not “fighting words” because that category of unprotected speech only covers statements made in the context of a face-to-face communication.
Collateral attack on prior OWI failed to make prima facie showing
State v. Andre Durand Reggs, 2013AP2367-CR, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Applying State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, the circuit court properly concluded that Reggs failed to make a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel for an earlier OWI conviction.
Circuit court had jurisdiction to order revocation for refusal despite delay in filing notice of intent to revoke
Marquette County v. Thomas J. Wagenaar, 2013AP2454, District 4, 7/3/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A long delay in filing the notice of intent to revoke after Wagenaar refused a chemical test under § 343.305 didn’t deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction. In addition, police had probable cause to believe Wagenaar was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.
Mother’s no-contest plea in TPR was knowing and voluntary
State v. Connie P., 2013AP2854, District 1, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Connie’s no-contest plea at the grounds phase of her TPR proceeding was knowing and voluntary despite her post-termination assertion that she was unduly influenced by the trial court’s comments before the scheduled trial and by the decision of her child’s father, Ray, to stipulate to grounds for termination.
Reading Miranda warnings before the “Informing the Accused” caution didn’t mislead defendant about implied consent law
Eau Claire County v. Michael A. Grogan, 2014AP172, District 3, July 1, 2014 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A reasonable person would have understood that he was given Miranda warnings because of his obstructionist behavior, so those warnings didn’t mislead Grogan into believing that the warnings applied in the implied consent context.
Failure to preserve evidence rule from Youngblood applies even though defendant wasn’t notified of right to test evidence before it was destoyed
State v. Jessica M. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42; case activity
Saying it is bound by the rule from Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the court of appeals holds that the state’s destruction of a blood sample before the defendant was notified of her option to test the sample did not violate her due process rights because she has not shown the sample was “apparently exculpatory.” A vigorous dissent says the majority reads Youngblood too broadly, and concludes that because the evidence was inculpatory and necessary to the prosecution, destroying the evidence violated Weissinger’s due process rights even if the state didn’t act in bad faith.
County presented sufficient evidence to support involuntary medication order; recommitment deadline explained
Portage County v. Jeffrey J.T., 2013AP2481, District 4, 6/26/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The report of the examining physician was sufficient to show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication were explained to Jeffrey, the subject of a ch. 51 recommitment proceeding, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
County failed to prove lack of competence to refuse medication or treatment
Waukesha County v. Kathleen H., 2014AP90, District 2, 6/25/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The County did not show that Kathleen, the subject of a ch. 51 commitment proceeding, is incompetent to refuse medication or treatment because it did not show that the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to her medication were explained to her, as required by § 51.61(1)(g)4. and Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶¶91, 97, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607.
Failure to present evidence of alternative sources for child’s sexual knowledge wasn’t ineffective
State v. Bryanntton A. Brown, 2013AP1332-CR, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present certain evidence that the complainant in Brown’s child sexual assault prosecution may have obtained her sexual knowledge from watching TV and movies and talking to her older sister. Nor was trial counsel ineffective for not taking steps to mitigate the impact of a letter Brown purportedly wrote to Carson, a fellow jail inmate, in which Brown admitted the charges. Finally, the circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its sentencing discretion.
City failed to prove gun was used in commission of a crime, so it must be returned to owner
Aaron v. Ols v. City of Milwaukee, 2013AP1882, District 1, 6/24/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ols is entitled to the return of his firearm under § 968.20 because there is insufficient evidence that Ols used the firearm in the commission of a crime.