On Point blog, page 224 of 485
Bifurcated sentences for enhanced misdemeanors reversed because they violate the 75% rule
State v. Eric T. Alston, 2013AP1833-CR & 2013AP1834-CR, District 4, 4/19/16 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1833-CR; 2013AP1834-CR
Bifurcated sentences that were first modified under the now-superseded, unpublished ruling in State v. Gerondale have to be modified again because they violate the rule that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence can’t exceed 75% of the total sentence.
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to comment on defendant’s silence or for telling jury defendant would testify
State v. Russell S. Krancki, 2014 WI App 80; case activity
In the first Wisconsin case to address how Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013), affects the admission of evidence of a defendant’s silence, the court of appeals reads Salinas to apply to a narrow factual scenario not present in this case. The court goes on to assume that trial counsel should have objected to testimony about Krancki’s silence, but finds his failure to object wasn’t prejudicial. The court also concludes trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for saying in his opening statement that Krancki would testify or for failing to exclude references to the .02 blood alcohol limit.
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI despite lapse between time of driving and time of police contact
State v. Dale F. Wendt, 2014AP174, District 2, 6/18/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The information known to the deputy at the time he requested Wendt to take a blood test provided probable cause to believe Wendt had driven his vehicle while intoxicated earlier that evening, despite the deputy’s lack of information as to whether Wendt drank during the time that lapsed between his driving and his contact with the deputy.
Theft-by-fraud conviction upheld based on indirect “communication” from defendant to victim
State v. David Phillip Foley, 2013AP1722-CR/2013AP1723-CR; district 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Under § 943.20(1)(d), theft by fraud requires, among other things, that the defendant made a false representation to the owner of the property that the defendant stole. This does not require direct communication between the defendant and the victim. It is sufficient that the defendant made a statement to a third party with the intent or reasonable expectation that it would be communicated to the victim.
No new trial despite newly-discovered evidence that cops involved in arrest and trial were “dirty”
State v. Jesse J. Franklin, Jr., 2013AP1447, District 1, 6/17/14 (unpublished); case activity
Milwaukee Police Officers Paul Lough and James Campbell testified against Franklin at his trial for possession of marijuana and cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm by a felon. Franklin was convicted and lost his appeal. A few years later he filed a § 974.06 motion arguing that he should be granted a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence–namely evidence that Officers Campbell and Lough had beaten, planted evidence on, and falsely arrested 6 individuals during the same period in which they arrested Franklin. Franklin argued that this evidence supported his defense that someone else had placed in his van the drugs and guns that the police found there.
Lack of scienter requirement in statute prohibiting driving with a detectable amount of a controlled substance doesn’t violate due process
State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 2014 WI App 79, petition for review granted 10/15/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 42 (posts here and here); case activity
Section 346.63(1)(am), which prohibits operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in the blood, does not violate due process by failing to require proof that the defendant knowingly ingested the controlled substance. In addition, Luedtke’s due process rights were not violated when the state crime lab destroyed his blood sample before he could have it independently tested.
Exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry into apartment; officer’s earlier steps past the threshold “irrelevant”
State v. Cordarol M. Kirby, 2014 WI App 74; case activity
The court of appeals holds that “while exigent circumstances may justify entry, the fact that entry has already been made does not necessarily invalidate reliance on the exigent circumstances doctrine.” (¶22). Thus, because in this case there were exigent circumstances justifying police entry into an apartment to locate a backpack the police believed contained firearms, it “does not matter” that an officer had earlier stepped over the threshold of the apartment door to converse with people inside.
Dad was not “innocent owner” of the car daughter used to sell drugs
State v. One 2010 Nissan Altima, 2013AP2176, District 2, 6/11/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Daughter’s possession of and control over a car titled and registered in her father’s name made her the “owner” of the car for purposes of the property forfeiture law, so the circuit court properly rejected her father’s claim that he was the “innocent owner.”
Court of appeals affirms order for new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel
State v. Donald Ray Michael, 2012AP2738-CR, District 1, 6/10/14 (not recommended for publication); case activity
Michael is entitled to a new trial on reckless injury and felon in possession of a firearm charges because trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to introduce evidence from the police department’s computer automated dispatch (CAD) report and failing to present testimony from an eyewitness to the incident.
Court did not erroneously exercise discretion in disposition of TPR case
State v. Dwayne F., Jr., 2014AP595, District 1, 6/10/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the best interests of Dwayne F.’s daughter would be served by a guardianship with the Child Welfare Bureau for adoption by her foster family, instead of placement with Dwayne F.’s father.