On Point blog, page 227 of 483
Court of Appeals addresses burden of proof for determining competency during postconviction proceedings
State v. Roddee W. Daniel, 2014 WI App 46, petition for review granted 9/18/14, modified and affirmed, 2015 WI 44; case activity
When postconviction counsel questions a defendant’s competency to understand his or her § 809.30 appellate rights or ability to effectively communicate with counsel but the defendant asserts he or she is competent, defense counsel has the burden of proving the defendant is incompetent by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.
Trial court erred in relying on the abrogated “interlocking confession” doctrine to deny severance of co-defendants’ trials
State v. John M. Navigato, 2012AP2108-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
State v. Teddy W. Bieker, 2012AP2693-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court, relying on the district attorney’s assertion of the so-called “interlocking confessions” doctrine, denied Navigato’s and Bieker’s motions to sever their trials on homicide,
Police had probable cause to arrest for eluding and OWI
State v. Marcus Norfleet, 2013AP2294-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police had probable cause to arrest Norfleet for both eluding and operating while intoxicated under the totality of the facts and circumstances available to the officer at the time of arrest.
After an officer tried to stop a speeding car at around 1:00 a.m., the car accelerated,
Lasanske compels rejection of Gerondale claim
State v. Anthony R. Giebel, 2013AP1874-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; c0urt of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Giebel challenged his misdemeanor repeater sentence based on the holding in State v. Gerondale, Nos. 2009AP1237/1238-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 3, 2009). While his appeal was pending, the court of appeals decided State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26,
TPR based on continuing denial of periods of placement and disposition didn’t violate due process
Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46
Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.
Trial court improperly weighed persuasiveness of evidence in denying Ch. 980 discharge petition
State v. Scott Maher, 2013AP1815, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court impermissibly weighed the relative persuasiveness of conflicting examination reports of experts when it denied Maher’s § 980.09 petition without holding a discharge hearing when it said it had “some ability apparently to assess the accuracy of the expert’s report or their qualifications” and concluded that the “wildly different conclusions”
OK to waive first-time 16-year-old offender into adult court on burglary charge
State v. Kadeem R., 2013AP2769, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The juvenile court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion under § 938.18 when it waived jurisdiction over a 16-year-old with no prior juvenile history for being an accomplice to an attempted nonviolent burglary. (¶¶2-5). There was no issue as to prosecutive merit, § 938.18(4), so the question was the application of the criteria under § 938.18(5).
Collective knowledge of police provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
State v. Matthew M. Moskopf, 2013AP771-CR, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police had collective knowledge of specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion to stop Moskopf’s vehicle where two 911 calls to the police department dispatcher–one from a bartender, another from an off-duty cop–reported that a man had been trying to get back into a bar he had been kicked out of,
All motions to reopen judgment based on voluntary termination of parental rights are governed by § 48.46(2)
Mareza L. v. Kim M.P., 2013AP1382, District 1, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The plain language of § 48.46(2) limits the time for any motion to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights, regardless of the grounds for the motion. Thus, even though Mareza now claims her voluntary termination was not, in fact, voluntary, her failure to bring a motion to reopen the judgment within the statute’s time limits means the circuit court properly denied the motion.
Evidence was sufficient to show mother failed to assume parental responsibility
Barron County DHHS v. Maria A., 2013AP2735, District 3, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under the highly deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims, State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶30, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Maria failed to assume parental responsibility for her daughter,