On Point blog, page 229 of 485
TPR based on continuing denial of periods of placement and disposition didn’t violate due process
Dane County DHS v. Latasha G., 2014AP45 & 2014AP46, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2014AP45; 2014AP46
Latasha argues she was determined to be unfit based on a condition that was impossible for her to satisfy due to an order in criminal cases barring any contact with the girls. Thus, the termination violated her substantive due process rights under Kenosha Cnty.
Trial court improperly weighed persuasiveness of evidence in denying Ch. 980 discharge petition
State v. Scott Maher, 2013AP1815, District 4, 4/3/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The circuit court impermissibly weighed the relative persuasiveness of conflicting examination reports of experts when it denied Maher’s § 980.09 petition without holding a discharge hearing when it said it had “some ability apparently to assess the accuracy of the expert’s report or their qualifications” and concluded that the “wildly different conclusions”
OK to waive first-time 16-year-old offender into adult court on burglary charge
State v. Kadeem R., 2013AP2769, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The juvenile court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion under § 938.18 when it waived jurisdiction over a 16-year-old with no prior juvenile history for being an accomplice to an attempted nonviolent burglary. (¶¶2-5). There was no issue as to prosecutive merit, § 938.18(4), so the question was the application of the criteria under § 938.18(5).
Collective knowledge of police provided reasonable suspicion for traffic stop
State v. Matthew M. Moskopf, 2013AP771-CR, District 2, 4/2/14; court of appeals decision (one judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The police had collective knowledge of specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion to stop Moskopf’s vehicle where two 911 calls to the police department dispatcher–one from a bartender, another from an off-duty cop–reported that a man had been trying to get back into a bar he had been kicked out of,
All motions to reopen judgment based on voluntary termination of parental rights are governed by § 48.46(2)
Mareza L. v. Kim M.P., 2013AP1382, District 1, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The plain language of § 48.46(2) limits the time for any motion to reopen a judgment terminating parental rights, regardless of the grounds for the motion. Thus, even though Mareza now claims her voluntary termination was not, in fact, voluntary, her failure to bring a motion to reopen the judgment within the statute’s time limits means the circuit court properly denied the motion.
Evidence was sufficient to show mother failed to assume parental responsibility
Barron County DHHS v. Maria A., 2013AP2735, District 3, 4/1/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Under the highly deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims, State v. Quinsanna D., 2002 WI App 318, ¶30, 259 Wis. 2d 429, 655 N.W.2d 752, the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that Maria failed to assume parental responsibility for her daughter,
10-year history of drug-dealing deemed admissible in case where state declined to charge drug crimes
State v. Jimmy L. Powell, 2013AP1111-CR, 3/27/14, District 4; (not recommended for publication); case activity
This appeal stems from a 1st-degree reckless injury conviction. Powell, a drug dealer, ran over and/or cut his client’s throat during a deal. His enthusiastic, 38-page initial brief raises 7 issues for review. This post examines the court of appeals’ decision on 2 of them.
“Other Acts” Evidence Issue: Whether the circuit court erred in admitting “other acts”
Additional pre-sentence credit granted after revocation of parole isn’t applied to reincarceration time
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, petition for review granted 11/14/14, reversed, 2015 WI 66; case activity
When sentence credit for time spent in custody before the defendant was sentenced is not granted until after the defendant has been revoked from parole and reincarcerated, the plain language of § 302.11(7)(am) and (b) requires DOC to apply the credit to the remaining period of parole,
Retroactive application of the law repealing the 2009 Act 28 early release statutes violates ex post facto clauses
State ex rel. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, petitions for review and cross review granted 11/4/15, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2016 WI 67; case activity
When Singh committed, or was convicted and sentenced for, his offenses, he was eligible for early release under statutes enacted by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28. But by the time he arrived at prison,
TPR petitioner didn’t prove that father failed to assume parental responsibility
Mary E.B. v. Cecil M., 2014AP160, District 2, 3/26/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted, 9/18/14, appeal voluntarily dismissed 12/17/14; case activity
The circuit court properly found that a mother who petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights did not prove the father failed to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6). The court of appeals rejects the mother’s arguments that the circuit court applied an erroneous legal standard and that its decision is not supported by the record.