On Point blog, page 230 of 483
12- to 13-month charging delay did not violate Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee
State v. Brian C. Beahm, 2013AP1678-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
An 12- to 13-month delay between Beahm’s arrest and the filing of OWI charges did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.
Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated depends on: the length of the delay; the reason for the delay;
Taking defendant from site of stop to nearby police station didn’t turn stop into an arrest
State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.
A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.
Officer had reasonable suspicion to continue detention and administer field sobriety tests
Marquette County v. Randy S. Tomaw, 2013AP1510, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Tomaw was going 17 miles over the speed limit at 1:20 on a Sunday morning. He did not appear to respond to the officer’s initial attempt at contact, his upper body swayed as he walked to the rear of his vehicle, and the officer detected the “strong odor” of alcohol on his breath.
Incomplete record means no review
State v. Daniel T. Storm, 2013AP2212, District 2, 3/5/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Storm’s claim that the circuit court imposed a fine and costs without determining his ability to pay because Storm did not provide a complete record on appeal:
¶4 It would have been nice had Storm provided us with the transcripts of those hearings [to which the circuit court’s written decision referred] so that we could see for ourselves what happened which resulted in the stipulation.
Defendant failed to prove her panic attack justified pre-sentencing plea withdrawal
State v. Gabriella Bernabei, 2013AP1734-CR & 2013AP1735-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1734-CR; 2013AP1735-CR
The trial court properly denied Bernabei’s motion to withdraw her pleas before sentencing because the record supported its conclusion that she had not proven she was suffering a panic attack at the time she entered her pleas.
Bernabei was charged with child neglect and multiple counts of animal mistreatment.
No error in failure to give instructions on lesser included homicide charges where defendant’s trial testimony didn’t support them
State v. Tammy S. Cole, 2013AP947-CR, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The trial court did not err in declining to instruct on second-degree reckless homicide or homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon, as Cole requested at her trial on one count of first degree intentional homicide for shooting Evans, her boyfriend:
¶14 The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Cole does not support submission of these lesser-included offenses.
Conviction under § 947.01 for “violent, abusive and otherwise disorderly conduct” qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
Robert W. Evans, Jr., v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Justice, 2014 WI App 31, overruled by Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31; case activity
A conviction for disorderly conduct under § 947.01 may qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), thus depriving the defendant of the right to possess a firearm.
Evans’s application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon was denied after DOJ concluded his 2002 disorderly conduct conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
Allowing testimony of foster parent at TPR grounds hearing was not improper
Wood County Human Services Dep’t v. Melanie M., 2013AP2814, 2013AP2815, & 2013AP2816, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP2814; 2013AP2815; 2013AP2816
Foster parent testimony during the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding has the potential to be prejudicial because it creates a risk the jury will reach a verdict by comparing the biological parent to the foster parent;
Officer’s approaching person on street and engaging him in conversation wasn’t a seizure
State v. Keith R. Friederick, 2013AP1609, District 4, 2/27/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Friederick was not seized by officer who approached him on the street and said sought to talk to him, applying United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), along with State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶53, 236 Wis.
Good-bye to Gerondale: Enhanced misdemeanor sentences are governed by the basic 75% and 25% rules
State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity
In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,