On Point blog, page 239 of 485
Consent to termination of parental rights deemed voluntary and in the best interests of the child
Jessica G. and Joshua G. v. Alicia L., 2013AP1843, District 2, 11/27/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Issue: Whether Alicia’s L’s consent to the termination of her parental rights was voluntary.
¶6 The circuit court may accept a parent’s voluntary consent to TPR only after questioning the parent and determining that the consent is voluntary and informed. Wis. Stat. § 48.41(2)(a). In making its determination,
Trial court properly concluded officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI
Fond du Lac County v. Randal B. Hopper, 2012AP1719, District 2, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly concluded the defendant did not unlawfully refuse to provide a breath sample because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI:
¶10 Considering the collective knowledge of dispatch and the arresting deputy at the time the deputy arrested Hopper,
Religious objection to blood draw is not relevant at a refusal hearing
State v. Victoria M. Milewski, 2013AP1323, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
After being arrested for OWI Milewski refused a blood test, saying her Christian Scientist beliefs prohibited her from allowing a needle to be inserted in her body; she offered to provide a urine sample instead. (¶¶2-3). At her refusal hearing she asserted her refusal to submit to the blood test for religious reasons was a reasonable objection under State v.
Suicidal thoughts and other evidence sufficient to meet Chapter 51 “dangerous” test
Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2013AP1638-FT, District 3, 11/26/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 127; case activity
Michael H. challenges a jury verdict finding him “dangerous” under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2a and involuntarily committing him for mental health treatment. Given this procedural posture, the court of appeals’ holding seems confined to the facts of this case.
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in declining to stay juvenile sex offender registration order
State v. Niko C., 2013AP1393, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying Niko’s request to stay the requirement that he register as a sex offender under State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1.
First, the court considered the relevant factors under §§ 301.45(1m)(e) and 938.34(15m)(c) and (16).
Victim’s injuries provided sufficient factual basis for plea to first degree reckless injury
State v. Antonio Reyes-Ortiz, 2013AP268-CR, District 1, 11/26/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Reyes-Ortiz argued there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea to first degree reckless injury because the victim’s injuries rose only to the level of “substantial bodily harm” under § 939.22(38), not “great bodily harm” under § 939.22(14), as required by § 940.23(1)(a).
The newly-adopted Daubert standard does not apply to ch. 980 discharge proceedings if the original petition for commitment was filed before the effective date of the standard’s adoption
State v. Michael Alger, 2013 WI App 148, petition for review granted, 5/23/14, affirmed, 2015 WI 3; case activity
In this important decision addressing an issue that’s been percolating in ch. 980 cases, the court of appeals holds that the Daubert standard for expert testimony does not apply to any proceedings in a ch.
Defects in notice about right to request refusal hearing didn’t excuse untimely filing of request
State v. Sidney H. Sawicky, 2013AP1335, District 3, 11/19/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54, 348 Wis. 2d 282, 832 N.W.2d 121, held that the 10-day limit for requesting a refusal hearing set out in § 343.305(9)(a)4. and (10)(a) is mandatory and cannot be extended, even due to excusable neglect.
Charge of driving without valid license instead of operating after revocation didn’t deprive circuit court of jurisdiction
State v. Cindy Lou Hilsgen, 2013AP659-CR & 2013AP660-CR, District 3, 11/19/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
When Hilsgen moved here from Minnesota her driver’s license was revoked, and she never got a Wisconsin license. She was charged in two separate cases with operating without a valid license. Relying on § 343.05(6), she claimed in postconviction motions that she should have been charged instead with operating while revoked based on the status of her Minnesota license.
Huge restitution award upheld based on defendant’s chance of winning lottery
State v. Ericka S. Thomas, Appeal No. 2013AP341-CR; District 1; 11/13/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This is a split decision over the proper application of § 973.20, the restitution statute. The circuit court convicted Thomas of Medicaid fraud, sentenced her to imprisonment, and ordered her to pay $356, 366.33 (the total amount she and accomplices stole) in restitution. At sentencing, her lawyer described her “extremely limited earning ability,” a statement bolstered by her PSI.