On Point blog, page 242 of 488
Aggregating 289 thefts as 1 continuous offense then dividing by 8 = no multiplicity violation
State v. Tina M. Jacobsen, 2014 WI App 13; case activity
Jacobsen was charged with 8 offenses for stealing $500,000 from her employer, and she was convicted on 3 counts. The charges were based on 289 individual thefts occurring over 3 years. On appeal she claimed her trial lawyer was ineffective for failing advise her that, and for failing to seek dismissal because, the charges were duplicitous or multiplicitous.
Jury need not be unanimous about exact location in building where felon possessed firearm
State v. Julian L. Perez, 2013AP750-CR, District 1, 12/10/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Where the evidence at trial showed that the defendant possessed a firearm over a short span of time at two locations in the same apartment building, the jury did not need to be unanimous as to which location the possession occurred. Instead, unanimity was required only as to whether the defendant had possessed a firearm in the building in question on the date charged.
Defendant must file a separate § 973.195 sentence adjustment petition for each sentence to be adjusted
State v. Jeffery Polar, Jr., 2014 WI App 15; case activity
The court of appeals holds that the plain language of § 973.195(1r)(a) requires a defendant serving multiple sentences to file a separate sentence adjustment petition for each individual sentence the defendant is seeking to adjust.
Polar’s governing sentences consisted of two consecutive terms, one with 7 years of confinement, the second for 3 years of confinement.
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to testimony about recorded conversations in Spanish between the defendant and the victim
State v. Adamis Figueroa, 2013AP47-CR, District 1, 12/3/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of a police department employee about the content of two recorded conversations in Spanish between Figueroa and J.R., who alleged Figueroa had sexually assaulted her several years ago, when she was a child. (During one conversation J.R. wore a wire and spoke with Figueroa in person;
Denial of motion to suppress confession, which led to guilty plea, deemed harmless error
State v. Trenton James Dawson, 2013AP834-Cr, District 1, 12/3/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This decision points up a problem in Wisconsin case law: How does an appellate court analyze “harmless error” in a situation where the trial court denies a motion to suppress a defendant’s confession, which then causes him to plead guilty?
Police interrogated Dawson for 30-45 minutes in the back of a squad car about his friend’s death.
First Amendment protects juvenile’s “crude and vulgar” YouTube video against disorderly conduct charge, but not against charge of unlawful use of computerized communication system
State v. Kaleb K., 2013AP839, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Kaleb posted a video on YouTube that depicted him “rapping” a song about his Spanish teacher. The song used “crude and vulgar sexual language” about the teacher. (¶2). (The trial court was harsher, characterizing the video as “obscene and hate-filled” and “shocking, hard to watch, really disgusting.” (¶3).) Based on the video Kaleb was charged in juvenile court with disorderly conduct under § 947.01(1) and unlawful use of a computerized communication system under § 947.0125(2)(d).
Consent to termination of parental rights deemed voluntary and in the best interests of the child
Jessica G. and Joshua G. v. Alicia L., 2013AP1843, District 2, 11/27/13 (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Issue: Whether Alicia’s L’s consent to the termination of her parental rights was voluntary.
¶6 The circuit court may accept a parent’s voluntary consent to TPR only after questioning the parent and determining that the consent is voluntary and informed. Wis. Stat. § 48.41(2)(a). In making its determination,
Trial court properly concluded officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for OWI
Fond du Lac County v. Randal B. Hopper, 2012AP1719, District 2, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly concluded the defendant did not unlawfully refuse to provide a breath sample because the officer lacked probable cause to arrest him for OWI:
¶10 Considering the collective knowledge of dispatch and the arresting deputy at the time the deputy arrested Hopper,
Religious objection to blood draw is not relevant at a refusal hearing
State v. Victoria M. Milewski, 2013AP1323, District 4, 11/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
After being arrested for OWI Milewski refused a blood test, saying her Christian Scientist beliefs prohibited her from allowing a needle to be inserted in her body; she offered to provide a urine sample instead. (¶¶2-3). At her refusal hearing she asserted her refusal to submit to the blood test for religious reasons was a reasonable objection under State v.
Suicidal thoughts and other evidence sufficient to meet Chapter 51 “dangerous” test
Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2013AP1638-FT, District 3, 11/26/13 (1-judge decision, ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, affirmed, 2014 WI 127; case activity
Michael H. challenges a jury verdict finding him “dangerous” under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2a and involuntarily committing him for mental health treatment. Given this procedural posture, the court of appeals’ holding seems confined to the facts of this case.