On Point blog, page 243 of 483
Right to confront and present evidence; probative value of evidence outweighed by prejudicial effect, § 904.03
State v. Damon R. Lowe, 2012AP555-CR, District 2, 9/18/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Lowe, charged with sexual and physical abuse of V.A.L., his adopted daughter, sought to present evidence that she was motivated to fabricate her allegations because she wanted to get away from her overly strict father, who restricted her use of cell phones, her internet use, and her choice of friends.
More on probable cause to arrest for OWI
State v. George R. Ferrell, Appeal No. 2012AP2602, 9/26/13, (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
A state trooper does not need evidence such as odors, admissions or containers to have probable cause to arrest for OWI. These facts will do the trick:
¶12 . . . [T]he State Patrol received several reports that Ferrell was driving erratically and dangerously. Thiede observed that Ferrell was speeding and watched Ferrell swerve within his lane.
For intent to defraud case, no need to instruct jury on terms of contract authorizing defendant’s conduct
State v. Greg LaPean, 2012AP2309-CR, District 3, 9/26/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity
This case boils down to whether LaPean transferred encumbered farm equipment with intent to defraud his lender, Security State Bank, in violation of § 943.84(2)(a); Wis JI-Criminal 1470. LaPean asserted the real controversy was not tried due to an incomplete instruction on intent, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of intent,
Police had probable cause to arrest for OWI based on driver’s admission he was impaired
Winnebago County v. Brady E. Bauman, 2013AP1075, District 2, 9/18/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
After encountering a deputy in a parking lot, Bauman stated he had been drinking, had driven a half-hour before, and had pulled into the parking lot because he felt impaired. The deputy asked, “Are you telling me that you are impaired and you were driving in an impaired state?” Bauman answered “yes.” The deputy had probable cause to arrest Bauman:
¶4 ….
Lack of colloquy regarding waiver of counsel in prior OWI case does not make prima facie showing for collateral attack
State v. Glen G. Bowe, 2013AP238-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The lack of any colloquy regarding Bowe’s waiver of his right to counsel when he pled in his prior OWI case does not by itself make the prima facie showing necessary for a collateral attack on the prior conviction because State v. Ernst,
Reseasonable suspicion of impairment justified extension of traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests
State v. Kenneth B. Burmeister, 2013AP1016-CR, District 3, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Police lawfully extended a traffic stop to conduct field sobriety tests because the odor of alcohol, the driver’s initial “deflective answer” to the question of whether he had been drinking, and his subsequent admission to drinking gave the police reasonable suspicion to believe the driver was impaired:
¶11 We reject Burmeister’s assertion that the facts observed by Logan suggest only the presence of alcohol.
Ineffective assistance of counsel — failure to demand speedy trial, communicate with defendant, and impeach the victim. Sentencing — unduly harsh sentence.
State v. Jerry Lee Carson, 2012AP2616-CR, District 1, 9/17/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Carson, convicted of second degree recklessly endangering safety, claimed his trial lawyer was ineffective on various grounds. The court of appeals holds counsel was not ineffective for failing to:
- Demand a speedy trial. Carson was not prejudiced by the delay beyond the statutory speedy trial deadlines.
Court of appeals: of curative instructions and smelly skunks
State v. Omar J. Smith, 2012AP863-CR, District 1, 9/10/13; (not recommended for publication); case activity
A jury convicted Smith of first-degree reckless homicide while armed as party to a crime and a host of other crimes. Two issues are noteworthy.
Miranda-Edwards issue: Police began questioning Smith while he was in custody. He invoked his right to counsel, so they stopped. They re-initiated questioning (with fresh Miranda warnings) during which Smith said things like “I kind of want a lawyer present,
Law of the case doctrine — procedure on remand
State v. Gary Wieczorek, 2012AP2217-CR, District 3, 9/10/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court had previously held that Wieczorek was unlawfully seized by the police on his front porch, but the court of appeals reversed that holding and remanded the case for further proceedings. (¶¶2-4). On remand, Wieczorek again alleged the seizure was unlawful because there were no exigent circumstances.
TPR — improper “golden rule” argument to jury
State v. Samantha S., 2013AP1503 & 2013AP1504, District 1, 9/10/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP1503; 2013AP1504
During closing arguments at the fact-finding hearing the guardian ad litem referred to Samantha’s failure to keep visitation appointments and said this failure confused the children, who as a consequence were becoming attached to the foster caregivers. (¶2). The court holds this statement did not amount to an improper “golden rule”