On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. John C. Baker, 2012AP2163-CR, District 2/4, 5/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The totality of the circumstances shows a police officer could reasonably suspect that a break-in had occurred or was about to occur at the time the officer temporarily detained Baker for the purpose of investigating that reasonable suspicion. The court concludes that even though “pulling one’s vehicle into a closed business during the middle of the night,

State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),

State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,

State v. Ervin Thomas, 2013 WI App 78; case activity

The trial court properly calculated the 180-day speedy trial time limit from the prosecutor’s actual receipt of Thomas’s demand for disposition, and not from the receipt of the demand three days earlier by the county courthouse’s “Information Management Services Distribution” [sic] office. Under § 976.05(3)(a) and State v. Whittemore,

Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.

Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often.  In this case, it did.   A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,

State v. Vicente Paul Vento, 2012AP1763-CR, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Invoking its discretionary reversal power, the court of appeals holds Vento is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and based its verdict on speculative testimony from an expert:

¶28      We agree with Vento that there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result because he met his burden under Wis.

Winnebago County v. Gina A.R., 2013AP226, District 2, 5/22/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activty

The court rejects Gina A.R.’s claim that the evidence at the final hearing was insufficient to show she  is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous, noting that much of her argument discusses facts not in the record and that the undisputed facts supported the commitment order. (¶¶4-6).

State v. Tammy S. Camden, 2012AP1451, District 4, 5/23/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court concluded a driver’s speeding was legally justified after accepting her testimony that she exceeded the speed limit in order to get away from a vehicle following in close proximity and copying her every move. The court of appeals reverses, concluding the defense of legal justification or “necessity”

Langlade County DSS v. Michael P., 2013AP385, 2013AP386, & 2013AP387, District 3, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP385; 2013AP386; 2013AP387

Sufficiency of evidence

Based on the entire record of the fact-finding hearing, the court of appeals concludes there was sufficient evidence that Michael P. failed to assume parental responsibility, despite his testimony tending to show he did assume responsibility:

¶26      …[I]t is clear that Michael did not have a “substantial parental relationship” with his children over the course of their lives. 

State v. Marquese H., 2013AP565, 2013AP566, & 2013AP567, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity: 2013AP565; 2013AP566; 2013AP567

The circuit court properly exercised its discretion in terminating Marquese H.’s parental rights because it considered the factors under § 48.426(1). The court rejects Marquese’s specific claim that the circuit court erred because, under § 48.426(1)(c) and Darryl T.-H.