On Point blog, page 251 of 484
Reckless driving, § 346.62(2) — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Rahb J. Kettleson, 2012AP2230, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The testimony of a citizen-witness–that a car operated by Kettleson “was probably going about 65 to 68[,]” came within five or ten feet of the rear of his vehicle before passing him, made at least six lane changes without signaling, and was traveling about the same speed while coming within approximately five to ten feet of other cars he was passing–was sufficient to support Kettleson’s conviction for reckless driving:
¶9 To convict Kettleson,
Habeas corpus provides remedy where parent’s lawyer failed to file timely appeal in TPR case
Amy W. v. David G., 2013 WI App 83; case activity
David G.’s parental rights were terminated in a proceeding commenced by the child’s mother. He filed a timely notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief, but his appointed appellate counsel failed to file a notice of appeal before the deadline. (¶3). That deadline cannot be extended because the legislature has decreed that the time for filing an appeal in a TPR case may not be enlarged when the petition was filed by someone other than “a representative of the public.”
Traffic stop — reasonable suspicion to believe break-in was occurring
State v. John C. Baker, 2012AP2163-CR, District 2/4, 5/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The totality of the circumstances shows a police officer could reasonably suspect that a break-in had occurred or was about to occur at the time the officer temporarily detained Baker for the purpose of investigating that reasonable suspicion. The court concludes that even though “pulling one’s vehicle into a closed business during the middle of the night,
Courts had no jurisdiction to consider plea withdrawal motion filed more than five years after sentencing
State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),
TPR — consideration of parent’s incarceration; exercise of discretion at disposition
State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,
Interstate Agreement on Detainers — delivery of request for disposition to prosecuting officer; applicability of substantial compliance doctrine
State v. Ervin Thomas, 2013 WI App 78; case activity
The trial court properly calculated the 180-day speedy trial time limit from the prosecutor’s actual receipt of Thomas’s demand for disposition, and not from the receipt of the demand three days earlier by the county courthouse’s “Information Management Services Distribution” [sic] office. Under § 976.05(3)(a) and State v. Whittemore,
Court of appeals tosses jury verdict in CHIPS case
Polk County v. Norman S., 2012AP2801, District 3, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity.
Given the court of appeals’s highly deferential standard of review for jury verdicts, it doesn’t throw them out very often. In this case, it did. A jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Norman S. was unable to provide necessary care so as to seriously endanger the physical health of his son,
New trial in the interest of justice ordered for defendant who raised NGI defense
State v. Vicente Paul Vento, 2012AP1763-CR, District 1, 5/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
Invoking its discretionary reversal power, the court of appeals holds Vento is entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice on the issue of his mental responsibility under Wis. Stat. § 971.15 because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and based its verdict on speculative testimony from an expert:
¶28 We agree with Vento that there is a substantial probability that a new trial would produce a different result because he met his burden under Wis.
Ch. 51 mental health commitment — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Gina A.R., 2013AP226, District 2, 5/22/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activty
The court rejects Gina A.R.’s claim that the evidence at the final hearing was insufficient to show she is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous, noting that much of her argument discusses facts not in the record and that the undisputed facts supported the commitment order. (¶¶4-6).
Traffic forfeiture — speeding — defense of “necessity”
State v. Tammy S. Camden, 2012AP1451, District 4, 5/23/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court concluded a driver’s speeding was legally justified after accepting her testimony that she exceeded the speed limit in order to get away from a vehicle following in close proximity and copying her every move. The court of appeals reverses, concluding the defense of legal justification or “necessity”