On Point blog, page 251 of 485
Substitution of judge — § 971.20(4),(5); reassignment of original judge does not make the judge “new” for substitution purposes. Admission of evidence — limiting the playing of audio recordings. Armed robbery, § 943.32 — sufficiency of the evidence.
State v. Keith M. Bohannon, 2013 WI App 87; case activity
Substitution of judge; “new” judge under § 971.20(5)
When a case is reassigned from the original judge to a second judge and then reassigned again back to the first judge, the first judge is the “original” judge assigned to the case under § 971.20(4), not a “new” judge under § 971.20(5). Therefore, a motion to substitute the original judge had to be filed before the arraignment,
Sex offender registration — court’s consideration of dismissed charges as part of exercise of discretion
State v. Christopher James Athas, 2012AP2151-CR, District 1, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court properly considered previous sexual assault charges that had been dismissed when it was deciding whether to order Athas to register as a sex offender after his conviction for fourth degree sexual assault:
¶3 …. Whether to order sex-offender registration is part of the circuit court’s sentencing discretion.
Disorderly conduct — sufficiency of the evidence
State v. Christina V., 2013AP405-FT, District 3, 6/11/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s order adjudicating Christina delinquent of disorderly conduct despite the judge’s comments that what happened in the case was “somewhat of a guess” and that his conclusions were “[m]y best guess” and based on what “I suspect” happened. (¶¶12-13).
Though the trial court found none of the witnesses “all that reliable”
Request for maximum sentence by police officers who were also victims did not breach plea agreement
State v. London Mack Stewart, 2013 WI App 86; case activity
Stewart was convicted of reckless injury, reckless endangerment, and felon in possession after he shot at and injured a police officer executing a warrant at a home where Stewart was staying. (¶2). Under the plea agreement the state agreed to recommend a “global” 25-year sentence (15 in, 10 out); the state did so, but the injured officer,
TPR — Effective assistance of counsel at fact-finding hearing
Jenna L.C. v. Dustin J.K.V., 2012AP2696, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Dustin’s claim that his attorney was ineffective at the fact-finding hearing on a TPR petition alleging he had failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter, Breyanna.
Trial counsel did not object to certain evidence about conduct Dustin allegedly engaged in shortly before he learned his girlfriend was pregnant with Breyanna.
Reckless driving, § 346.62(2) — sufficiency of the evidence
Winnebago County v. Rahb J. Kettleson, 2012AP2230, District 2, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The testimony of a citizen-witness–that a car operated by Kettleson “was probably going about 65 to 68[,]” came within five or ten feet of the rear of his vehicle before passing him, made at least six lane changes without signaling, and was traveling about the same speed while coming within approximately five to ten feet of other cars he was passing–was sufficient to support Kettleson’s conviction for reckless driving:
¶9 To convict Kettleson,
Habeas corpus provides remedy where parent’s lawyer failed to file timely appeal in TPR case
Amy W. v. David G., 2013 WI App 83; case activity
David G.’s parental rights were terminated in a proceeding commenced by the child’s mother. He filed a timely notice of intent to pursue postdisposition relief, but his appointed appellate counsel failed to file a notice of appeal before the deadline. (¶3). That deadline cannot be extended because the legislature has decreed that the time for filing an appeal in a TPR case may not be enlarged when the petition was filed by someone other than “a representative of the public.”
Traffic stop — reasonable suspicion to believe break-in was occurring
State v. John C. Baker, 2012AP2163-CR, District 2/4, 5/30/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity
The totality of the circumstances shows a police officer could reasonably suspect that a break-in had occurred or was about to occur at the time the officer temporarily detained Baker for the purpose of investigating that reasonable suspicion. The court concludes that even though “pulling one’s vehicle into a closed business during the middle of the night,
Courts had no jurisdiction to consider plea withdrawal motion filed more than five years after sentencing
State v. Juan M. Rodriguez-Faustino, 2012AP2777, District 1, May 29, 2013; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
Rodriguez-Faustino pled to a misdemeanor drug offense and, in January 2007, was placed on probation for 12 months. (¶¶4-5). In September 2012 he filed a motion to withdraw his plea, asserting his attorney was ineffective under Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1475‑1476 (2010),
TPR — consideration of parent’s incarceration; exercise of discretion at disposition
State v. Roy W., 2013AP413, District 1, 5/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The court of appeals rejects Roy W.’s arguments that “virtually every” factor under § 48.426(3) weighed in his favor and that the only ground for terminating his parental rights was his sixteen month prison sentence. (¶1). Based on a lengthy review of the record and the circuit court’s reasoning for terminating Roy’s parental rights (¶¶2-9,