On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Jeremiah J. Purtell, 2012AP1307-CR, District 2, 3/7/13  (not recommended for publication); petition for review granted 11/20/13.  Case activity.

This case concerns a probation agent’s search of the defendant’s computers.  Following a conviction for 2 counts of animal cruelty, a court placed the defendant on probation and imposed a condition that he not own or possess a computer. 

State v. Tavoris A. Murphy, Sr., 2012AP505-CR, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Murphy argues the circuit court erred when it found good cause for the state’s late disclosure of a letter written by the defendant and ruled the letter would be admissible as rebuttal evidence. (¶¶1, 20, 22). The letter was written to DeKeyser, a defense witness, and outlined DeKeyser’s testimony.

Village of Spring Green v. Michael D. Deignan, 2012AP1303, District 4, 2/28/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The court of appeals rejects the claim that § 175.40(6), which authorizes an officer to arrest or provide aid or assistance anywhere in the state under written inter-agency agreements, should govern the lawfulness of defendant’s arrest because it is more specific than Wis. Stat. § 175.40(2), which authorizes an officer to arrest while engaging “in fresh pursuit” anywhere in the state:

¶14      ….

State v. Joseph L. Hernandez, 2012AP2148-CR, District 2, 2/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

The trial court properly found that Hernandez made a prima facie showing that a prior OWI conviction was invalid despite his poor recollection of details of the prior proceeding, distinguishing State v. Hammill, 2006 WI App 128, ¶11, 293 Wis. 654, 718 N.W.2d 747 (“a defendant who ‘simply does not remember what occurred at his plea hearing’ does not make a prima facie showing”):

¶10      Although this case somewhat resembles Hammill in that it involves a defendant’s less than perfect memory of the earlier proceedings and a sparse record,

State v. Andrew J. Wirth, 2012AP208-CR, District 4, 2/21/13; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Wirth was charged with the shooting deaths of two people outside a bar. He claimed self defense. The trial court allowed evidence that Wirth engaged in a confrontation earlier in the evening at a different bar with someone other than the shooting victims. In a fact-intensive opinion, the court of appeals concludes that if admission of the evidence was error,

Racine County v. Renee D., 2012AP1974, District 2, 2/20/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Wis. Stat. § 48.415(5) is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process

As applied to Renee D., the two elements for the “child abuse” ground under § 48.415(5) are: 1) the parent has shown a pattern of physical or sexual abuse that is a substantial threat to the health of the child who is the subject of the petition;

State v. Jonathan A. Herr, 2013 WI App 37; case activity

In a case arising from a high-speed chase and subsequent arrest for OWI, the court holds that the use of unreasonable force to arrest the defendant does not require the suppression of evidence that was not a product of, or causally related to, the alleged unreasonable force.

Police saw Herr driving erratically and attempted to stop him.

State v. Edward C. Lefler, 2013 WI App 22; case activity

Probable cause found to search trunk of vehicle for evidence of burglary-related crimes, after an indisputably lawful stop for drunk driving:

¶11      …  “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”  United States v.

State v. Adam W. Gilmour, 2011AP878-CR, District 2, 6/20/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

The trial court’s rejection, as lacking credibility, Gilmour’s claim that his acceptance of a deferred prosecution agreement was coerced by financial considerations (in that he had been unable to afford the costs associated with jury trial) is affirmed:

¶10      On review, we note that while Gilmour testified that he decided to take the DPA because he could not afford the trial retainer,

Racine County v. Latanya D.K., 2013 WI App 28; case activity

TPR – Waiver of jury trial need not be part of admission colloquy

¶2        Latanya’s major arguments raise an important question:  Must the court engage in a personal colloquy with a parent regarding his or her waiver of the right to a jury trial before accepting the parent’s admission that grounds for termination of parental rights exist?