On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

Outagamie Co. Dept. of HHS v. Alicia H., 2012AP1508, District 3, 11/14/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Protective placement order upheld, against challenge to proof as to risk of harm (care, incompetence and permanent developmental disability being conceded). Fact-specific analysis won’t be summarized here (¶15). Proof necessary to protective placement recited (¶12), as is standard of review:

¶13      When we review a protective placement order,

State v. Joshua A. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136; case activity

Felon-in-possession, § 941.29, was properly joined for trial with reckless injury by use of dangerous weapon:

¶17      Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that the charges were properly joined. The felon in possession and reckless injury charges were “based on the same act or transaction.” See Wis.

State v. Thomas E. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 137 (recommended for publication); case activity

After performing an HGN test, which exhibited 6 out of 6 indicia of impairment, Schmidt was arrested for OWI. At the ensuing trial, he asserted diabetes as a possible cause for the HGN result. The trial court ordered, as a condition of his testifying to this effect, that he submit to an HGN test outside the presence of the jury.

court of appeals certification review granted 1/15/13; case activity

Issues Certified:

1. In Maryland v. Shatzer, ___U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010), the United States Supreme Court held that, even if a defendant has invoked his or her right to counsel, law enforcement may give the Miranda[2] warnings again so long as the defendant has been released from custody for at least fourteen days.  

State v. Gary M. Hemmingway, 2012 WI App 133; case activity

Stalking,  § 940.32(2m)(a), which previously survived overbreadth and vagueness challenges based on rights to travel and equal protection, State v. Ruesch, 214 Wis. 2d 548, 571 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1997), now withstands a free-speech challenge: The statute isn’t a facially overbroad regulation of protected speech, in that the first amendment doesn’t immunize intentional conduct aimed at causing serious distress or fear of bodily harm.

State v. Tyler H., 2012AP914, District 3, 11/6/12,  court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Evidence held sufficient to support delinquency adjudication, where juvenile called mother “a fucking whore” after she struck him during a family “squabble” in their home.

¶9        We conclude Tyler’s conduct was of the type that tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.  First, we reject Tyler’s argument that his language could not provoke a disturbance because a disturbance was already occurring.

State v. William F. Vollbrecht, 2012AP49-CR, District 3, 11/6/12,  court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. The jury was entitled to reject Vollbrecht’s testimony that the shot he fired into his ex-girlfriend’s new boyfriend was accidental.

¶12      Vollbrecht’s argument fails on two fronts.  First, consistent with Poellinger, the jury was permitted to accept Clark’s revised version of events and reject Vollbrecht’s tenuous explanation of what occurred at the time of the shooting.  

State v. Allen Dell Vaughn, 2012 WI App 129 (recommended for publication); case activity

Waiver / Forfeiture of Right, Generally 

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege; forfeiture is:  (1) the failure to object to something without intending to relinquish that which an objection might have preserved and (2) doing something incompatible with the assertion of a right, ¶21, citing State v.

State v. Ouati K. Ali, 2011AP2169, District 4, 11/1/12

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Postconviction Proceedings – Right to Counsel 

A defendant has no constitutional right to counsel outside the direct appeal period, therefore Ali’s argument that failure to appoint counsel counsel to pursue DNA testing deprived him of due process is a non-starter.

¶12      Ali does not claim that the public defender erroneously exercised its discretion in declining to appoint him counsel for the purpose of pursuing his motion for postconviction DNA testing.  

Winnebago County v. Anastasia G. Christenson, 2012AP1189, District 2, 10/31/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity

Probable Cause – PBT, § 343.303

¶11      At the time Putzer administered the PBT to Christenson, he was aware that she had driven her car into a ditch, smelled of “intoxicating beverages” around midnight on Saturday night/Sunday morning (a day and time that increases suspicion of alcohol consumption),