On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Bridgette M. Glaze, 2010AP3128-CR, District 2, 8/24/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Glaze: John C. Orth; case activity

Although Glaze’s stop by one officer investigating possible domestic violence was likely unsupported (¶9), the stop was adequately supported by an alternative basis: observations of a second, off-duty officer which, under the “collective knowledge” doctrine were imputed to the first officer and supplied reasonable suspicion that Glaze was driving while intoxicated.

County of Ozaukee v. David W. Berend, 2011AP291, District 2, 8/24/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Berend: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

Breathalyzer test results are admissible (and presumptively accurate) in OWI and PAC proceedings if “the sample was taken within 3 hours after the event to be proved,” § 885.235(1g). Berend’s test was administered at 11:07, and he said he’d stopped drinking at 8:00.

State v. Paschall Lee Sanders, 2011 WI App 125 (recommended for publication); for Sanders: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The definitions of “mental disorder” in since-amended pattern instruction Wis JI—Criminal 2502 (2009), though concededly contradictory, didn’t prevent from being tried the issue of whether Sanders qualified for commitment as a sexually violent person:

¶14      As we have seen, two sentences in what the circuit court told the jury are contradictory:

(1)   “Mental disorder means a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence and causes serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”  (Emphasis added.)

(2)   “Not all persons with a mental disorder are predisposed to commit sexually violent offenses or have serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”

As noted earlier,

State v. Jose A. Reas-Mendez, 2010AP1485-CR, District 1, 8/23/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Reas-Mendez: Andrea Taylor Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; case activity

The victim’s pretrial lineup identification of Reas-Mendez isn’t suppressible: the lineup was comprised of “four men, all of generally the same build, in the same type of clothing, with dark, shoulder-length hair, approximately of the same age, and wearing bandanas covering their faces from the tops of their noses down,”

State v. Orbin B. Harris, 2011 WI App 130 (recommended for publication); for Harris: Matthew S. Pinix; case activity

Good-time credit may not be earned on a  jail sentence for a violent offense being served in prison:

¶1       Orbin B. Harris appeals the judgment convicting him of battery and intimidation and the order denying his postconviction motion.  Harris, who was sentenced to ten months in the house of correction for the battery and to seven years in state prison for the intimidation,

Florence County Department of Human Services v. Jennifer B., 2011AP88, District 3, 8/19/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer B.: Martha K. Askins, Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Removal from jury consideration of a ground for termination (CHIPS orders) without prior discussion between court and parties was error:

¶10      While we agree that a directed verdict is available in the grounds phase of a TPR proceeding, 

DOC v. Warren Lilly, Jr., 2011 WI App 123 (recommended for publication); case activity

¶2        The primary issues we address on this appeal and their resolution are as follows:

I.                   In light of Saenz, what is the correct legal standard for the showing DOC must make to obtain a court order continuing to authorize the forced feeding of an inmate?[1]

We conclude that in this situation DOC must show that: (1) if forced feeding is withdrawn,

County of Winnebago v. Matthew J. Miller, 2011AP661, District 2, 8/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

Experimental Aircraft Association Air Venture grounds were sufficiently “held out to the public,” for purposes of OWI-related liability, because the EAA granted substantial access to the public via purchased passes.

¶7        The analysis in Tecza is most analogous to this case.  

Kevin G. v. Jennifer M. S., 2009AP1377, District 4, 8/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Jennifer M.S.: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

Evidence held sufficient to support termination for failure to assume parental responsibility, § 48.415(6)(a), applying “totality-of-the-circumstances test” where “the fact-finder should consider any support or care, or lack thereof, the parent provided the child throughout the child’s entire life,” Tammy W-G.

State v. Richard Dean Boyer, 2011AP305-CR, District 1, 8/16/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Boyer: Walter Arthur Piel, Jr.; case activity

OWI trial, where the chemist who analyzed the blood sample testified, but the person who drew the sample didn’t: the court rejects Boyer’s argument that his right to confrontation was violated by his inability to cross-examine the person who drew the blood.