On Point blog, page 3 of 488
COA clarifies “serious crime” factor in involuntary med challenges; rejects challenges to treatment plan and affirms
State v. B.M.T., 2025AP1745-50, 11/21/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
In this appeal from an involuntary medication order, COA provides additional guidance as to how the “seriousness” of a crime is determined and rejects a challenge that the medication plan was insufficiently individualized.
Defense Win: COA relies on Melanie L. and Virgil D. to reverse involuntary medication order
Outagamie County v. R.M.R., 2025AP561, 11/18/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
In a strong defense win, COA rejects the County’s arguments and holds that the evidence is insufficient to support this medication order as the County failed to name the particular medication it sought to involuntarily administer.
COA holds that DHS may refile petition to revoke NGI committee’s conditional release after dismissal for violating 72-hour requirement
State v. Kyle A. Schaefer, 2023AP1747-CR, 11/18/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
Schaefer appeals from an order granting the Department of Health Services’ petition to revoke his conditional release under WIS. STAT. § 971.17(3)(e). When DHS originally detained Schaefer, it filed the required probable cause statement and petition to revoke his conditional release in the circuit court case but failed to timely submit the documents to “the regional office of the state public defender” within 72 hours as required by § 971.17(3)(e). After the circuit court dismissed the petition pursuant to State v. Olson, 2019 WI App 61, ¶2, 389 Wis. 2d 257, 936 N.W.2d 178, DHS refiled the same petition with a new date of detention. Schaefer’s conditional release was thereafter revoked on the second petition. COA affirms, holding that DHS may refile after a petition is dismissed for lack of compliance with § 971.17(3)(e).
COA authorizes circuit courts to consider prejudice when determining whether to join cases for trial
State v. Max Bell, 2024AP1923-CR, 2024AP1924-CR, & 2024AP1925-CR, 11/13/25, District IV (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Whether to join cases for trial is a separate inquiry from whether to sever cases that have been joined. While the severance subsection of the joinder statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.12(3), directs the circuit court to sever charges if a party is prejudiced by joinder, the circuit court is not required by statute to consider prejudice when determining whether charges should be joined. See Wis. Stat. § 971.12(1),(4). Nevertheless, the COA held in a decision recommended for publication that a circuit court is permitted to consider prejudice when making its initial joinder decision. The COA affirmed joinder of Max Bell’s charges for trial and his subsequent convictions in each case.
COA affirms TPR order, rejects arguments premised on “substantial likelihood” question for continuing CHIPS as undeveloped and forfeited
Kenosha County v. V.L.W., 2025AP1914, 11/12/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
COA rejects “Victor’s” arguments on appeal, which are all based on the continuing CHIPS “substantial likelihood” provision applying in his case. COA concludes that Victor did not prove this provision, which requires that the has been placed outside the home for less than 15 of the most recent 22 months, should apply.
COA affirms denial of suppression motion in OWI 3rd case based on concession
State v. Richard T. Weske, 2025AP154-CR, 11/5/25, District II (ineligible for publication); case activity
Weske appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the investigatory traffic stop constituted an unreasonable seizure because the officer was outside his jurisdiction and was therefore without authority to conduct the stop. COA affirms, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for a suspected OWI, and Weske conceded that the officer had the authority to do so outside his jurisdiction under Wis. Stat. § 349.03(4).
COA critiques Gramza but extends its holding to apply to § 973.195 petitions for sentence adjustment
State v. Angela R. Joski, 2023AP1371-CR, 10/29/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity
The state appealed Joski’s early release under Wis. Stat. § 973.195, arguing that pursuant to State v. Gramza, 2020 WI App 81, ¶24, 395 Wis. 2d 215, 952 N.W.2d 836, Joski must fully serve the mandatory minimum three-year term of initial confinement prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 346.65. COA agrees due to Gramza‘s interpretation, and reverses.
Defense Win: COA reverses order extending involuntary commitment.
Trempealeau County v. S.K., 2025AP645, 11/4/25, District III (ineligible for publication); case activity
The COA reversed the circuit court’s order to extend “Sharon’s” involuntary commitment. Although the County presented evidence that Sharon would stop taking medication to treat her schizophrenia if she were not committed, the evidence to support her current dangerousness was conclusory.
Defense Win: COA clarifies defense of others doctrine and holds erroneous instructions merit new trial
State v. Tommy Jay Cross, 2023AP2013-CR, 11/4/25, District III (recommended for publication); case activity
In an opinion that might remind some readers of their first year of law school, COA outlines the basic principles of Wisconsin’s self-defense doctrine and holds that the jury was given inaccurate instructions on the subject as it pertains to defense of others.
COA: Licensed hemp processor may be prosecuted for controlled substance offenses without referral from administrative agency that regulates hemp industry
State v. Christopher J. Syrrakos & Kristyn A. Shattuck, 2024AP554 & 2024AP556, 10/29/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The COA held, in a decision recommended for publication, that a licensed hemp processor may be prosecuted for offenses related to possessing, manufacturing, and delivering products that contain concentrations of THC above the threshold to be classified as “hemp” without a referral by the agency concerned with regulating the hemp industry.