On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Yancy D. Freland, 2011 WI App 80 (recommended for publication); for Freland: Michael D. Zell; case activity

Conviction for an out-of-state sex offense comparable to a misdemeanor in Wisconsin will be treated as a misdemeanor for sex offender registration purposes, § 301.45(6).

¶12      Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(1d)(am)1. specifically defines has been “[f]ound to have committed a sex offense by another jurisdiction” to include a person who has been convicted “for a violation of a law of another state that is comparable to a sex offense.”[7] Taken as a whole,

Rock Tenn Company v. Labor and Industry Review Commission, 2011 WI App 93 (recommended for publication); case activity

A worker’s compensation provision authorizing payment “for any future treatment” enacted after a work-related injury was incurred is remedial in nature and therefore can “be retroactively applied to award prospective treatment expenses.”

¶13      We reject Rock Tenn’s argument and conclude that LIRC reasonably held that Wis.

Kevin S. Dalka v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2010AP1428, District 2, 5/24/11

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); case activity

¶5        Dalka forfeited his right to appellate review of the order compelling him to accept the settlement offer.  …  It is a fundamental principle of appellate review that issues must be preserved in the circuit court.  State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59,

County of Milwaukee v. James R. Matel, 2010AP1950, District 1, 5/24/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Matel: Andrew Mishlove; case activity

Personal jurisdiction may be conferred on an OWI-1st defendant by mailing the uniform traffic citation, coupled with filing of the citation with the trial court. Personal service isn’t required by § 345.11(5). State ex rel. Prentice v. Milwaukee Cnty.,

State v. Crystal P. Keith, 2010AP1667-CR, District 1, 5/24/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for Keith: John A. Pray; case activity

On Keith’s conviction for reckless homicide in beating death of foster son, statements of her biological daughter (such as, “Why does mama have to go to jail for what my daddy did”) didn’t satisfy the test for newly discovered evidence. Keith’s confession to the police “was so detailed”

Columbia County v. Mark Devos, 2010AP2349, District 4, 5/19/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Devos: Rex Anderegg; case activity

The DOT Informing the Accused form that was read to Devos contained language beyond that specified in § 343.305(4): “In addition, under 2003 Wisconsin Act 97, your operating privileges will also be suspended if a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance is in your blood.” (This information must be provided to an accused pursuant to § 343.305(8).) Devos argues that DOT thereby effectively amended § 343.305(4) without legislative authorization,

State v. Jenny L. Nowak, 2010AP1499-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nowak: Keith F. Ellison; case activity

Warrantless entry into Nowak’s garage was justified under hot pursuit doctrine, given “probable cause to believe Nowak committed a jailable offense—specifically, resisting by failure to stop,” § 346.17(2t) (punishable by 9 months imprisonment), ¶15. (Citing, State v. Richter,

Village of Menomonee Falls v. Jesse Schaefer, 2010AP2485, District 2, 5/18/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Schaefer: James A. Gramling, Jr.; case activity

¶4        As a threshold matter, we address the Village’s contention that the municipal court lacked competency to proceed on Schaefer’s Wis. Stat. § 806.07 motion to reopen.  Whether a court has lost competence to proceed presents a question of law that we review de novo.  

State v. William J. Zarda, 2011AP386-CR, District 3, 5/17/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Zarda: Ricky Cveykus; case activity

Under settled authority, the disorderly conduct statute, § 947.01, is neither overbroad (¶5, citing State v. Douglas D., 2001 WI 47, 243 Wis. 2d 204, 626 N.W.2d 725); nor vague (¶6, citing State v. Zwicker,

certification; for Soto: Shelley Fite, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity, circuit court affirmed 2012 WI 93

Plea Procedure – Personal Presence

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine whether Jon Soto’s statutory right to be physically present during a plea hearing was violated when the judge conducted the hearing through video teleconferencing and whether this issue was properly preserved.