On Point blog, page 317 of 484
Evidence – Ongoing Conflict with Deceased, Hearsay – Residual Exception, 3rd-Party Guilt; Sufficiency of Evidence – Homicide
State v. Kevin M. Moore, 2009AP3167-CR, District 2, 12/15/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Moore: Jeffrey W. Jensen; Moore BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Evidence – Frequenting “Gentleman’s Club” as Source of Friction with Deceased
Evidence that Moore spent much time and money at a local “gentleman’s club,” offered by the State to as support for an “ongoing conflict”
Court of Appeals Publication Orders, 12/10
court of appeals publication orders, 12/14/10
On Point posts from this list:
2010 WI App 160 Jefferson County v. Joseph S.
2010 WI App 161 State v. Raymond Allen Nickel
2010 WI App 162 State v. Scottie L. Baldwin
2010 WI App 163 State v. William Dinkins, Sr.
2010 WI App 166 State v.
Miranda – Custody; Lesser Included Offense Instruction
State v. Tony Lamont Jackson, 2010AP351-CR, District 1, 12/14/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Jackson: Hans P. Koesser; Jackson BiC; State Resp.; Reply
Miranda – Custody
Initially treated at the scene of a shooting by the police as a witness rather than suspect, Jackson voluntarily accompanied the police to the station to continue providing information,
TPR – Default as Sanction; Formal Advice as to Rights – Harmless Error
State v. Marquita R., 2010AP1981, District 1, 12/14/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Marquita R.: Carl W. Chesshir
TPR – Default as Sanction
Delay of over two-and-one-half years between petition and fact-finding hearing (despite statutorily mandated schedule of 45-day limit, § 48.422(2)), caused by Marquita R.’s “egregious” and “bath faith” conduct, intended to disrupt the TPR process, supported the trial court’s decision to find her in default as a sanction.Nor did the default ruling violate due process,
TPR – Right to Post-Disposition Visitation, Vacated Order and Right to Reinstated Visitation
State v. Lorraine J. / Johnny J., 2010AP137, et al,District 1, 12/8/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Lorraine J.: Melinda A. Swartz, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; for Johnny J.: John J. Grau
TPR – Right to Post-Disposition Visitation
A termination order severs all parental rights, including visitation under § 48.43, ¶¶31-37.
TPR – Vacated Order and Right to Reinstated Visitation
Grant of a post-disposition motion,
Consensual Entry of Residence
State v. Mark A. Miller, 2010AP352-CR, District 4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Bill Ginsberg; Miller BiC; State Resp.
The court concludes that Miller voluntarily consented to police entreaties over an 11-minute period to enter his home so that they could perform field sobriety testing, notwithstanding his refusals during that time to allow entry:
¶7 The circuit court found that the officer spoke with Miller for approximately eleven minutes and,
TPR – Disposition – “Wishes of the Child”
Dane Co. DHS v. Susan P. S, 2010AP573, District 4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se
Determination of the “best interests of the child” at TPR disposition includes consideration of various factors, including the “wishes of the child.” The TPR court need not hear directly from the child, but may instead take evidence of the child’s wishes from other sources.
Court discusses evidentiary issues that appear to be too inconsequential,
Miranda – Impeachment – Harmless Error
State v. Marlon M. Anderson, 2010AP742-CR, District 1/4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Anderson: Angela Conrad Kachelski; Anderson BiC; State Resp.
A defendant’s statement made voluntarily but in violation of Miranda isn’t admissible in the State’s case-in-chief, but is admissible if the defendant testifies and the statement is inconsistent with his testimony. The question raised here relates to how such inconsistency is measured: whether outright contradictions are necessary,
Traffic Stop – Reasonable Suspicion
State v. Brian R. Rogers, 2010AP1300-CR, District 4, 12/9/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; State’s Resp. Br.
Even assuming Rogers violated no traffic law, his driving pattern provided reasonable suspicion for a stop:
¶10 Here too, the totality of the circumstances provided Lambrecht with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. Lambrecht observed Rogers’ vehicle weave both within and outside its lane multiple times over the span of approximately one mile.
Sentencing Conditions, § 973.049(2): No-Contact Order – “Victim” Definition
State v. Mark Allan Campbell, 2011 WI App 18; for Campbell: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; Campbell BiC;State Resp.; Reply
(Issue of plea bargain breach discussed in separate post, here.)
On sentencing Campbell for sexual assault of his daughter, the trial court had, and properly exercised, authority under § 973.049(2) to bar Campbell’s contact with his son until completion of sex offender treatment.