On Point blog, page 328 of 484
Traffic Stop – Tail Lamp Violation
State v. Laurence Evan Olson, 2010AP149-CR, District 4, 8/5/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Olson: Christopher W. Dyer; BiC; Resp.; Reply
¶11 WISCONSIN STAT. § 347.13(1) provides that “[n]o vehicle originally equipped at the time of manufacture and sale with 2 tail lamps shall be operated on a highway during hours of darkness unless both such lamps are in good working order.” WISCONSIN STAT.
Restitution – Settlement Agreement
State v. Theresa E. Palubicki, No. 2010AP555-CR, District 3
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Palubicki: Michael D. Petersen; BiC; Resp.; Reply
The burden of proving setoff rests with the defendant. Although Palubicki reached a settlement agreement with the hit-and-run victim, she did not meet her burden of proving that the agreement covered lost wages, therefore she is liable for them in restitution.
Field Sobriety Testing
State v. Eric Michael Webley, No. 2010AP747-CR, District 4, 7/29/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Webley: Steven Cohen; BiC; Resp.
The police had reasonable suspicion believe Webley was driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 0.02, and thus to perform field sobriety tests, after an indisputably proper stop for speeding, given the following (in addition to which, Webley admitted having had two beers):
¶8 …
Traffic Stop – Lane Violation
State v. Kevin A. Rhyne, No. 2009AP163, District 4, 7/29/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; Resp. Br.
¶7 “An officer may conduct a traffic stop when he or she has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶13, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (citing State v.
TPR – Evidence; Hearsay; Effective assistance
Dane Co. DHS v. Laura E.N., No. 2010AP1172, District 4, 7/29/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Laura E.N.: Jean K. Capriotti
TPR – Evidence
Evidence that the mother was caring for an infant son not under CHIPS order wasn’t relevant to her ability to meet conditions for the return of her older daughters who were the subjects of the TPR proceeding, ¶¶13-16.
State v. Chad W. Voeller, No. 2009AP001596-CR, District II, 7/28/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Voeller: Steven G. Richards; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Counsel – Sanction – Appendix
Contrary to the State’s certification, the appendix does not include the trial court’s findings or opinion. The transcript of the oral findings and opinion should have been included in the appendix.
State v. Brian T. St. Martin, No. 2009AP1209-CR, District II, 7/28/10, review granted 10/27/10
certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp.; Reply
Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph
The court of appeals certifies to the supreme court the following question:
Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,
SVP Discharge Procedure: Summary Judgment not Supported
State v. Walter Allison, Jr., 2010 WI App 103; for Allison: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Summary judgment in favor of discharge isn’t an available option under § 980.09.
¶18 Applying the principles governing statutory interpretation to Wis. Stat. § 980.09, it is clear that the legislature explicitly prescribed a different procedure from those outlined in Wis.
State v. Elijah Arlanders Brock, No. 2009AP002120-CR, District I, 7/27/10
court of appeals decision (3-judge, not recommended for publication); for Brock: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
Statement – Coercion
Threatened action against defendant’s girlfriend didn’t support suppression of his resulting statement:
¶11 Brock argues that Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963), requires suppression of his statement. Lynumn held that threats that a mother’s children would be taken away from her unless she “cooperated” “must be deemed not voluntary,
Judicial Bias – Sentencing after Revocation
State v. James Robert Thomas, No. 2010AP332-CR, District III, 7/27/10
court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Thomas: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate; BiC; Resp.; Reply
The sentencing court exhibited objective bias, requiring resentencing, when it imposed the maximum on sentencing after revocation, given the court’s threat when it placed Thomas on probation to do just that if his probation were revoked.