On Point blog, page 343 of 484

Unfair Prejudice, § 904.03 – Computer-Generated Animation – “Surprise” Use

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78
For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding:

¶11      The State submits that the computer-generated animation was intended as a demonstrative exhibit. The decision to admit or exclude demonstrative evidence is committed to the trial court’s discretion. [6] State v.

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Guilty Plea Waiver Rule – Generally, Authority to Ignore

State v. Benjamin D. Tarrant, 2009 WI App 121
For Tarrant: Susan E. Alesia, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

 

¶6        Waiver. Before addressing the merits, the State argues that Tarrant’s no contest plea constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶54, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437.

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Deferred Prosecution Agreement – Standard of Review

State v. Chase E. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117
For Kaczmarski: Harold L. Harlowe, David M. Gorwitz

Issue/Holding:

¶10      Both the State and Kaczmarski agree that the deferred prosecution agreement is analogous to a contract and therefore we draw upon principles of contract law in determining the respective rights of the parties to the agreement. See State v. Roou, 2007 WI App 193,

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Deferred Prosecution Agreement – Resumption of Prosecution after Agreement Has Expired

State v. Chase E. Kaczmarski, 2009 WI App 117
For Kaczmarski: Harold L. Harlowe, David M. Gorwitz

Issue: Whether commission of an offense during the period of the deferred prosecution agreement permitted resumption of the prosecution after that period expired, under the wording of the agreement.

Holding:

¶13      We conclude that the deferred prosecution agreement unambiguously provides that, in the event that Kaczmarski breaches the agreement,

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Guilty Pleas – Plea Bargains – Charge “Dismissed Outright”: Ambiguous as to Whether State Can Argue Facts Underlying Charge

State v. Richard L. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, PFR filed 8/4/09
For Wesley: Alvin Ugent

Issue/Holding: A plea agreement under which the State dismissed one count “outright” and “(b)oth sides are free to argue” was ambiguous as to whether to State could argue the facts underlying the dismissed charge at sentencing:

¶17      We thus conclude that the plea bargain was ambiguous because the agreement could have meant the State would either (1) dismiss the charges outright,

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Guilty Pleas – Plea Bargains – Construction of Terms

State v. Richard L. Wesley, 2009 WI App 118, PFR filed 8/4/09
For Wesley: Alvin Ugent

Issue/Holding:

¶12      The interpretation of plea agreements is rooted in contract law. See State v. Deilke, 2004 WI 104, ¶12, 274 Wis. 2d 595, 682 N.W.2d 945. Contractual language is ambiguous only when it is “reasonably or fairly susceptible of more than one construction.” State v.

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Witness – Personal Knowledge Requirement, § 906.02 – Computer-Generated Animation

State v. Jeremy Denton, 2009 WI App 78 / State v. Aubrey W. Dahl, 2009 WI App 78For Denton: Paul G. Bonneson
For Dahl: Patrick M. Donnelly

Issue/Holding: Lay witness, who testified to computer-generated animation that attempted to recreate the alleged crime through the eyes of certain witnesses, lacked personal knowledge to undertake this effort:

¶16      As a lay witness,

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Opinion Testimony – Comment by One Witness Whether another Witness Truthful

State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161
For Patterson: David R. Karpe

Issue/Holding:

¶35      The first three alleged instances of misconduct are similar. In each instance, the prosecutor sought to demonstrate the possible unreliability of one witness’s recollection by using seemingly inconsistent recollections of another witness. For example, in one instance the prosecutor asked: “So if all other witnesses said that at 11:00 your mom was already home … that would be wrong?” We see no Haseltine problem with these three instances because the prosecutor was not asking a witness to opine as to whether another witness was telling the truth.¶36      The fourth alleged instance does appear to have involved a Haseltineviolation.

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Guilty Pleas – Required Knowledge – Collateral Consequence: Firearm Possession Prohibition, Disorderly Conduct as “Crime of Domestic Violence”

State v. Joseph E. Koll, Jr., 2009 WI App 74, PFR filed 4/29/09
For Koll: Alexander L. Ullenberg

Issue: Whether Koll’s conviction of so-called “non-domestic” disorderly conduct was for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence as defined 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(33)(A), so as to preclude him from obtaining a handgun.

Holding: The federal Gun Control Act bars gun possession to anyone convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” 18 U.S.C.

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Rebuttal Witness – Test for “Bona Fide” Rebuttal

State v. Juan M. Sandoval, 2009 WI App 61, PFR filed 5/6/09
For Sandoval: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The State need not disclose bona fide rebuttal evidence, the test for which turns on whether the evidence “only became necessary at rebuttal” (as opposed to whether it would have been admissible or useful in the State’s case-in-chief), ¶¶30-34.

¶33   We are convinced that the State satisfied the law of Wisconsin in this case.

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