On Point blog, page 362 of 484
Conspiracy — § 939.31 – Sufficiency of Evidence – Agreement
State v. Henry E. Routon, 2007 WI App 178, PFR filed 7/23/07
For Routon: Jefren E. Olsen, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶36 Routon, as noted above, argues that the single sale to Agent Smith is, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of an agreement. However, in the cases on which he relies, there was no evidence, as there is here,
Forfeiture – Dismissal with Prejudice, Failure to Hold Timely Hearing on Petition, § 961.555(2)
State v. Lamont D. Powell, 2007 WI App 127
For Powell: Nicholas C. Zales
Issue/Holding:
¶3 The sixty-day limit in Wis. Stat. § 961.555(2)(b) is mandatory and a forfeiture petition must be dismissed unless the requisite hearing is held within the sixty-day period because a person may not be deprived of his or her property “for an indefinite time” without a prompt judicial assessment of whether forfeiture is justified.
Reasonable Suspicion – Basis – Unusual Nervousness and Behavior, as Ground to Extend Routine Traffic Stop
State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky
Issue: Whether a concededly proper traffic stop (for speeding) was extended without sufficient cause when the officer, after issuing the ticket and returning the license, asked to search the car.
Holding:
¶15 We conclude that Ramstack could have formed a reasonable suspicion that Bons was engaged in illegal activity,
Reasonable Suspicion – Basis – Traffic Stop – Vehicle’s Owner Known to Have Revoked License
State v. Frank C. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, PFR filed 11/8/07; prior history: Certification, 8/8/07, denied, 9/10/07
For Newer: Francis R. Lettenberger
Issue/Holding: The police have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle whose owner’s DL is known to have been revoked, given no reason to think someone other than the owner is behind the wheel:
¶2 We now reverse the circuit court’s suppression of the evidence and remand for further proceedings.
Reasonable Suspicion – Basis – Traffic Stop – Pretext
State v. Frank C. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, PFR filed 11/8/07; prior history: Certification, 8/8/07, denied, 9/10/07
For Newer: Francis R. Lettenberger
Issue/Holding: ¶4, n. 2.
The circuit court also refused to consider the alternative grounds of the observed speeding violation because the officer “wasn’t using that as a basis for the stop.” We note that the officer’s subjective motivation for making a stop is not the issue;
Commencing Appeal – Effect of Notice of Appeal to Non-Final Order – Construing as Petition for Leave to Appeal
State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi
Issue/Holding: Dismissal of an appeal as having been directed to a non-final order doesn’t in and of itself bar the court of appeals from deciding to grant leave to appeal, ¶7 n. 2:
In its jurisdictional memoranda, the State asks us to construe its notice of appeal as a petition for leave to appeal in the event that we decline jurisdiction over the appeal.
OWI – State’s Appeal: Collateral Attack on Prior OWI Conviction – Non-Final Order, Permission to Appeal Required
State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi
Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:
¶2 A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.
OWI – Appellate Procedure: Finality of Order, State’s Appeal: Collateral Attack on Prior OWI Conviction
State v. Gary J. Knapp, 2007 WI App 273
For Knapp: Cory C. Chirafisi
Issue/Holding: The State may not appeal as a matter of right from a successful collateral attack on a prior OWI conviction, reducing the pending charge from OWI-3rd to -2nd; instead, the State’s remedy is to seek leave to appeal a non-final order:
¶2 A defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction to prevent its use as a penalty enhancer when the prior conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.
Warrantless Entry of Residence – Exigency — Destruction of Evidence (Drugs)
State v. Dwight M. Sanders, 2007 WI App 174, affirmed on different ground, 2008 WI 85
For Sanders: Patrick M. Donnelly, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶32 In both Hughes and Garrett, the police officers actually detected the presence of drugs within the residence before they entered without a warrant. In Hughes, the officers smelled the “unmistakable odor of marijuana coming from [the defendant’s] apartment.” Hughes,
§ 943.20(1)(d), Theft by Fraud – Civil Tort Law, as Aid to Construction
State v. Dale C. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31
For Ploeckelman: Rand Krueger
Issue/Holding:
¶17 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.20(1)(d) prohibits a type of fraud, which is addressed by both criminal and civil tort law. See State v. Timblin, 2002 WI App 304, ¶31, 259 Wis. 2d 299, 657 N.W.2d 89. While there are no common law crimes, this court has consulted civil tort law as an aid to interpreting the criminal fraud statutes.