On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

Marathon County v. T.R.H., 2022AP1394, 3/14/23, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Counties often seek recommitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c, the third standard of dangerousness. It is the easiest standard to satisfy–especially at the recommitment stage. But not this time. The court of appeals held that the county can’t just offer testimony that, at some point in the past, the person failed to care for himself, experienced delusions, and struggled with social interactions when not on medication.  The county’s evidence must be more specific.

Brown County v. J.J., 2021AP1079, District 3, 3/7/23 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Before an Indian child subject to a CHIPS proceeding is placed out of the home of his or her parent or Indian guardian, § 48.028(4)(d)2. and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) both require, among other things, proof by clear and convincing evidence that “active efforts, as described in [§ 48.028(4)](g) 1., have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitation programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian child’s family and that those efforts have proved unsuccessful.” The court finds the County proved it made “active efforts” in this case.

Milwaukee County v. D.H., 2022AP1402, 3/7/23, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

To obtain an involuntary medication order, a county must satisfy the multi-step test for incompetency to make medication decisions in §51.61(1)(g)4. The first step requires the county to prove that the person received a “reasonable explanation” of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to medication. The examiner can’t just testify that she complied with the statute. She must tell the court what she told the person about the medication. In “Dan’s” case, the court of appeals reversed the involuntary medication order because the county failed this step.

State v. Brooke K. Eder, 2021AP485, 2/28/23, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Officers got a warrant to arrest one Estes. The warrant permitted them to search Eder’s apartment for Estes; the affidavit gave various reasons to believe that Estes would be there. Estes was there, and they arrested him. After they arrested him, though, they searched the basement of the three-unit building. You can’t do that! “A search may not be continued after the objects identified in the search warrant have been located and seized.” State v. Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 414, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978). This unlawful search turned up contraband that led police to get a new warrant to search Eder’s apartment; Eder seeks to suppress the evidence found in this second search on the ground that it was the fruit of the basement search.

Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17; case activity

Unfortunately, the court of appeals just turned Chapter 51 upside down in a published opinion. It holds that counties must move examiners’ reports into evidence at recommitment hearings, but not at initial commitment hearings. This appeal concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support an involuntary medication order entered following an initial commitment. The court of appeals held that the doctor’s testimony was insufficient to support the order, but the doctor’s report, which was not moved into evidence, filled the gaps. It thus affirmed the med order.

State v. Debra L. Rippentrop & Steven E. Rippentrop, 2023 WI App 15; case activity (including briefs) 2022AP92-CR and 2022AP93-CR

The nonprosecution agreement the Rippentrops made with the state doesn’t violate public policy and is therefore enforceable, and that requires the criminal charges filed against them to be dismissed with prejudice.

Kenosha County v. A.C.S., 2022AP1821-1825, 2/15/23, District 2 (one judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Here’s a fact pattern one hopes doesn’t come up too often. The county sought the termination of “Anna’s” parental rights to five children. It then moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she’d been convicted of a serious felony related to the death of another child. A hearing was set, but Anna’s counsel informed the court she’d be in trial in a homicide case. Expecting an adjournment–which both trial counsel and the court of appeals note is “common practice” in such a situation–the attorney told Anna the hearing would be put off. Counsel’s homicide trial then unexpectedly ended early, though she still had work to do to wrap it up. The TPR court apparently heard through the grapevine that the homicide trial was over. Without any successful contact–or much apparent effort to contact–Anna or her lawyer, the court held the scheduled hearing ex parte and, at the county’s request, granted summary judgment. Later, over Anna and her counsel’s protestations, the court terminated her rights.

On February 22, 2023, the court of appeals ordered publication of the following criminal law related decision:

State v. Ayodeji J. Aderemi, 2023 WI App 8 (delay in upload of information on efiling system didn’t deprive circuit court of jurisdiction in criminal case)

Winnebago County v. J.D.J., 2022AP1138, 2/22/23, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Such a maddening case. J.D.J., a prisoner diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was going to have a hard enough time winning a jury trial regarding his ch. 51 initial commitment. But the circuit court made his uphill battle impossible through a series of highly questionable pre-trial and trial rulings. Then the court of appeals, relying on nothing beyond its gut (i.e. not case law) affirmed.

Wood County v. P.M.P., 2022AP1815, 2/23/23, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

In this appeal, P.M.P.’s sole challenge was to the circuit court’s application of the “best interest of the child” factors in §48.426(3)(a)-(f). P.M.P. conceded that the circuit court adequately considered the “substantial relationship” factor, but its analysis of the other facts was too terse. The decision required reversal under s Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 303 N.W.2d 581 (1981) and State v. Margaret H., 2000 WI 42, ¶27, 234 Wis. 2d 606, 610 N.W.2d 475. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed.