On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

State v. Steven A. Harvey, 2006 WI App 26
For Harvey: Christopher William Rose

Issue/Holding: Plea bargain, which permitted State to comment on facts but not to make specific sentencing recommendation was not violated by State’s presentation of victim and others who themselves asked for maximum penalty:

¶40      We first disagree that the State breached the plea agreement by going beyond factual argument with its comments about evidence it would have introduced had there been a trial.

State v. Reinier A. Ravesteijn, 2006 WI App 250
For Ravesteijn: Rudolph L. Oldeschulte

Issue/Holding:

¶6        Ravesteijn, a citizen of the Netherlands, argues that the trial court was obligated to consider whether he needed an interpreter and to obtain his personal waiver of the right to an interpreter. See State v. Neave, 117 Wis. 2d 359, 375, 344 N.W.2d 181 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v.

State v. Anna Annina, 2006 WI App 202
For Annina: Robert R. Henak

Issue/Holding:

¶9        Annina seeks to withdraw her Alford plea on the grounds that a manifest injustice has occurred. “Withdrawal of a plea following sentencing is not allowed unless it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”  State v. Smith, 202 Wis.  2d 21, 25, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996).

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶39      Questions that call for a narrative are generally improper because they do not alert court and counsel to the subject about which the witness is about to testify. There are exceptions, however, and whether to permit a question calling for a narrative response is within the trial court’s discretion under Wis.

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶35      … Rule 906.08(2) permits the cross-examination of a witness about “extrinsic” matters, “if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Certainly, lying on direct-examination, and repeating the lie on cross-examination, is “probative of truthfulness.” Moreover, Rodriguez opened the door, and the prosecutor was fully justified in calling him on it. 

State v. Justin Yang, 2006 WI App 48
For Olson: John J. Grau

Issue/Holding: Defense cross-examination of a principal State’s witness was impermissibly curtailed when the trial court abruptly ended inquiry into whether the witness had threatened to cause the defendant (her ex-husband) “trouble” following his remarriage, where:

• The witness testified only with the aid of a translator and had obvious difficulty answering questions (“a witness’s comprehension affects our analysis of whether a trial court can cut-off cross-examination prematurely.

State v. Walter T. Missouri, 2006 WI App 74
For Missouri: Jeffrey W. Jensen

Issue: Whether the defense should have been allowed to cross-examine the arresting officer about an instance of misconduct between the officer and a third party which was assertedly very similar to the defense theory that the officer mistreated the defendant and planted evidence on him.

Holding:

¶20      Moreover, WIS.

State v. Jeffrey Lorenzo Searcy, 2006 WI App 8
For Searcy: Joseph L. Sommers

Issue/Holding:

¶48 Here, Adams’ statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance hearsay exception. Adams spontaneously made the statements, without police prompting, under the stress of watching her cousin being taken into custody at gunpoint. It was only one to two minutes after Searcy’s arrest that Adams emerged from the crowd that had gathered to witness the arrest and yelled,

State v. Reinier A. Ravesteijn, 2006 WI App 250
For Ravesteijn: Rudolph L. Oldeschulte

Issue/Holding: Although kidnapping for ransom, § 940.31(2)(a), is susceptible to possible mitigation of penalty from 60 to 40 years if the victim is released without permanent physical injury, testimony from counsel at a postconviction hearing that the defendant was well aware of this possibility when he pleaded guilty dooms his claim that he was unaware of the potential penalty when he entered his guilty plea,

State v. Roberto Vargas Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, PFR filed 8/28/06
For Rodriguez: Donna L. Hintze, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: Where the defendant’s brother testified that the non-testifying complainant had recanted, the prosecution could impeach the brother with the possibility that the complainant was motivated by fear due to the brother’s gang affiliation, ¶31: “A witness’s motive (whether testifying ‘live’ or by admission of his or her out-of-court assertions) is never collateral,