On Point blog, page 387 of 484
Appellate Procedure – Harmless Error Test – Confrontation
State v. Harry L. Seymer, 2005 WI App 93
For Seymer: Andrea T. Cornwall, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: Improper termination of defendant’s cross-examination of the sexual assault complainant was not harmless error, where abbreviated though it was, cross had already “raise(d) serious questions concerning A.S.’s credibility and the veracity of her account …. Thus, it is within the realm of reasonable possibility that the completed cross-examination would have produced evidence that seriously undermined the credibility and recollections of the victim,
Review — Sentence After (Extended Supervision) Revocation — Sufficiency of Articulated Rationale
State v. Brandon E. Jones, 2005 WI App 259
For Jones: Amelia L. Bizarro
Issue: Whether the sentencing court provided sufficient reasons for Jones’s reconfinement following revocation of extended supervision.
Holding:
¶9 …. The key is for the circuit court to provide sufficient information about its reasoning so as to allow for meaningful review. The “need for meaningful appellate review of a trial court’s decision to take away a person’s liberty must be our polestar.” Swiams,
Presentence Report — Use / Subsequent to Sentencing
State v. James L. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn
Issue/Holding:
¶14 Montroy also argues a new PSI is necessary because the inaccurate information will continue to prejudice him in the future. He cites Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.27 (Nov. 2002) for examples of the various uses for a PSI beyond sentencing. However, Wis. Stat. § 973.08(2) requires that the transcript of Montroy’s sentencing hearing be part of his record.
NGI Procedure – Abandonment of NGI Plea and Necessity of Personal Colloquy
State v. Jennifer F. Francis, 2005 WI App 161
For Francis: Hans P. Koesser
Issue: Whether the trial court must engage the defendant in a personal colloquy before allowing an NGI plea, § 971.06(1)(d), to be abandoned.
Holding: Because an NGI plea is not a constitutional or otherwise fundamental right, a personal colloquy with the defendant isn’t a precondition to withdrawal of the plea, ¶¶15-22.
SVP: Dangerousness, Reduced Showing — Effective Date
State v. Shermell G. Tabor, / State v. Ronald Irvin Ryan, 2005 WI App 107
For Tabor / Ryan: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding: Legislative modification of the definition of SVP “dangerousness” (2003 Wis Act 187, §§ 2, 2m, amending §§ 980.01(7) and 980.02(2)(c); reducing the necessary showing from “substantial probability” to mere likelihood of sexual violence) has an effective date of April 22,
Sentence Modification — New Factor — Assistance to Law Enforcement
State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)
Issue/Holding: “(A) defendant’s substantial and important assistance to law enforcement after sentencing may constitute a new factor that the trial court can take into consideration when deciding whether modification of a sentence is warranted,” ¶1.
¶8.
SVP – Post-Disposition – Discharge Procedure – Probable Cause Determination, Insufficient Showing on Particular Facts
State v. Robert M. Fowler, 2005 WI App 41, PFR filed 3/9/05For Fowler: Randall E. Paulson, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶30 Dr. Harasymiw’s report concludes that Fowler still is a sexually violent person. This was sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that it was substantially probable that Fowler would engage in acts of sexual violence. …¶31 … Although Dr. Maskel disagreed with certain conclusions,
Sentence — Modification (at State’s Behest) — New Factor: Defendant’s Economic Circumstance
State v. Frederick W. Prager, 2005 WI App 95
For Prager: Daniel P. Fay
Issue: Whether, six days after original sentencing and imposition of probation, the State’s proffered new factor (that defendant had quitclaimed the jointly owned farm to his wife) supported a modification to an active prison term.
Holding: Although the term of probation was premised in part on the economic hardship that defendant’s wife would suffer if he were sentenced to prison (¶¶4,
Sentencing – Modification — New Factor — General Test
State v. John Doe, 2005 WI App 68
For John Doe: Amelia L. Bizzaro (the court file has been ordered sealed, and the caption amended “to shield the defendant’s identity”)
Issue/Holding:
¶6. Thus, sentence modification on the basis of a new factor is a two-step process. Id. First, the defendant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a new factor justifying a motion for sentence modification.
Sentencing – Factors — Guidelines (& Sixth Amendment)
State v. James L. Montroy, 2005 WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn
Issue/Holding: Wisconsin discretionary guideline regime is not governed by the holdings of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), ¶¶20-24.