On Point blog, page 416 of 483
Reasonable Suspicion — Stop — Duration — Prolonged to Administer Field Sobriety Tests
State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue/Holding: Continued detention, in order to administer field sobriety tests, was supported by reasonable suspicion, given the defendant-driver’s mild odor of alcohol as well as ambiguity surrounding the cause of the fatal accident. “Thus, one reasonable possibility was that Colstad struck the child with his pickup truck because his judgment and driving skills were impaired by alcohol.”
Reasonable Suspicion — Stop — Duration — Prolonged to Process Scene of Fatal Accident
State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue/Holding: Prolonged detention of the driver at the scene of a fatal accident did not transmute a temporary stop into an arrest:
¶17 Colstad argues that the duration of his detention was unreasonable because the officer directed him to wait, instead of questioning Colstad sufficiently to dispel or confirm the officer’s suspicions,
Reasonable Suspicion – Stop – Basis – Knowledge Driver Had No License
State v. Bruce A. Kassube, 2003 WI App 64
For Kassube: Leonard D. Kachinsky
Issue/Holding:
¶7. We conclude, however, that the totality of the circumstances supports a reasonable basis for James’s suspicion. James had known Kassube between nine and twelve years and had never known Kassube to have a driver’s license at any time during that period. Further, within eleven months of the stop, Kassube informed James that he still did not have a license.
Reasonable Suspicion – Stop – Basis – Minor Traffic Offense
State v. Guy W. Colstad, 2003 WI App 25
For Colstad: T. Christopher Kelly
Issue/Holding: Although some United States Supreme Court cases seemingly assume that probable cause is required to support a stop for civil infractions, state precedent allows such a stop on reasonable suspicion, ¶12. The stop in this case is upheld:
¶14 The undisputed testimony demonstrates that the collision occurred on a straight road with “absolutely clear”
§ 948.02(2), Attempted Sexual Assault (Intercourse) – Crime Known to Law Despite Lack of “Formal” Intent Element
State v. James F. Brienzo, 2003 WI App 203, PFR filed 10/10/03
For Brienzo: Jerome F. Buting
Issue: Whether attempted sexual assault of a child (by intercourse), § 948.02(2), is a crime known to law, in that the offense lacks an intent element and any crime of intent, § 939.32, requires specific intent for the completed act.
Holding: Sexual contact explicitly requires “intentional touching,” and therefore supports a charge of attempted assault by contact,
§ 940.01, First-Degree Intentional Homicide — Sufficiency of Evidence
State v. Evan Zimmerman, 2003 WI App 196, (AG) PFR filed 9/10/03
For Zimmerman: Keith A. Findley, UW Law School
Issue/Holding: Although “most of the persuasive evidence against” Zimmerman was his own statements and alibi; and although a conviction may not be based solely on a negative inference drawn from the defendant’s own version, other evidence sufficiently supported the conviction, including: “evidence of his obsessive behavior,
§ 940.03, Felony Murder — PTAC Allegation Superfluous
State v. Theodore J. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6, PFR filed 1/21/03
For Krawczyk: John T. Wasielewski
Issue/Holding:
¶25. Krawczyk next argues that he was incorrectly charged as “a party to the crime” of felony murder and that this error also rendered his plea to that offense unknowing. We agree with Krawczyk that the State did not need to include the party-to-a-crime allegation in the felony murder charge.
Battery to, and Intimidation of, a Witness § 940.201(2)(a) and (b) — Elements
State v. Anthony M. Cotton, 2003 WI App 154
For Cotton: Timothy T. Kay
Issue/Holding:
¶19. Following the preliminary hearing and bindover, the State filed an information containing new charges pertaining to Cotton’s encounter with Paikowski-one count of battery or threat of battery to Paikowski and a further similar count regarding Paikowski’s family pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 940.201(2)(a) and (b). These charges require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant caused or threatened to cause bodily harm to the victim or victim’s family,
Community Caretaker – Automobile Towed for Safekeeping
State v. Timothy T. Clark, 2003 WI App 121
For Clark: Rodney Cubbie
Issue/Holding: Police tow of an automobile for “safekeeping,” even though “none of the typical public safety concerns illustrated by Opperman are at issue,” but rather on the ground that the vehicle was unlocked and therefore potentially at risk of theft, was unreasonable because effective alternatives to police seizure were available:
¶21.
Exigent Circumstances – Reported Crime in Progress – Warrantless Entry
State v. Scott Michael Harwood, 2003 WI App 215
For Harwood: Pat J. Schott, Margaret G. Zickuhr
Issue: Whether warrantless entry was supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances, as required by State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶17, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621, based upon a tenant’s reporting a break-in at another apartment within the complex.
Holding1 (probable cause):
¶15.