On Point blog, page 55 of 485
Dismissal of truancy petition on one ground won’t be vacated to dismiss it on a different ground
Waukesha County v. E.B.V., 2021Ap1910, District 2, 4/20/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court granted the County’s motion to dismiss the truancy petition filed against E.B.V. because E.B.V. was no longer truant and, after initially contesting the facts of the petition, he entered into a consent decree. J.C.V., one of E.B.V.’s parents, had also filed motions to dismiss the petition, alleging it was untimely,
TPR affirmed: court applied “best interests of the child” factors appropriately
State v. S.J., 2022AP160, 4/19/22, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
“Sharon” pled “no contest” to being an unfit parent, and then the circuit court held that it was in “Danielle’s” best interests to terminate Sharon’s parental rights so that Danielle’s paternal aunt could adopt her. Sharon appealed that decision arguing that the circuit court failed to give sufficient consideration to 1 of the 6 “best interests of the child” factors in §48.426(3).
COA asks SCOW to decide when defendant’s right to counsel attaches
State v. Percy Antione Robinson, 2020AP1728-Cr, certification filed 4/19/22, District 1; case activity (including briefs)
Whether Milwaukee County’s CR-215 procedure for determining probable cause triggers an accused’s 6th Amendment right to counsel for any subsequent “critical stage” of the legal proceeding?
Court of Appeals addresses successive postconviction motion, judge’s use of written rather than oral sentencing rationale
State v. Hajji Y. McReynolds, 2022 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)
This decision addresses: 1) the propriety of successive postconviction motions; 2) a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony vouching for the credibility of another witness and to improper character evidence; and 3) the novel issue of the sentencing judge’s use of a written rather than oral explanation of its sentencing rationale under § 973.017(10m)(b).
Challenges to charging periods and jury instructions in child sexual assault case rejected
State v. Michael T. Dewey, 2021AP174-CR, District 4, 4/14/22 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Dewey was charged with three dozen counts of child sexual assault related crimes alleged to have occurred during various times between 2005 and 2013. He argues the charging periods for most of the counts were “too long and disjointed” to allow him to prepare an adequate defense and that his trial lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to jury instructions for five of the counts on the ground that the three non-continuous time periods charged for those counts failed to protect his right to a unanimous verdict. The court of appeals rejects his arguments.
COA affirms initial commitment without specifying standard of dangerousness
Walworth County v. P.S., 2021AP2090-FT, 4/13/22, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court entered an initial commitment order against P.C. without specifying a standard of dangerousness. The court of appeals shrugged. It did not matter because the circuit court’s findings “were specific, tracked the statutory criteria, and are supported by the record.” Opinion, ¶10 n.2.
In a “close case,” COA affirms recommitment under 4th standard of dangerousness
Waupaca County v. H.I.B., 2021AP2026, 4/7/22, District 4 (1-judge opinion ineligible for publication); case activity
It is uncontested that “Hazel” has done well for three commitments in a row. Yet the court of appeals has affirmed her 4th Chapter 51 recommitment because the jury could have inferred a “substantial probability” of death or serious injury from evidence that was “only suggestive” and that “lacked details such as dates and clear descriptions of conduct.”
The redefinition of “egregious” in TPR cases continues
Dane County DHS v. A.D., 2022AP76 & 2022AP77, District 4, 3/31/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
Another case showing that in TPR proceedings, “egregious” conduct is coming to mean “missing one hearing.”
COA botches pro se appeal concerning the waiver of transcript fees for the poor
City of Rhinelander v. Zachary Tyler LaFave-LaCrosse, 2020AP1466-1467, 4/5/22, District 3 (1-judge appeal, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This case needs a motion for reconsideration. LaFave-LaCrosse, an unemployed student, appealed convictions for OWI 1st and refusal to take a breath test and moved the circuit court for waiver of transcript fees due to his indigency. The circuit court denied his motion, so he appealed that decision. The court of appeals held that the circuit court made an error of law. But then the court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard to affirm.
Order requiring juvenile to register as sex offender affirmed
State v. E.L.C., 2021AP1624, 4/5/22, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
In 2016, 13-year-old E.L.C. pled to 4th-degree sexual assault of his 7-year-old sister. The juvenile court deferred the issue of sex offender reporting until E.L.C. had a chance to participate in counseling. Five years later, it ordered him to register as a sex offender based on his conduct during supervision and his failure to fully engage with treatment. The court of appeals affirmed.