On Point blog, page 66 of 490

CoA finds sufficient evidence for initial commitment under 3rd standard

Marathon County v. J.A.E., 2021AP898, 12/7/21, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

For an initial commitment under §51.20(1)(a)2.c., the circuit court must find clear and convincing evidence that a mentally ill person’s judgment is impaired such that there  is “a substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to himself or others.” The court of appeals held that James’s hallucinations during his examinations, his refusal of medication, and his use of methamphetamine satisfied this standard.

Read full article >

Knowing possession of trace heroin imputed from track marks and paraphernalia

State v. Nakyta V.T. Chentis, 2022 WI App 4; case activity (including briefs)

To convict someone of possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove both that he was in possession of the substance and that he knew or believed he was in possession of it. State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 159, 211 N.W.2d 801 (1973). See also Wis JI-Criminal 6000. In a published opinion, the court of appeals holds Chentis knew he possessed a trace amount of heroin–undetectable until the State Crime Lab applied a special chemical to paraphernalia–based on fresh track marks on his arm.

Read full article >

Defense win! COA finds evidence insufficient for recommitment

Portage County v. C.K.S., 2021AP1291-FT, 11/24/21, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court recommitted C.K.S. but apparently neglected to specify the applicable standard(s) of dangerousness. C.K.S. appealed arguing that the court violated D.J.W. and that the county’s evidence of dangerousness was insufficient. The court of appeals declined to address the D.J.W. error. Instead, it reviewed the county’s evidence of dangerousness and held it insufficient under the only standards that could apply: the 1st, 3rd, and 4th standards.

Read full article >

COA asks SCOW to decide whether things that happen simultaneously happen on two “separate occasions”

State v. Corey Rector, 2020AP1213, certification filed 11/24/21; granted 2/16/22; affirmed 5/23/23; District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the certification):

Whether the plain meaning of “separate occasions” in the sex-offender-registration statute means that the two convictions must have occurred at different times in two separate proceedings so that the qualifying convictions occurred sometime before a defendant is convicted in the current case. Stated otherwise, can the qualifying convictions occur simultaneously, as they did in this case, and as Wittrock and Hopkins held?

Read full article >

COA: circuit court erred in imposing jail contempt sanction for refusing to give phone passcode

State v. Lamondo D. Turrubiates, 2020AP233, 11/23/21, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police arrested Turrubiates and the state charged him with several counts having to do with an alleged assault on his girlfriend. During the arrest police took his phone. The state came to believe the phone might contain evidence of crimes by Turrubiates, and it moved the circuit court to compel him to provide his passcode, despite the fact that it had not yet obtained a warrant to search the phone. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014). The court ordered Turrbiates to provide the passcode and he refused; it then found him in contempt of court and ordered him jailed until he reveals the code (though it stayed this sanction pending appeal).

Read full article >

Court of appeals excuses state’s failure to file any brief; upholds denial of expunction

State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)

Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.

Read full article >

November 2021 publication list

The court of appeals has ordered the publication of the following criminal law related opinion:

State v. Randy L. Bolstad, 2021 WI App 81 (defendant entitled to resentencing because sentencing court failed to consider the gravity of the offense)

Read full article >

Summary judgment on TPR grounds reversed

Marathon County DHS v. S.K., 2021AP1124 & 2021AP1125, District 3, 11/18/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court granted partial summary judgment on the petitions to terminate the parental rights of S.K. (“Sarah”) for failure to assume parental responsibility of her two daughters. The court of appeals reverses, holding there are genuine issues of material fact that require a trial on the grounds for the petitions.

Read full article >

Evidence at recommitment hearing was insufficient to establish dangerousness; appeal of transfer to inpatient treatment is moot

Trempealeau County DSS v. T.M.M., 2021AP100 & Trempealeau County DSS v. T.M.M., 2021AP139, District 3, 11/12/21 (one-judge opinions; both ineligible for publication); case activity: 2021AP100 & 2021AP139

The court of appeals agrees with T.M.M. (“Tiffany”) that the evidence presented at her recommitment hearing was insufficient to prove she was dangerous under one of the standards listed in § 51.20(1)(a)2. The court also rejects as moot her appeal of an order transferring her under § 51.35(1)(e) to a more restrictive placement while she was still under the original commitment order.

Read full article >

COA affirms TPR based on best interests of the child

State v. M.P.H.-R., 2021AP1628, 11/23/21, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

M.P.H.-R gave birth to A.S.H. in 2011 when she was just 14 years old. Since then both mother and daughter have suffered mental health problems. They lived together briefly twice over the intervening 10 years. Otherwise, for 7 years A.S.H. has lived with a foster family.  The trial court terminated M.P.H.-R.’s parental rights based on §48.426(3)‘s “best interests of the child” factors. The court of appeals affirmed.

Read full article >