On Point: 46. WI Court of Appeals

City of Cedarburg v. Katherine D. Young, 2020AP1848, District 2, 3/17/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Young was prosecuted for an OWI 1st offense that did not arise out of a traffic stop or involve police collecting blood or breath samples or even testifying at trial. Can that be done? Sure, it can. And the evidence that was presented at trial was sufficient to convict her, too.

State v. Kenyon D. Grant, 2020AP785, 3/9/21, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) held that trial counsel cannot concede guilt over his client’s express objection. This would deny the client his 6th Amendment right to determine the objective of his defense and require an automatic new trial. Grant raised a McCoy claim in this case. It failed because trial counsel testified that Grant did not oppose his concession strategy and objected only after hearing the State’s evidence against him.

Jefferson County v. S.M.S., 2020AP814, 3/11/21, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

It is blackletter law that the probable cause hearing for a Chapter 51 commitment must be held within a statutorily-prescribed time from the subject individual’s detention or the circuit court must dismiss the proceeding for lack of competency to adjudicate it. See §51.20(7)(a) and Dodge Cnty. v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, ¶5, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592. In this case, the court of appeals held that the Ryan E.M. rule did not apply because the individual’s conduct (he was pro se) made it necessary for the circuit court to adjourn the probable cause hearing beyond the 72-hour period expired.

State v. Donald P. Coughlin, 2019AP1876-CR, District 4, 3/4/21 (not recommended for publication), state’s petition for review granted 9/14/21; case activity (including briefs)

In 2010 Coughlin was charged with over 20 counts of having sexual contact with three different children during various periods between 1989 and 1994. The court of appeals holds the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the counts involving  two of the children.

State v. Greg Douglas Griswold, 2020AP1598, District 4, 3/4/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Griswold was convicted of violating § 26.12(5)(b) by starting a fire in an “extensive forest protection area” without a permit. The statute excepts fires started for warmth, and Griswold claimed that’s what he was doing. When evidence supports more than one reasonable inference, the reviewing court accepts the inference drawn by the trier of fact, see, e.g., State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990), and under that standard the trial court reasonably rejected Griswold’s defense.

State v. Patrick A. Keller, 2021 WI App 22; case activity (including briefs)

Keller was convicted of causing mental harm, as a party to a crime, to his stepdaughter, who has autism. During his trial, the circuit court admitted statements made by non-testifying confidential reporters to Child Protective Services access workers. In a published decision, the court of appeals holds that these statements were not made for the primary purpose of gathering evidence to prosecute Keller, so the Confrontation Clause does not apply.

State v. Joseph G. Green, 2021 WI App 18; case activity (including briefs)

SCOW recently declared parts of §971.14 unconstitutional. See State v. Fitzgerald,  2019 WI 69, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165 and our post here. The statute allowed the government to administer unwanted antipsychotic medication to a defendant to render him competent for trial in violation of  Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003). Here in Green’s case the court of appeals describes the evidence the State must present, and the findings the circuit court must make, before ordering involuntary medication. It also clarifies the procedures involved in appealing an involuntary medication order.

County of Green Lake v. Lori Melchert, 2020AP473, District 2, 2/24/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Melchert’s challenge to a prior OWI that was improperly treated as a first offense comes way too late under City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, and City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463.

S.K. v. S.S., 2020AP277, District 3, 2/26/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (briefs not made available)

S.S. (or “Susan,” to use the court’s pseudonym) isn’t entitled to a new TPR grounds trial based on her trial attorney’s failure to object to the admission of testimony she argues was irrelevant “other-acts” evidence. Even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to object (and the court doesn’t necessarily agree that’s the case (¶16 n.4),

State v. Timothy D. Wright, 2020AP1578, 2/25/2021, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wright worked at Christmas Mountain. Over the course of a couple of months he allegedly directed several racist and threatening rants at colleagues, including threats to kill some of them. A supervisor eventually called the police, and Wright was fired and charged with four counts of disorderly conduct. He eventually pleaded to two with the other two read in. The circuit court ordered Wright to pay $14,755 in restitution to the corporation that owns Christmas Mountain at $100 per month. Wright argues this was improper for three reasons: because the corporation was not statutorily a “victim” of his conduct; because the claimed damages–the cost to hire armed guards after he was fired–were not “special damages … which could be recovered in a civil action”; and because the circuit court failed to consider his inability to pay.